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Abstract
This project elaborates a concept of “species panic,” a severe and often violently-charged
reaction to the notion that one’s privileged species status as a human being is under
threat. In this project’s post-1900 American literary archive, species panic is often
provoked by nonhuman eros, which provokes and threatens the fantasy of human
exceptionalism. Theoretically, this project yokes animal studies and posthumanism
(Donna Haraway, Dominic Pettman, Kathy Rudy) with queer theory and critical race
studies (Mel Y. Chen, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, Alexander Weheliye) as its central
driving forces. This theoretical backdrop informs my reading of American authors Jack
London, Ernest Hemingway, Philip K. Dick, Toni Morrison, Linda Hogan, and Joy
Harjo. Species Panic is divided into five chapters, each of which organizes around a
particular species of nonhuman animal: dogs, bulls, androids, cows, and horses. While
this project’s first three chapters deal with the yoked constructions of masculinity and
(straight white male) humanity, the fourth and fifth chapter dramatize the unique and
different experiences of female authors depicting human-animal erotic relations. What I
add to the analysis of animal studies thinkers such as Donna Haraway is a sustained
focus on interspecies erotics as a cultural driving force, manifested in the panicked
literary case studies I explore.
Cumulatively, the texts I analyze show an American literature still threatened by
Darwin’s radical intervention in the history of science. In its conclusions, Species Panic
reveals a threatened human clinging to the husk of species exceptionalism as the closet
of animality looms loudly in the backdrop. What my research reveals is that interspecies
eros is a central and under-analyzed component of thinking around nonhuman animals. I

i

do not, however, suggest that rejuvenated attention to interspecies and nonhuman eros
will rehabilitate human-nonhuman relations. Instead, I simply suggest that interspecies
eros—in all its prickly complexity—must become a central factor in how we think about
nonhuman animals. The erotic, this study insists, is a central component of how we
interact with, conceive, and construct nonhuman life. But that eros is not an intrinsic
source of redemption; interspecies erotics remains complex, multifaceted, and mired in
panic.

Keywords: American literature; Animal studies; posthumanism; ecocriticism; queer
theory; the novel; poetics; Jack London; Ernest Hemingway; Philip K. Dick; Toni
Morrison; Linda Hogan; Joy Harjo.
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Introduction: Species of Panic

Nonhuman eros is a cross-cultural imaginative force that is central to human psychic and
sexual self-understanding. At least as far back as the cave paintings in Chauvet, France
(31,000 BP),1 animals have throbbed hotly through the human imaginary.2 Interspecies
eroticism has also been a longstanding driver of human literary and symbolic poesis. If,
as John Berger claims, “the first metaphor was animal” (253), that first animal metaphor
was surely encoded with eros. Sex and desire have long been species-transgressive
urges, siren songs beckoning from the far side of the human. Just as love, in Dominic
Pettman’s words, “makes us both more and less than human” (Creaturely Love xi), so
too have sex and desire long been species-transgressive.
In addition to serving as actual sex and relationship partners (bestiality and
zoophilia will be discussed in detail shortly), animals have historically provided a way
for many cultures to understand human sexuality. Ancient Greek myth is rife with sexy
sirens and centaurs and lecherous fauns, riddled with swans and Ledas, bulls and
Europas. The menagerie of Greek myth already tells us that nonhuman eros is both
violent and enticing, fearful and compelling. But this is not a uniquely Western
phenomenon. According to Hani Miletski, interspecies erotics is important to Hindu
tradition and “portrayals of human-animal sexual contacts frequently appear in temple
sculptures all over India” (Understanding 10). Likewise, “Tantrism often portrays man

1

In their 1996 book Dawn of Art: The Chauvet Cave, Jean-Marie Chauvet, Eliette Brunel Deschamps, and
Christian Hillaire explain that “statistical estimates” based on radiocarbon dating of the Chauvet paintings
identify a “timespan of 1300 years, centered on 31,000 years ago” (122). Almost twice as old as the
famous Lascaux caves, this discovery was enormously surprising when it was made in 1993.
2
In this study I generally use the term “animal” as a shorthand for “nonhuman animal.” I tend to use the
clunkier “nonhuman animal” only when it is necessary for highly technical distinctions.
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as a rabbit, bull, or horse, and the woman as a doe, or mare, or female elephant”
(Miletski, Understanding 10). The Ancient Chinese story of the silkworm horse
describes a girl who marries a stallion before turning into a silkworm after her father
skins the horse (Birrell 199). A cautionary tale, this story simultaneously indulges the
fantasy of and prohibits the act of interspecies coupling—this doubleness turns out to be
endemic to the species panic genre. The Indigenous traditions of Turtle Island are also
rife with interspecies eros. Take, for example, the Tlingit story of “The Woman Who
Married the Bear” or the Skidi Pawnee story of a man who marries and reproduces with
a “deer-maiden” (Snyder 171; Dorsey 280).3 One need not dig too deep through the
weeds of contemporary popular culture to locate the pulse and throb of nonhuman eros:
think King Kong, Grizzly Man, Twilight, The Little Mermaid. Still not satisfied? If you
dare, behold the thousands and thousands of examples at your fingertips in the great
collective sexual unconscious of websites like Pornhub and Xvideos. There you’ll find
vast menageries of toon porn, tentacle porn, monster porn, creature porn, robot porn—
enough interspecies erotics to fuel millennia of panic. Start looking across human culture
for examples of interspecies eros and you’ll find it everywhere.
Human ideas of love and sex have long been negotiated through encounters with,
and fantasies about, the nonhuman. But the suggestion of nonhuman sexuality tends to
make people uncomfortable. Midas Dekkers phrases this tension as an iteration of what
Gary Francione calls the general “moral schizophrenia” of human relations to animals
(68): “The high regard in which love for animals is held is matched only by the

3

Acknowledging that this overview is problematic—particularly in its deployment of extra-traditional
historians and anthropologists such as Snyder and Dorsey—I mobilize such research here only to provide
some schematic evidence for my central point about the cross-cultural ubiquity of interspecies eros.
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fierceness of the taboo of having sex with them” (Dekker 1).4 While it is useful as a limit
condition of panic, zoophilia is only one node on the broader spectrum of interspecies
erotics I examine throughout this study. Dekker’s succinct paradox opens the broad
chasm between animal lovers and animal lovers. Much as we might openly love animals
in the sense of affection, the shadow of animal sexuality remains a closeted and panicprovoking underside of that love. Interspecies erotics, broadly defined as a spectrum of
intimacy from coitus to care, is a howling repression at the heart of modern American
culture, and this dissertation seeks to unpack some of the phobias that have buried
animal sexuality in the darkest closets of the literary psyche.
The primary term of this study, “species panic,” describes the common literary
trope of a severe and often violently charged reaction to the notion that one’s privileged
species status as a human being is under threat. If you’ve ever tried to explain why
you’re vegetarian to a table of anxious carnivores, you’ve probably witnessed their
species panic. If you’ve accused someone of treating you like an animal, you know
species panic. If you’ve laughed uncomfortably at what a farmer might do with his
chicken or his sheep, you’ve known species panic. If you’ve let a dog lick your face and
blushed or trembled at the suggestion behind a vigorous crotch-sniff, you’ve known
species panic. If you shift in your chair when I tell you that as of 2016 bestiality is legal
in Canada as long as it’s non-penetrative or that as of 2018 zoophilia porn is legal in
every American state except Oregon (Garcia np; Wisch np), you’ve known species

4

Dekker is far from the only person to have noted this paradox around the bestiality taboo. Kathy Rudy
explores this tension in her article “LGBTQ…Z?”, and in his book Human Error Dominic Pettman notes
that “the prevalence of human-animal ‘husbandry’ in Greek myths, Indian sculptures, Japanese woodcuts,
surrealist literature, or the fantasies of American housewives has not made bestiality any less of a universal
taboo” (79).
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panic. Recently, species panic has rocked American public discourse most memorably
through sites such as zoonotic diseases like HIV-AIDS, Ebola, and SARS (Shukin 205),
and the question of gay marriage. In large part, Species Panic will tell you what you
already know: that animal eros is all around us, that we live alongside animal sex, and
that we would prefer nonhuman sexuality to remain unmentioned.
In his foundational text The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida offers
a case study of species panic through the oral/literary form of the anecdote. Meditating
on what it might mean for a human and a cat to confront each other’s nakedness, Derrida
describes a latently erotic and overtly panicked encounter; a man stands naked in front of
a cat, wondering about his potential “perversity” and feeling “a shame that is ashamed of
itself” (7, 9). The coupling of bare animal bodies in an enclosed space and a profound
resultant shame suggests that Derrida’s discomfort arises from the possibility of a
transgression of the bestiality taboo.5 Although Derrida’s thinking attempts to traverse
the apparently unbridgeable gap between feline and human perceptual experience, he
confronts the “abyssal limit of the human” at the suggestion of interspecies desire (12).
Derrida’s “malaise” (4), then, insofar as it emerges from the anxious interface between
sexual and species identification, offers a clear diagnosis of species panic.
The central argument of this study is that erotics broadly defined—a spectrum
including pleasure, affection, sexuality, intimacy, desire, romance, love, care, empathy,
and friendship among other affective and physical manifestations—characterizes
relationships with nonhuman animals in American literature after 1900, and that these
erotic interspecies bonds tend to be saturated by panic. Examining American literature

5

For an insightful analysis and critique of the bestiality taboo from the perspective of queer theory, see
Kathy Rudy’s article “LGBTQ…Z?”
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that emerges in the context of the post-Darwinian shift in the United States’ cultural
understanding of species existence, I show how American fiction and poetry throughout
the twentieth century and beyond dramatizes a panicked and fascinated response to the
new, malleable concept of species being. When human exceptionalism under siege,
literature bucks, squirms, and bolts through the stages of species panic.
One of the primary functions of species panic—and how it became an interest for
me as a literary phenomenon—is its ubiquity as a narrative trope, particularly in
twentieth-century American literature. H.P. Lovecraft’s evolutionist horror story “Arthur
Jermyn,” first published in 1921, offers a prototypical literary exemplar of species panic.
After learning that he is descended from a race of “strange hybrid creatures” who live in
the depth of the Congolese jungle (50), the story’s eponymous protagonist kills himself
via self-immolation (47). Lovecraft’s “exaltation of supreme horror” derives from Arthur
Jermyn’s recognition of his relation to a “mummified white ape of some unknown
species, less hairy than any recorded variety, and infinitely nearer mankind” (55).
Species panic, here, emerges not from the sexual threat of radical animal alterity but
from the proximity of animality signalled by an evolutionary fringe figure. This “stuffed
goddess” is also crucially female (55), and the story’s suggestion is that Jermyn’s greatgrandfather reproduced with her, making Jermyn’s abject horror into a kind of transgenerational sexual regret. Part of the racial/species horror of the story is, of course,
sexual and reproductive: the fearful primal scene of human-animal copulation that links
human and apes through a common ancestor. During the Darwinian hangover of the
early twentieth century, many writers, including Lovecraft, articulated a panicked and
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horrified, while curious and amazed, negotiation with the “beast within.”6 In the study to
follow, Jack London’s The Call of the Wild offers the clearest parallel to Lovecraft in his
reckonings with an ancient humanoid primate who appears hauntingly and thrillingly in
the psyche of London’s canine protagonist, Buck. Lovecraft’s tale as a whole grapples
with Darwin’s fearful revelation that animals are much more closely related to humans
than we’d previously thought, exacerbating that anxiety through the suggestion that the
bridge between humans and animals is sexual and erotic. Lovecraft’s tale demonstrates
an exemplary case of the species panic pattern: species-transgressive desire leading to
sex causing monstrous procreation that eventually leads to horror at the latent animality
of the human, culminating in violent self-destruction.
What I will not do in this dissertation, though it would be entirely possible,7 is
offer a litany of literary cases that follow this basic pattern. Instead, this study will show
how various formations of interspecies erotics—from Jack London’s jubilant but racially
problematic dog love to the question of android erotic agency in Philip K. Dick and the
fraught erotics of dairy in Toni Morrison’s Beloved—provoke unique and nuanced
iterations of species panic. The diverse case studies I explore also demonstrate moments
when interspecies eros is not horrific or violent. Friendship, companionship, loyalty,
affinity, mutual respect—these are just a few of the more nonthreatening facets of
interspecies love explored in this study. Chapter 5, in particular, offers a quieter vision of

The “beast within” is the common English translation of the title of Emile Zola’s 1890 naturalist novel La
bête humaine. In America, writers who explored this theme between 1890 and 1950 include Frank Norris
(McTeague), Jack London (The Seawolf), Edgar Rice Burroughs (Tarzan), as well as Lovecraft. For a
more detailed account of the “discourse of the jungle” in this era (Lundblad 1), see Michael Lundblad’s
2013 book The Birth of a Jungle (Oxford University Press).
7
Such a study of the rote iterations of species panic could perhaps work through Mary Rowlandson’s
Narrative of the Captivity and Restoration of Mary Rowlandson, Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Black Cat,”
Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, Flannery O’Connor’s Wise Blood, and Dennis Johnson’s 2011 novella
Train Dreams.
6
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interspecies compassion and care, particularly in the poetry of Chickasaw writer Linda
Hogan. Though panic is the general focus of this study, there is genuine and edifying
compassion and care in species-transgressive erotic relations, and panic can be softer,
gentler, and more complex than the extreme instance Lovecraft offers. Species panic,
moreover, does not need to emerge from explicit trans-species sex. One of the assets of
literature is its affinity with the suggested, the unsaid; part of the power of the species
panic complex emerges from the shadows and closets. Animals, as literary generators,
often denote an urgent, visceral, and crucially embodied symbolic presence—a
metaphorical presence so powerful, as in Hemingway’s bulls, that the unspoken eros
bleeds and drips off the page.
By now it should be clear what this study assumes: that there is no such thing as
an autonomous species, therefore no such thing as a coherent humanness. Following
Anat Pick, I do “not set out to show what is after all by now accepted wisdom, that the
distinctions between humans and animals are conceptually and materially indecisive”
(1). Rather than arguing that “man descended from animals and remains still animal”
(Grosz, Becoming Undone 13), I take this premise as a starting point.8 Humanity is a
status claimed by those with the power and privilege to claim it. This study derives its
theoretical foundations from Charles Darwin’s claim, in On The Origin of Species by
Means of Natural Selection (1859), that “species are not immutable” (98). Like Darwin,

8

In his 2008 book Zoographies, Mathew Calarco still feels the need to “defend” the claim that “the
human-animal distinction can no longer and ought no longer to be maintained” (3). By 2011, when Anat
Pick publishes Creaturely Poetics, such a claim seems to be self-evident, at least within animal studies.
Pick asserts as “accepted wisdom” the fact that “the distinctions between humans and animals are
conceptually and materially indecisive” (1).
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who marvelled in mutation and was far more interested in fringes than cores,9 I tend to
look at the slippery membranes and interstices of species being. An equally germane
fertilizer for the soil of my own thinking is Donna Haraway’s more recent formulation,
riffing on Bruno Latour: “we have never been human” (When Species Meet 165). What I
add to the flourish of theory and scholarship inspired by Darwin and Haraway is a
protracted focus on eros. I maintain that species definition is erotically negotiated, and
that our relations to nonhuman animals, particularly companion animals, are permeated
by eros.
My turn to nonhuman eros as a generative site for thinking is not entirely new.
Writers like Donna Haraway (When Species Meet), Marjorie Garber (Dog Love), Kathy
Rudy (Loving Animals), Michael Lundblad (The Birth of a Jungle), and Dominic
Pettman (Creaturely Love), have already done excellent work towards liberating human
sexuality from the dominion of homospecies norms. Riding on the wings and haunches
of these excellent thinkers, I aim to show 1) that interspecies eros has been much more
present in the biozoopolitics of human/nonhuman society and sexuality than is usually
thought, and 2) that this already-widespread system of interspecies eros need not be
radical or liberating. Like any formation of eros, interspecies erotics is by turns complex
and problematic, beautiful and energizing, prickly and panicked, banal and sublime.

As Timothy Morton notes, the reader can “detect Darwin’s amazement” as he describes the deep-time
intersecting and overlapping of all forms of life (28), what Morton characterizes as “[t]he mesh” (30).
Morton, here, is referring specifically to Darwin’s bombastic explanation of the “truly wonderful fact” that
“all animals and all plants throughout all time and all space should be related to each other” (Darwin,
Origins 176).
9

9
Lexical Specimens
The term “species” is a slippery fish. Deriving from the Latin “specere”, meaning “to
look” and “to behold” (Haraway, When Species Meet 17), the word’s most familiar
meaning is “[a] class composed of individuals having some common qualities or
characteristics, frequently as a subdivision of a larger class or genus” (“species,” def 8).
First and foremost, species is the basic unit or rank of biological taxonomy. As John S.
Wilkins explains in his 2009 book Species: The History of the Idea,10 the concept began,
in Aristotle’s History of Animals, as a unit of “universal taxonomy” before developing “a
uniquely biological flavor around the seventeenth century” (9).11 Riding the coattails of
zoologists like Comte de Buffon and Carl Linnaeus, Charles Darwin shaped the modern
concept of speciation in his ground-breaking 1859 study On the Origins of Species by
Means of Natural Selection. Although Wilkins asserts that “Darwin and his followers”
(5), surprisingly enough, “did not add much to the species debate” (5), he affirms that
Darwin’s main contribution was to “raise in sharp relief problems brought about by the
notion of speciation and the subsequent mutability of classifications” (5). The first
modern species panic came in the virulent response of creationists to Darwin’s work, on
which subject Thomas Henry Huxley wryly noted that “if a general council of the church
scientific had been held” in 1860 (624), Darwin “would have been condemned by an
overwhelming majority” (624). Darwin himself struggled to define precisely what he
meant by the term “species,” eventually conceding that while no definition “has as yet

Wilkins’ book provides a dense and rigid overview of the history of the concept “species” from Aristotle
to the present.
11
In his 2014 book The Lagoon: How Aristotle Invented Science, Armand Marie Leroi notes that “many of
Aristotle’s kinds can be convincingly identified with modern species, among them: dogs in toto, horses,
two cicadas, four woodpeckers, six sea urchins and humans” (104).
10
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satisfied all naturalists” nonetheless “every naturalist knows vaguely what he means
when he speaks of a species” (Origin 122). Intrinsically slippery, the term “species” is a
placeholder, a murky lexical terrain, its own entangled bank.
Practically speaking, Darwin does deploy a coherent understanding of the term
“species,” and that definition has everything to do with sex. What defines members of
one species is “aversion to interbreeding” while what creates species difference is
“mutual sterility” (Wilkins 158; Darwin, Variation 172). Darwin’s shifting
understanding of species culminated towards the end of his life in a “‘snowflake’ theory
of species” according to which “all members are alike in some ways, but they are also
unique individuals” (Wilkins 158). However, “there is a difference between denying that
the rank of species has a definition and denying that the term species has one. Darwin
denies the former, but not the latter” (Wilkins 158). Darwin was what Wilkins calls a
“species realist” (158); though he denied the “absolute rank of Linnaean classification”
in theory, he nonetheless “used it in practise” (Wilkins 158). Contemporary scientists
still have trouble defining the term “species,” and most prefer “speciation” (Howard and
Berlocher v), a late-Darwinian term that emphasizes the plastic and procedural nature of
biological interaction as commonly understood according to the widely accepted Modern
Synthesis theory.12 Like Darwin, I regard the term “species” as a messy approximation.
Species Panic takes for granted, and depends on, the fluidity of species being. So I
proceed from an innate terminoligcal tension: while this study will maintain an
intentionally slippery notion of the term “species,” this term’s primary meaning will be

The term “Modern Synthesis” was coined and disseminated by Ernst Mayr in his 1963 work Animal
Species and Evolution. Modern Synthesis theory links evolutionary theory with genomics and the study of
DNA, integrating the work of “specialized disciplines” such as “natural history, systematics, paleontology,
ecology, and other areas” (Carroll 54-55).
12
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understood as the basic unit of biological taxonomization, as impermanent and multifaceted “kinds.”
My sense of “species” as an intrinsically self-transgressive and entangled field of
embodiment hums and thrums with queerness and eros. It is far from incidental that
Foucauldian “bio-power” emerges when humanity or “Western man was gradually
learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world” (Foucault 143, 142),
evolving in terms of self-conceptualization from an Aristotelean political animal to “an
animal whose politics places his existence as a living being into question” (Foucault
143). The question of speciation is an under-remarked aspect of Foucault’s famous
declaration that as of 1870—11 years after the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of
Species—“the homosexual was now a species” (43). It is no coincidence that among
Foucault’s more “minor perverts” he names “Krafft-Ebing’s zoophiles” (43). Alongside
Foucault’s homosexuals, zoophilia emerges from the shadows of speciation.
But—though I do explore the subject—Species Panic is not a project about
zoophilia. Rather, my sense of interspecies erotics hinges on a broad understanding of
the terms “eros” and “erotics,” drawing on the Ancient Greek sense of eros as “love”
(“Eros,” n., def 1). Far from limited to genital acts, “eros” here reflects a semantic
continuum including intimacies, desires, loves, and sex of all types. The erotic, as I use
this term, is a force of connection and desire through which we strive to enter, empathize
with, and affectively inhabit others, both in sex and the libidinal complex that surrounds
and enfolds the sex-love continuum.
A foundational theoretical premise of this project is that interspecies erotics is on
some level queer, that is non-normative. Using the sense of “across” that underpins Eve
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Sedgwick’s sense of the word “queer” (Tendencies xii) and the prefix “trans-” (Hayward
258) as a motif, this study undertakes a series of theoretical crossings, reading across and
between animals, humans, species, fictions, poetics, methodologies, bodies, organisms,
sexualities, and machines. I use the word “queer,” then, in these two primary senses: 1)
to refer to humans and animals who practise, embody, or self-identify through nonnormative sexualities, and 2) as a crosswise pulse running through texts and objects,
artifacts and people, that renders things peculiar.13
One of the reasons interspecies erotics are definitively queer is that the obverse
side of the bestiality taboo is an often unspoken regulatory ideal that human sexuality
should be enforced through a norm I call “homospecies sexuality.” Within the species,
heterosexuality is enforced as a rigid norm that insists on sleeping with someone with
different genitals. Hence what is deemed by Freud and others to be pathological about
homosexuality—the sexual desire for the same (Freud, Three Essays 2)14—is a
normative requirement at the level of species sexuality, which militates against the desire
to sleep with what is different. With its obvious sonic resonance of “homo,” the term
“homospecies sexuality” also demonstrates the shiftiness and fragility of sexual norms
and codes. Although Western and other cultures enforce heterosexual sex within the

These senses, the political and the theoretical, both owe much to Mel Y. Chen’s rigorous genealogy of
the word “queer” in Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (2012). In this book, Chen
offers a robust historicization of the term “queer,” thinking deep and critically about its “masterly
slipperiness, its aporetic quandaries” (59). Ultimately, Chen asks “what might remain of today’s queer’s
enduring potencies” (59), a question this project gathers and carries as it travels through the variously
potent and impotent queer aesthetics of interspecies erotics through, alongside, and against dominant
discourses of species normativity.
14
While Freud notes that the sexual objects of what he calls “absolute inverts” are “exclusively of their
own sex” (Three Essays 2), he later hypothesizes that “the sexual object is not someone of the same sex
but someone who combines the characters of both sexes” (Three Essays 10). Throughout his discussion of
“inversion” in the first of the Three Essays, Freud repeatedly affirms that homosexuality can play out
through various, complex psychological figurations. Inversion remains, though, a pathological condition
rooted in some aberration from the development of a “normal” heterosexual comportment.
13

13
species, they simultaneously enforce homospecies sex and in so doing covertly define
the human as, at least partly, a sexually-constituted subject.
Though this is the socio-political backdrop into which it enters, Species Panic is
not a sexological study but a literary one, dealing not with actual sex but with the
fantasies, analogues, diversions, and suggestions of literary psycho-sexual exploration.
In narrative and poetry, this vision of the sexual subject gets defined with and against
nonhuman eros. In the literary archive I analyze, the grapplings of eros sometimes take
place through direct literary representations of zoophilia. More often—partly because
species panic is an outgrowth of the suggested, the closet, the unsaid—animal eros forms
and informs human sexual self-understanding through its role as accoutrement and
dressage in the realm of literary fantasy. One of the notable traits of literary animal eros
is that it is an enormously suggestive force; the less directly nonhuman sexuality is
actually spoken in literature, the more prominent and forceful that eros becomes as a
literary device.
My final point about interspecies erotics is that simply reaching out to animals in
the Frankensteinian animation of writing is often an act of love. Though nonhumanoriented writing wanders a plurality of possible affective-generic paths from panic to
mourning to curiosity, we often begin to write about animals because we love them. Of
course human love of nonhuman animals includes many of the complexities of humanhuman eros as well as many unique aspects and matrices. The erotic impetus to write the
animal need not be an edifying form of love—it can be fraught, anxious, confused,
jealous, and any of the other less charismatic facets of eros. Nonetheless, one of the
reasons why animal studies and queer theory have made steady bedfellows is that there is

14
also an eros driving animal studies and animal-friendly thinking more generally. In The
Descent of Man, Charles Darwin writes that “disinterested love for all living creatures” is
“the most noble attribute of man” (151), and since Darwin the disciplines of ethology,
biology, naturalism, and more recently animal studies in the humanities have been driven
by intimacy and eros.15 Darwin defined the human as a creature-loving animal. Isn’t it
pretty to think so?

The Flesh-Out: Forms of Panic
“I tried to imagine frog-love, its possible pleasures, its oozy raptures, but I turned
my mind violently away, for in the imagining I felt something petty and cruel,
something in the nature of violation.”
—Stephen Millhauser, “A Visit” 39

In The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (2016), novelist
Amitav Ghosh wonders how the nonhuman and the human ever came to be thought of as
separate: “the real mystery in relation to the agency of nonhumans lies not in the

Jane Goodall writes that “there have been Gombe chimpanzees whom I have most truly loved” and that
she has “deeply loved several dogs” (439, 438). John Berger describes Comte de Buffon’s shift from
Cartesian dualism to modern zoology as “tenderness” (255). Edward O. Wilson speaks of the naturalist as
a “romantic voyager” and defines the biologist’s vocation as grounded in “biophilia” (13, 1). Timothy
Morton bases his framework for “the ecological thought” on an imperative towards “intimacy” with “the
strange stranger [nonhuman beings]” (135), concluding that the ecological thought is “like true love”
(135). Helen Macdonald opens her bestselling 2014 falconeering memoir, H is for Hawk, by discussing “a
landscape [she’s] come to love very much indeed” (3). Examples proliferate, as do fascinating overlaps
between the genres of naturalism and the literary romance plot, such as Alyssa York’s The Naturalist
(Random House 2016) and Andrea Barrett’s story “Wonders of the Shore,” anthologized in Best American
Stories 2016.
15
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renewed recognition of it, but rather in how this awareness came to be supressed in the
first place (65). Ghosh proceeds to argue that “Literary forms have clearly played an
important, perhaps critical, part in the process” (65). For Ghosh, the development of the
human-nonhuman schism—one symptom of a larger scientific tendency towards the
“partitioning” of nature from culture (71)—has roots in the tradition of the bourgeoisrealist novel, a form whose mimetic impulse reflected the gradualism (vs. catastrophism)
toted by the architects of capitalist imperialism.16 The realistic novel, its focus turned
inward to reflect the human moral struggle, emerged in tandem with geology,
probability, and other modern sciences and worked alongside the technoscientific
worldview to create the metahistorical fiction of a human experience lived apart from
nonhuman, inert nature.17 The novel, in other words, has been paramount to the creation
of a worldview that sees the human as an exemplary creature—a worldview that has also
brought human civilization into peril through the accelerated processes of anthropogenic
climate change.18 One of the things Species Panic demonstrates, though, is that even as
the novel was, throughout the twentieth century, busily building a façade of human
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While I am generally on the same page as Ghosh, his book has a tendency to sensationalize and
oversimplify. Take, for example, his well-intentioned but overstated claim that all fiction involving
nonhuman life is ghettoized as science fiction or climate fiction: “Inasmuch as the nonhuman was written
about at all, it was not within the mansion of serious fiction but rather in the outhouses to which science
fiction and fantasy” (66). Such a claim suggests a willful ignorance regarding an American canon (Ghosh
elsewhere references Moby-Dick) that is a veritable parade of fauna, from Poe’s cats and Raven’s to
Hemingway’s bulls and marlins to Melville’s iconic literary whale. I would argue, actually, that a
profusion of nonhuman life is one of the presences that links almost all the most famous works of
American literature.
17
Ghosh summarizes this fascinating history on pages 16-22 of The Great Derangement, writing, for
instance, that this correlation “is why Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle, Stephen Jay Gould’s brilliant study of
the geological theories of gradualism and catastrophism, is, in essence, a study of narrative” (19).
18
Ghosh’s point, here, is forceful and troubling: “I have come to recognize that the challenges that climate
change poses for the contemporary writer, although specific in some respects, are also broader and older;
that they derive ultimately from the grid of literary forms and conventions that came to shape the narrative
imagination in precisely that period when the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere was rewriting the
destiny of the earth” (7).
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exceptionalism, it was also grappling with the fissures in that façade, opening peep holes
through which to glimpse the puny, naked animal behind the curtain. Literature has long
been a tale of the fraught, messy, ecstatic, and panicked romance of human-nonhuman
erotic encounter.
The five chapters to follow explore literary archives of interspecies erotics and
species panic. My methodological turn to literature is largely motivated by the fact that
interspecies erotics is one of the most prominent and least acknowledged undercurrents
in American literature. As Mary Allen notes, “An astonishing number of actual animals
play impressive roles in American literature. No other national literature makes them so
important” (10). As long as there have been animals in American literature, there has
also been interspecies erotics—from William Bradford’s seventeenth-century reports of
animal buggery to Edgar Allen Poe’s panicked cat-lovers and eroticized ravens to
Melville’s great male whale hunt to William Faulkner’s late-night tristes between boys
and mares to the “wild love” between a woman and a stallion in Robinson Jeffers’ “Roan
Stallion” to Edward Albee’s bestiality play The Goat, or Who is Sylvia? (Jeffers 15). In
most of the above examples, the thematic of interspecies erotics wends, at moments of
climax, into memorable instances of species panic. Given the wealth of examples of
species panic, it is not farfetched to say that species panic is itself a recognizable literary
device.
Critics in animal studies have done important work towards establishing the
connection between narrative, poetics, and animality. Proposing a notion of “narrative
ethology” (19), Susan McHugh links fictional texts by Jack London and Charles Dickens
to popular scientific nonfiction books by Jane Goodall and Franz de Wall to ground her
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call for an “ongoing systematic analysis of how forms of species remain embedded in
storytelling practise” (5). In his 2014 book Zoopoetics: Animals and the Making of
Poetry, Aaron Moe takes up this challenge. Using whale song, horse flesh, snake motion,
octopus mimicry,19 and elephant social organization as part of his copious animal
archive, Moe demonstrates that “animals are makers. They make texts. They gesture.
They vocalize” (11).20 In the Introduction to their 2018 essay collection What is
Zoopoetics?: Texts, Bodies, Entanglement, Kári Driscoll and Eva Hoffman elaborate on
Jacques Derrida’s apparent throwaway identification of “Kafka’s vast zoopoetics”
(Derrida, The Animal 6), explaining how, far from being “texts about animals” (Driscoll
and Hoffman 4), “zoopoetic texts” are texts whose “poetic thinking” unravels through
“an engagement with animals and animality” (4)—animals are constitutive of literary
form and body. Anat Pick extends zoopoesis to the inherent animality of language itself.
Recalling Derrida’s claim that in Plato’s Phaedrus “Logos is a zōon” (Dissemination 84),
Pick argues that the constitutive “foreignness” of language “fissures the identity and selfpresence of the human” (4). For Pick, language is inherently “creaturely” (6)—
embodied, organic, irrational, enfleshed. Just as animals and words are embodied
narratives and poetics, so words and stories are fleshly and animate.
While such theoretical ground has been well trod, what has not been surveyed in
detail is the manifestly erotic nature of human representations of animals. The eroticism,
a version of E.O. Wilson’s “biophilia” (2), implicit in the artistic impulse towards
animals—the manifold modern attempts to touch animals via art—comes across
vigorously and viscerally in the literary archive, which has long been one of the great
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“They are zoopoetic to the extreme” (Moe 33).
Crucially, Moe also maintains that animals have “agency” in their making (11).

18
collective human vocalizations of love. When we run animal stories through the
interpretive lens of eros, we see the tense dialectic of attraction and disgust driving the
human endeavour to reach the animal via literature. In the following pages, though this is
sometimes more explicit and sometimes more subterranean, eros and aesthetics are
necessarily conjoined. Just as each chapter has its own totem animal (dog, bull, android,
cow, horse), each tries to develop its own kind of creaturely aesthetic. Chapter One
follows the fierce narrative pangs and pantings of Jack London’s deep time humancanine romance, Chapter Two traces Ernest Hemingway’s foray through the voids of the
anal-animal aesthetic, and Chapter Three watches panic scream across the spectrum of
the human continuum—perhaps the clearest image for the aesthetics of this project as a
whole. Chapter Four takes the slippery murk of dairy as its aesthetic focalizer while
Chapter Five ponders the artistry of the equine body. These readings situate the
individual animals under discussion through readings in biology, ethology, ecology, and
history, grounding the study’s theoretical approach with more tangible archives,
discourses, and data sets.
The reader may note that, apart from the final chapter which focuses on two
contemporary American poets, Species Panic offers close examinations of four canonical
American authors—Jack London, Ernest Hemingway, Philip K. Dick, and Toni
Morrison. Furthermore, this project strategically analyzes what are probably the four
most canonical texts by these authors: The Call of the Wild, The Sun Also Rises, Beloved,
and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? This turn to four urtexts of American fiction
is not arbitrary—it is symptomatic of a profundity that needs highlighting: these
mainstays of the twentieth-century American canon are heady with the pulse of
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interspecies erotics. What does it mean for the twentieth-century American psyche that
its literary production is so hot for animals? Many diverse answers to this question will
emerge, along with a closet full of fresh questions.
This study does fall victim to the temptation to organize around charismatic
megafauna, but with what I believe is a legitimate reason: the discourse of animality in
American literature, which as I argue is pervasively concerned with erotic exploration of
animal bodies as an index of species being, tends to explore larger animals like dogs and
horses rather than, say, plankton, microfauna, or molecular life. If part of my project is to
read the American canon against itself and to unveil surprises therein, then I must to
some extent read the canon on its own terms. As much as anything, Species Panic is
about the threats and perils of (always already failed) attempts to define and selfcategorize as human. Because my focus is on a human-produced archive of literature, I
don’t have the ability, like recent work in multispecies studies, to fully remove the
human element, examining, say the interspecies eros between crocodiles and plovers. All
studies need their limitations, and one of mine is that the nonhuman animals I read are
those that have troubled, unsettled, and revealed fissures in the human through the
anxious biophiliac drama of canonical American literature. In its focus on a selection of
large animals (and the more radical inclusion of the android—a decidedly humanoid
nonhuman carbon-silicone hybrid organism), my methodology draws on Driscoll and
Hayward’s claim that “[a]nimals, moreso than other forms of life such as plants, are
obviously agential beings that operate at roughly the same scale and speed of humans
(5). It is because of this affinity that larger animals are generally easier to write and think
alongside, and certainly easier to love. Animals, furthermore, “have always served as
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both a mirror and a screen for the human” (Driscoll and Hayward 5); accepting Berger’s
claim that the first metaphor was animal means re-reading the history of human signmaking as an ancient interspecies romance.
Acknowledging the problems involved in focusing on charismatic megafauna,
my first chapter, “Homo-Canine Exceptionalism on Jack London’s Great White Male
Frontier,” critically focalizes around the most charismatic and human-proximate animal
in Western culture: the dog. Reading Jack London’s enormously popular 1903 novella
The Call of the Wild as a frontier-shaping colonialist venture into the great, white, and
increasingly threatened north, this chapter hinges on the dog Buck’s troubling slaughter
of Indigenous peoples at the tale’s end, reading that murderous moment as a finale of a
parable of man-dog hybrid colonialism. Heeding calls by scholars such as Zakiyyah
Iman Jackson who have recently signalled the need for animal studies and posthumanist
critics to attend to the overlapping membranes at work in the discursive categories of
race, species, and animality, this chapter reads London’s man-dog romance as a
colonialist endeavour and seeks to offer a bulwark against unproblematic readings of
liberatory interspecies eros in London’s oft-praised novella.
Chapter Two, “Anal-Animal Eroticism in Hemingway’s Corrida,” reads
Hemingway’s fighting bulls in The Sun Also Rises as dark avatars of a fearful and
threatening anal-animality. Using early sexological theory with which Hemingway
would have been familiar, I show how sexologists and psychoanalysts such as Freud
linked anality and animality as fearful, creaturely voids that threatened the drive to
heteronormative erotic self-determination. In the novel, the bull becomes an avatar for a
threatening form of queerness that Hemingway and his protagonist Jake Barnes are
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anxious to overcome. But the novel’s melancholic denouement suggests the kind of
agony and ennui that remains after the death of animality and anality, signaling a loss of
erotic potentialities that haunt the narrative with tragic resignation. Here animal death is
at its most forceful and spectacular, as Hemingway uses animal eros as a sacrifice on the
altar of his aesthete’s agenda.
Chapter Three, “Human Continuums, Trans Andys, and Cyberotic Triangles in
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?”, is in many ways the theoretical core of this
project. This chapter couples Dominic Pettman’s thinking on human-animal-machine
conglomeration with Eve Sedgwick’s theorization of erotic triangles in Between Men to
address an issue which has been largely overlooked in scholarship on Dick’s novel: the
interplay of human, animal, and android sexuality. Dick’s exploration of species panic
pushes engrained notions of “the human” from a stable category into something more
like what Pettman calls the “humanimalchine” (Human Error 6), a shifting position on a
spectrum of species being. This chapter analyzes the queerness of interspecies desire as it
plays out in the novel and suggests that Dick’s androids offer exemplary paradigms of
trans embodiment before concluding that while interspecies desire can offer productive
reconceptualizations of sexuality, the queerness at the heart of Deckard’s sexual
explorations is not a priori radical, thus reiterating Chapter One’s caution regarding toooptimistic embraces of interspecies eroticism.
Chapter Three is also the final chapter in this project’s first section,
“Manimalities and Animaladies,” which centres around particularly masculine
formations of species panic. The project’s second and final part, “The Anxious
Interface,” focuses on specifically female and feminine archives as it moves towards a

22
more sustained consideration of the interactions and intersectionalities of race, species,
and gender construction and power. To this end, Chapter Four, “Lactic Panic and the
Erotics of Dairy in Toni Morrison’s Beloved,” presents a milkier, murkier vision of the
possibilities of interspecies erotics than any previously seen. This chapter delineates
these arguments through an exploration of the “fraught erotics” of dairy, arguing that one
of the novel’s governing tensions is Sethe’s panic about becoming human dairy. Despite
the library shelves brimming with Beloved scholarship, few critics have paid much
attention to the primal scene of bestiality at the novel’s core. Beloved has usually been
read, understandably, as a text about cultural (re)memory and the hauntology of slavery,
with analyses focusing on the novel’s devastating scene of infanticide. But I show how
the apparently-minor presence of nonhuman animals can be read as providing a crucial
counterpoint to, and point of overlap between, nonhuman animal and enslaved human
life. In the novel, this relation is typically hostile, anxious, and fraught with tension. The
project’s only chapter to home in on scenes of explicit bestiality, human-animal sex,
here, becomes a pivotal tipping point on a hierarchy of torture and dehumanization
against which the privileged white male human is defined.
Chapter Five, “The Equine Erotopoetics of Linda Hogan and Joy Harjo,”
represents a shift in the terms of my analysis, as panic recedes somewhat from the scene.
This chapter reads Hogan and Harjo’s poetic vision of human- and specifically femaleequine romance. While I frame my argument through scholars such as Qwo-Li Driskill
and Mark Rifkin, who expose and critique the overlaps between settler-colonialism and
heteropatriarchy, my own contribution, characteristically, is to emphasize the prevalence
of nonhuman eros in Hogan and Harjo’s poetry, thus establishing a triangular dialogue
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between queer theory, Indigenous studies, and animal studies. Reading affinity between
humans and horses (Hogan) as well as the equine-erotic-ecstatic (Harjo) as simultaneous
forces of decolonial and anti-heteronormative subversion, I show how both poets use a
poetics of equine eroticism to elaborate decolonial agendas and challenge the
institutionalized heteronormativity that is both a foundation of the settler colonial state
and a cornerstone of the ongoing attempt to define the human—racially, sexually,
politically—as the one with the right to dominate. I hope to have demonstrated
adequately by this point how murky and messy and problematic interspecies eros can be
and by taking, here, a step to the periphery of Western thinking I hope to show how
many of the problems of species panic derive from a specifically Western, instrumental
way of thinking about human-animal interactions.
I would like to conclude this Introduction by offering a final word on the way I
read literature in this study, by way of the emergent field of multispecies studies. In their
field-defining 2016 article “Multispecies Studies: Cultivating Arts of Attentiveness,”
Thom van Dooren, Eben Kirksey, and Ursula Münster position multispecies studies “[i]n
contrast to animal studies” through a shift of focus away from the human and towards
encounters among nonhuman creatures (3). Inspired by the work of Donna Haraway,
multispecies studies seeks a “broader taxonomic scope of inquiry” and “focuses on the
multitudes of lively agents that bring one another into being through entangled relations”
(Dooren, Kirksey, and Münster 3). But the field is also constituted by a commitment
towards reparative storytelling. Dooren, Kirksey, and Münster situate the field as a
possible antidote to the “[o]nly-human stories” that have helped to create “a period
shaped by escalating and mutually reinforcing processes of biosocial destruction—from
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mass extinction to climate change” (3). Elsewhere, van Dooren and Deborah Bird Rose
suggest their desire to “restory the relationships that constitute and nourish” diverse
“forms of human and nonhuman life” (77). While I support the multispecies studies
project in general, I also think it offers a limited understanding of what story can and
should do.21 Asking for “better stories” can only get us so far, and to sluice human
poetics and narrative into the stream of salvational storytelling can strike a literary critic
as potentially reductive. Much as I would like to, I don’t believe we can effectively
mobilize story in pursuit of specific political purposes. Another term for Good Stories is
bad literature. I take a different approach to narrative, poetics, and storytelling. Rather
than seeking to rehabilitate story, I seek to track the fluctuations and movements of the
narrative organism. Rather than reading for, I seek to read as is, tracking the struggles
and panics that have constituted the American navigation of the human-animal relations
and seeing what we might learn by attending to stories and poetics.
I opened this section with a quotation from a Stephen Millhauser story, “A Visit,”
in which the unnamed narrator visits his friend who has married a frog—a fairy tale
premise told in absurdly realist style. The moment I’ve quoted takes place when the
friend and his frog-wife proceed upstairs to bed and what the moment of my epigraph
dramatizes is a psychological refusal. The rhetorical technique is apophasis: the narrator
invokes frog-love by not talking about frog-love (except maybe a little bit). The sense
that something has been violated “in the imagining” suggests and invokes the momentary
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While van Dooren, Kirksey, and Münster insist that their project overcomes the human focus of
“human-animal studies” (3), the focus on reparative storytelling also seems to re-introduce the human into
the equation as the architect of salvation-by-narrative. Their insistence on the value of story also seems to
wilfully ignore the archives of narratology, semiotics, and literary criticism, when surely some dialogue
with these fields could re-nuance and enrich their understanding of story.
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horror of this (non)contemplation. The narrator’s decision not to imagine frog-love is of
course one way to imagine frog love and to invite the reader into a kind of pact of the
unspoken, signalling the by-now familiar figuration of bestiality as envoidedness, the
unspeakable. The refusal of disclosure also generates a pulse of narrative tension,
drawing the reader into the repulsive-compulsive fantasy of the would-be voyeur. And
what is this but the domain of story, of narrative, of panic. Species panic wriggles and
writhes in the mesh of story.
Don’t panic. Which means, of course: do.
The Last Taboo? A Brief History of American Zoophilia
In February 2015 Ontario’s openly gay premier, Kathleen Wynne,22 came under pressure
when the Ontario Liberal Party proposed updating the health and physical education
curriculum to include discussions of anal sex, same-sex partnership, trans persons, and
masturbation. In response, protestors rallied at Ontario’s provincial house of parliament
in Queens Park, Toronto.
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In a notable twist, Wynne herself has since become a fount of conservative panic, conceding the 2018
provincial election more than a week early after receiving full-scale vitriol from the electorate.
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Figure 1: Protesters rally against the newly announced sex-ed curriculum at Ontario's parliament in February 2015.
Reprinted with permission of The Canadian Press

Clearly, the crowd sees education about malleable gender identity and non-normative sex
acts such as anal sex as deeply threatening. More interesting, though, is that the holder of
this sign obviously sees non-normative sexualities and sex acts on a continuum with
interspecies sex—teaching children about safe non-vaginal intercourse is one small step
away from encouraging them to have sex with animals. As a rhetorical move, this
slogan—“WHAT’S NEXT, SAFE ANIMAL SEX?”—seeks to mobilize panics
surrounding interspecies sex to galvanize an age-old slippery-slope argument about the
depravity of pathologized queer sexualities.
One need not look far to find parallel scenarios in the United States. In 2013,
U.S. Senator Rand Paul publicly declared his concern that legalizing gay marriage may
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lead to marriages between humans and nonhuman animals (Amira np).23 While such a
comparison doubtlessly draws on the rhetoric of human exceptionalism in an attempt to
provoke disgust regarding human-animal coupling and refract that disgust onto gay
humans, the response from the queer and anti-homophobic community also demonstrates
a profound species panic. Writing for New York Magazine, Dan Amira asserts that
Rand’s rhetorical gesture is “literally the world's most insulting, ignorant, and
nonsensical argument against gay marriage” (np). Species panic operates here both
through Rand’s provocative inclusion of bestiality on the spectrum of queerness and the
resultant disgust response from a voice sympathetic to gay rights activism. Paul uses
animal marriage as a rhetorical lynchpin, a limit case of queerness that makes gay
marriage seem one step further along a slippery slope of perversion. Amira’s response
indicates the understandably righteous attempt to differentiate gay marriage from animal
marriage and, implicitly, a reaction against the sodomy-recalling accusation that
homosexual coupling is more animalistic than heterosexual coupling. Of course, the gay
marriage debate has nothing to do with interspecies eros except in the habitual attempts
of conservative pundits to semantically link these issues. While interspecies erotics is
necessarily queer, human queerness need not be species transgressive. Paradoxically, the
suggestion that one form of non-normative sexuality leads to another in a kind of queer
snowball effect allows conservative rhetoricians to mobilize animal sexuality and to
deploy interspecies eros as ammunition for policing the emancipatory sexual claims of
queer human beings. What we get here, then, is the panicked excitement of the right
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As Amira notes in his article, Rand subsequently backpedalled from this argument, no doubt in response
to pressure from an outraged queer and queer-friendly community (np).
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wing reaching to prohibit and police transgressive sexualities emerging as its own form
of interspecies eros, the dialectical charge of Foucauldian circuits of power and pleasure.
The subject of my research—interspecies erotics—casts a broad net; interspecies erotics
need not involve traditional penetrative or oral sex acts, and it need not occur between a
human and a nonhuman animal. But zoophilia—the preferred term of practitioners of
human-animal sex—also clearly occupy one end of the spectrum of interspecies erotics
that Species Panic explores. Human-animal sex is the threatening telos of interspecies
desire, the revulsive umbra that makes other manifestations of human-animal love
fraught and delicate, panicky and threatened. It’s okay to love your cat, but to love just
your cat—to blur the line between animal lover and animal lover—makes you a cat lady,
a madwoman. Because the suggestion of zoophilia is the extreme end of the spectrum of
interspecies eros, and because bestiality has a penchant to provoke panic, a brief foray
into the nature of bestiality will help to ground the broader cultural-affective atmosphere
of species panic that this study explores.
Human-animal sex seems to be about as old as the human species. Midas
Dekkers notes that “[c]opulating with animals is probably as old as humanity. Depictions
of it are found in the very oldest cultures” (15). Surveying a robust array of research,
Miletski traces the origins still earlier, stating that “the practise of human-animal sex
began at least in the Fourth Glacial Age, between 40,000 and 25,000 years ago” (“a
history” 1).24 Pottery by the Chimu and Mochica peoples are elaborately decorated with
scenes of human-animal intercourse, and Bronze Age rock paintings in Sweden clearly

Drawing the link between bestiality and agrarian cultures, Joyce E. Salisbury considers it “likely that
intercourse with animals had been one expression of human sexuality for as long as people lived closely
with their animals” (84).
24

29
show a human male penetrating a herd animal, most likely a goat (Dekkers 15).
According to Miletski, zoophilia has been a central part of the development of human
sexuality and the practice has been documented in Ancient Egypt, China, Asia, Africa,
Inca, The Middle East, Greece, Rome, and various North American Indigenous cultures
(“a history” 2-15).25
The cross-cultural and trans-historical presence of what Dominic Pettman calls
the “universal taboo” against zoophilia reinforces the sense of just how common the
practice has been throughout the ages (Human Error 79).26 The prevalence of bestiality
taboos suggests the prevalence of bestiality—why else would there be a need to prohibit
it? Looking at the history of its taboo, then, has much to suggest about zoophilia. The
crime was punishable by torture and death in Ancient Egypt, and under Islamic law
sodomy with animals is a capital crime (Miletski, “a history” 3, 25). Cultures such as the
proto-Hebrew Hittites had strict regulations about which nonhuman creatures were

Miletski’s survey offers a striking overview of the pan-cultural prevalence of bestiality. The Egyptians
are fabled to have had sex with crocodiles (Miletski, “a history” 3). Prince Chien of the Han dynasty is
said to have forced women to copulate with dogs (Miletski, Understanding 23). In Ancient Rome,
“Bestiality was widespread among shepherds” (recalling Pan and anticipating Havelock Ellis) while
“Roman women were known to keep snakes which they trained to coil around their thighs and slide past
the lips of their vaginas” (Miletski, “a history” 4). Miletski also notes that “bestiality flourished as a public
spectacle” in Roman “sex circuses” where “[w]omen copulated with bears, snakes, and crocodiles”
(Understanding 13). Though Miletski’s research may sound farfetched—research around zoophilia often
does—it is for the most part supported by Midas Dekkers, Joyce E. Salisbury, and others who have worked
on this fraught subject. Though extensive, Miletski’s research draws primarily from the tradition of
Eurocentric ethnography—she refers to the “Eskimo” and primarily quotes from Western male
anthropologists (“ a history” 16). It is hard not to read Miletski’s account as problematically racialized
given the insensitive delivery of claims such as this one: “Arabs practise bestiality primarily with goats,
mares, sheep, sows, and camels, if the latter cooperate. Arab women reportedly have oral sex and
intercourse with dogs whenever men are not available to please them (Understanding 25). Milketski’s “A
history of bestiality and zoophilia,” originially published in the peer-reviewed journal Anthrozoös, seems
to be a more reliable source than the self-published Understanding Bestiality and Zoophila [sic].
26
Taboo can be a turn on in itself. According to Marjorie Garber’s reading of a selection of bestialityconfessional memoirs, one of the more common appeals of zoophilia is precisely in transgression of the
taboo (158).26 Beyond the question of the arousal of the taboo itself, what interests me in Garber’s analysis
is the conclusion that even for the zoophile sex with animals is not an act of pure attraction but one caught
up in the doubled circuit of desire/disgust. This dualism—the very heart of species panic—is itself the
zoophiles’ kink.
25
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permissible to have sex with and which weren’t (Miletski, Understanding 2). The Book
of Leviticus named bestiality punishable by death: “And if a man lie with a beast, he
shall surely be put to death: and ye shall slay the beast” (20.15), a notable punishment
because here it is not only the human violator but also the violated animal that must be
put to death. According to John M. Murrin, the murder of the animal was necessary
because bestiality both “lowered a man to the level of a beast” and “left something of the
human in the animal” (117). Part of the bestiality taboo seems to originate in a fear of
contamination—the worry that “humans could, if provoked by bestial lust, join
themselves to the animal kingdom in a horrifyingly literal sense” (Canup 120). The
Leviticus taboo is also notable as a Western frame of the taboo because it establishes
bestiality as a particularly phallic and potentially reproductive sin, anticipating the
ongoing association of bestiality with sodomy and buggery. This taboo, with its focus on
“man,” thus leaves open the possibilities of women having sex with animals and men
acting as receptive partners, along with a whole host of other potential sex acts.27
Zoophilic sex did not become a scientific object of study until the emergence of
sexology in the late nineteenth century when the “scientific term zoophilia was given its
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Despite heavy prohibitions, bestiality continued to linger in the legal fringes of society. Miletski notes
that “[b]estiality was most widespread and accepted in Western society during the Middle Ages—from the
fall of the Roman Empire in 476 A.D. to the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492” (Understanding
14). Throughout “the Middle Ages,” Miletski continues, “bestiality was practised by farmers, priests, and
nuns; many people were doing it, but nobody was talking about it” (Understanding 14). The rationale
Miletski provides is simple proximity: because most people in agrarian cultures live in close range with
animals, sexual encounters would have been common, if secretive. In her 1994 book The Beast Within:
Animals in the Middle Ages, Salisbury offers a rigorous history of the complex and shifting legal and
ecclesiastical regulations pertaining to bestiality in medieval Christian Europe, where it was variously seen
as equivalent to masturbation and homosexuality (90, 91). While medieval standards such as the eleventhcentury Council of Ancyra had seen bestiality as a crime meriting a penance ranging from forty days to
twenty years (Salisbury 90, 91), in 1534 both England and Sweden made bestiality a capital crime
(Salisbury 100). This dramatic shift in the legislation of bestiality, occurring at the very of the birth of
Renaissance humanism, indicates that animal eros had become a source of panic.
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official baptism by Krafft-Ebing in his landmark study Psycopathia Sexualis (1886)”
(Pettman, Human Error 79).28 Zoophilia and bestiality remain something of a legal grey
area in the modern world, with the legal status of human-animal sex acts often nebulous
or unknown. Many nations are only lately catching up on archaic and outdated laws, with
a flourish of revamped legislation in the last decade or so. As of 2005, bestiality had not
officially appeared in the legal codes of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania,
Belgium, or the Netherlands (Miletski, “a history” 8). Reports of “bestiality brothels”
and “erotic zoos” spreading through Germany, where bestiality had been legal since
1969 (Mortimer np), led to 2012 Bundestag legislation banning any sex acts which
would “force an animal” into “unnatural behaviour” (Mortimer np), opening the doors
for murky conversations about consent and self-determination. In 2015, Denmark
outlawed bestiality shortly after Norway, Sweden, and Britain had done the same (Tange
np). Michigan State University’s Animal Legal and Historical Center’s “Table of State
Animal Sexual Assault Laws” contains the best summary of current legal data
surrounding bestiality in the U.S., but even this well-documented resource can only
affirm that “about 45” states have “some provision that criminalizes engaging in sexual
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Following the 1886 publication of Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s Psycopathia Sexualis, zoophilia and
bestiality began to attract some attention in sexological study. In his 1906 book Erotic Symbolism,
Havelock Ellis had suggested that “[b]estiality is very rarely found in towns” (81), practised among
shepherds and goatherds with “great frequency” (83). Pathologizing the practice by asserting that it is “the
sexual perversion of dull, insensitive, and unfastidious persons” (79), Ellis notes that bestiality does
sometimes occur “among women in civilization” and that in such instances “the animal is nearly always a
pet dog” (83), a fact that Krafft-Ebing corroborates (578): “[t]he intercourse of females with beasts is
limited to dogs” (578). Ellis and Krafft-Ebing do not provide many figures; instead they provide stories—
sensational, provocative tales in which it is hard not to read a certain erotic pleasure in the exuberance of
narration, a feature common to the literature arround bestiality and zoophilia. Following Ellis and KrafftEbing, veterinarian and sexologist Alfred Kinsey became infamous for making bestiality the ultimate open
secret of twentieth century America and beyond. In his 1948 study Sexual Behavior in the Human Male,
Kinsey and his colleagues estimate that 40-50% of American males living in rural areas had had sex with
animals (Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin 671), a number that has been questioned by many and quoted by
more in its own kind of gasping statistical eros.
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conduct with animals” (Wisch np), with human-animal sex being variously a
misdemeanour or felony. The five states that have no law prohibiting human-animal sex
are Hawai‘i, Kentucky, New Mexico, West Virginia, and Wyoming (Wisch np). South
Carolina is the only state that still legally refers to bestiality as “buggery” (Wisch np).
Currently Texas, Nevada, and California are among states that include convicted
zoophiles on registered sex offender lists (Wisch np). The range of possible punishments
varies widely from state to state; in some states bestiality is a misdemeanor while in
Rhode Island offenders can receive prison sentences of up to 20 years. As with Europe,
many of America’s bestiality laws have been recently updated, with Alaska, Texas,
Kansas, California, Nevada, and Michigan updating legislation since 2008. Bestiality
became illegal in Texas in 2017 through Section 2 of Senate Bill 1232, instituting a
“comprehensive bestiality law” following significant public outcry and media shaming
(Wisch np, Saputo np). The spate of bestiality legislation in the border-tightening
political spheres of America and Europe in the past decade invites the question of
whether this is symptomatic of an era increasing its security against the invasive threat of
species panic?29
The slew of bestiality legislation also suggests that zoophilic sex remains
common enough to call for law-making. Perhaps the best archive of human-animal erotic
fixation is the widespread interest in bestiality porn. In her 2010 article “When Species
Meat: Confronting Bestiality Pornography,” Margaret Grebowicz canvases a large array
of internet bestiality pornography that she summarizes as a “proliferation of zoo porn”

For an excellent analysis of the relation between species and border panic, see Melissa Autumn White’s
article “Viral/Species/Crossing: Border Panics and Zoonotic Vulnerabilities” (Women’s Studies Quarterly
40.1/2 [2012]).
29
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(2). The sheer amount of bestiality porn on the internet certainly suggests a widespread
erotic interest in nonhuman animals, as does Miletski’s account of secret zoophilia
societies like the “sophisticated sexualists” and “Advent Partners, Ltd” (Understanding
31, 35), highly-circulated publications like Wild Animal Revue and the Pet Book series,
or “Color Climax’[s] 8mm animal films, such as Dog Fuckers, Horse Lovers, and Horse
Power” (Understanding 31). Grebowicz’s nuanced account is concerned not with
numbers but with a “post-Foucauldian” inquiry into the “subjective and intersubjective
effects of the circulation of this discourse” (3). Her analysis of a wide range of striking
and provocative pornographic archive, however, certainly presents an image of
pornographic variety and plenitude. What is clear is that the desire-construct Grebowicz
analyzes is enormously complex: bestiality porn reveals an “internally inconsistent
kaleidoscope of constructs and norms” that “tells us little about the practice of bestiality”
(2). Grebowicz’s wide-ranging examples, from women “penetrating themselves with
snakes, eels, and other fish” to a gorilla looking up a cartoon woman’s skirt (3),
demonstrate that there are myriad ways for humans to have sex with nonhuman animals.
The central difference between the terms “bestiality” and “zoophilia” is that
bestiality is usually used pejoratively to connote a monstrous perversion while zoophilia
is the preferred term of self-identifying animal lovers. 30 Zoophiles often think of
themselves as a “persecuted subculture” (Grebowicz 6), a claim that seems warranted by

Though the terms “zoophilia” and “bestiality” are not quite interchangeable, I tend to gravitate towards
the former when possible. According to Gieri Bolliger and Antoine F. Goetschel, the “scientifically
correct” term “zoophilia” simply means “love” or “affection” for animals (24). The term “zoophilia” is
generally preferred by practitioners of human-animal sex to the pejorative “bestiality,” with its connection
to religious notions of sodomy and perversion. According to Andrea M. Beetz, “the main difference
between bestiality and zoophilia” according to “zoophiles” themselves is “that zoophilia, besides involving
sexual contact with animals, also includes an emotional involvement” (113). Zoophilia, of course, is also a
claimed sexual identity, and not just a designate of disgust.
30
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the general societal distaste for their sexual choices. Analyzing Robinson Devor’s 2007
film Zoo, a documentary about a horse-sex mortality incident in Enumclaw,
Washington, Pettman notes that the discourse around the case often draw on the oftinvoked “parallel between zoophiles and pedophiles” (Human Error 81).31 Attempting to
slip such stigma, zoophiles insist that the animals they have sex with receive sexual
pleasure (Grebowicz 14), a fascinating and rare appeal to the value of nonhuman
sexuality. Likewise, as films like Cristopher Spencer’s documentary Animal Passions
make clear, zoophiles insist that their choice of animals as emotional, romantic, and
sexual partners is not the result of human rejection.32 For them, animals do not substitute
for inaccessible human sexual contact. Rather, zoophiles insist that they simply have
more “affinity” with nonhuman animals than the average human being (Pettman, Human
Error 79). Intimacy with, and proximity to, animals becomes a psychological bridge
between animal lovers and animal lovers.
Despite the wide range of practices and desires demonstrated by Grebowicz’s
research and films like Animal Passions, the legal discourse around zoophilia has tended
towards definitions that focus narrowly on male-centric, phallic, and penetrative sexacts.33 A 2016 Canadian Supreme Court ruling in a case involving a serial sexual abuser
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Such comparisons abound in the discourse around zoophilia. Take, for example, Mark Anthony Conditt,
suspected architect of a deadly bombing in Austin, Texas, who compared homosexuality with zoophilia
and pedophilia in a blog post (Rosenberg and Berman np). Such discourse reiterates the pathologization of
zoophilia as part of a cluster of deviant queerness.
32
Animal Passions is available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pl9DdB75d2E.
33
Noting that “the sheer amount of bestiality porn on the internet is disproportionately large in
comparison to the number of bestiality cases which make the daily or weekly news” (8), Grebowicz points
out that “the cases which do make the news rarely describe the kind of sex that makes up the majority of
the porn. Women receiving cunnilingus from dogs (and occasionally cats), women penetrated by dogs and
horses, and occasionally pigs and goats, women performing fellatio on dogs, horses, goats, even camels—
these acts are almost never prosecuted” (8). In the massive closets of internet bestiality porn, animals are
usually “masculinized” (Grebowicz 9), contra the usual presumption of the feminization of animals and
their association with human female bodies. It turns out, furthermore, that the fantasy—as well as the
material reality of the porn—is often non-penetrative.
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declared a wide range of acts of bestiality legal in Canada. One of the ways the
defendant assaulted his stepdaughters was by using peanut butter to entice the family dog
towards oral sex. Part of the problem for the court was that there is no stable legal
definition of the term, and one of the trial’s outcomes was the judge’s suggestion that
Canadian government should better define the term “bestiality” (Garcia np). The case
declared that bestiality as a legal category in Canada had since 1892 been “linked to
‘buggery’ – or sodomy – with animals” and ultimately ruled that only penetration of
animals should be illegal (Garcia np). I deploy this disturbing study not just as a
precursor of Chapter One, which focuses on the darker side of dog love, but also to
demonstrate the legal and ethical murk around bestiality and nonhuman eros more
broadly. While the details of the case show just one way in which nonhuman bodies can
be deployed erotically as instruments of torture,34 the court’s emphasis on the single,
fetishized act of penetration also dismisses a whole range of human and nonhuman
sexual possibilities. One of the recurring anxieties surrounding interspecies eros is that it
resists many of our categories and challenges so many of our boundaries; to a great
extent, we simply don’t know what to make of it. The juridical tendency to define
bestiality through phallic, penetrative sexuality not only focuses on one human sex and
one organ—it also overwrites the possibility of nonhuman animal sexual agency and
consent.35 Occupying one extreme of the spectrum of interspecies erotics, zoophilia is a

34

A disturbingly similar practice, Colleen Glenney Boggs shows in Animalia Americana, occurred in the
American “abuse of prisoners” at Abu Ghraib in March 2006 (41).
35
Consent is a controvertial subject surrounding bestiality and zoophilia, and the issue of whether animals
can provide meaningful consent seems largely unresolvable. (The cast of Animal Passions insist that their
animal partners consent—that a dog can take agency with its tongue and a horse could easily say no
through violence). In “Heavy Petting,” the oft-cited 2001 essay in which he frames his utilitarian approach
to bestiality, Peter Singer suggests, radically, that “sex with animals does not have to involve cruelty” (np).
For Singer, the evidence is in part physiological: “the fact that the vagina of a calf can be sexually
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livid and thriving undercurrent of human sexual cultures, one that can be deployed,
variously, as a force of erotic stimulation, coercion, and prohibition, among other things.
But zoophilia is just one node of the broad and variegated aesthetics of interspecies
erotics with which I engage in the work to follow.

From Pan to Panic

Before proceeding through my literary analysis, it will be useful to contextualize this
study’s central affect. Panic is a concept born in the Arcadian wilderness, where eros
meets animality in the figure of Pan, the etymological progenitor of the word “panic”
(“Panic,” adj., def. 1). A Grecian deity with the face and torso of a human and the legs
and horns of a goat (Figure 1, below; OED, “Pan” def. 1), Pan was a minor and
peripheral figure in Ancient Greek theology: the patron of shepherds and the god of the
dark fringes of the wilderness. From the outset a symbol of species transgression (as

satisfying to a man shows how similar these organs are” (np). Even assuming that Singer means
“complementary” rather than “similar,” it remains striking that Singer uses pleasure as his barometer of
ethics. Margaret Grebowicz disagrees with Singer’s assessment of relative cruelty, classing the animal,
along with children and the mentally ill, as “the being that never consents” (10). The paradigm of consent,
though, may not be the right lens through which to approach zoophilia/bestiality. I discuss this further in
Chapter Four, which asks how sex between domesticated animals and human slaves complicates the issue
of consent. One clear point about bestiality is that it would be very rare and gruesome without animal
domestication. The foundation of industrial animal domestication (what Marjorie Spiegel in The Dreaded
Comparison names as its own form of slavery) calls the ethical framework of consent into question. Did
animals consent to domestication in the first place? Do they consent to artificial insemination or enforced
sex with one another for breeding purposes? Why is mating cattle and other animals using “rape racks”
and other techniques of bondage not a question of consent? In other words, if we really cared about what
animals consented to sexually and otherwise, we would probably not sterilize, confine, and kill them with
impunity. Though stallions do clearly enjoy being relieved by human-held prosthetic vaginas, the varied
and complex sexual interactions between human and nonhuman animals often blur clear understandings of
“no means no” or “yes means yes.” Instead of trying to resolve the thorny question of consent in bestiality
and zoophilia,35 I will simply say that concerns and debates over nonhuman sexual consent often involve
manifestations of species panic. Part of the reason people turn to arguments like “if a child can’t consent
then a dog can’t consent” (reiterating the bestiality-pedophilia parallel) is because they want to police or
prohibit human sex with animals. In the feedback loop of sexuality, though, prohibition often produces
desire.
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were many Ancient Greek gods and demi-gods), Pan was “the last and youngest of the
Olympian gods, guardian of shepherds and flocks, of wild natural spaces, and of rustic
music” (De Cicco 49). Patricia Merivale, author of Pan the Goat-God: His Myth in
Modern Times (1969), notes that Pan was “first worshipped in Arcadia” (1), where he
was known for “pastoral activities” such as “music-making and dancing” and seen as a
“comic-grotesque godling” (1). Central to Pan’s identity is his physical embodiment as a
god-animal hybrid: “The paradox of being half goat and half god is at the very core of
his nature” (Merivale 1). Pan’s body represents the join of human (humanoid torso and
hands), god (he is a deity), and animal (horned, with the legs of a goat).
There is also a fierce and tortured sexuality about Pan. Never a god of sex, love,
or desire, Pan was the symbol of a dark, threatening, uncharismatic sexuality. The
Ancient Greeks, as Pierre Borgeaud explains in his 1979 book The Cult of Pan in
Ancient Greece, associated Pan with “systematic sexual frustration” (108). Pan “lives
among the nymphs, but is unlucky in love” (Borgeaud 108), and perhaps it is his pent-up
sex drive that leads him to copulate with the goat in the most famous lasting image of
Pan/Faunus (figure 1). Or perhaps it is not so abnormal for Pan, as the god of shepherds,
to explore his flock sexually—shepherds have “tended” to their flocks erotically across
many cultures and civilizations. Pan also commands a magic power, “panolepsy”
(Borgeaud 108), a precursor of the familiar modern panic response that leads to fits in its
“epileptic form” (108). Panolepsy, in other words, is a form of seizure that arrests its
victim. Panolepsy derives from “Pan’s confusion and ultimate rage when he finds
himself seduced by an object who escapes his passion” (Borgeaud 120), but its precise
meaning, origin, and contours remain elusive. Panolepsy, though clearly rooted in
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sexuality and desire, remains crucially ambiguous—an ancient precursor of the manyheaded malaise of panic.
Pan, reborn as Faunus, was seen by the Romans, as “old, shaggy, and lecherous”
(Merivale 3). Figure 1, a sculpture uncovered among the erotic artworks of Pompeii,
demonstrates the way Roman civilization viewed the sexuality of Faunus:

Figure 2: “Pan Copulating with Goat.” Unknown artist. Marble sculpture, Naples National Archaeological
Museum. Photo credit: Marie Lan-Nguyen.

Pan, using his characteristically human hands to restrain the goat, pins the animal, the
reflection of his bestial half, down in a sex act that may or may not be consensual—is the
goat braying in torment or licking in pleasure? Pan’s head, raised above the goat’s in a
gesture of feral dominance, suggests that the establishment of power takes place through
this negotiation—that species status is navigated through sex. While Pan’s human face
stares into the eyes of the goat with fierce intimacy, the coil of their embrace hums with

39
the tension of beating hearts and bleating mouths. Perhaps most telling: Pan’s genitals
come to function as a literal hinge between species. A smooth-skinned torso tops a furry,
hircine lower body, and the penis sprouts out from the very cusp of species being.
The goat itself is a noteworthy avatar, one that will surface again in Chapter
Three of this study. As Servanne Woodward notes, in terms of literary history the goat
“belongs to the pastoral genre” (181). Among the oldest agricultural animals, the goat is
also known to be crotchety, curmudgeonly—more ornery than the docile sheep or cow.
The goat, furthermore, is a literally “horny” creature, in possession of an unrestrained,
unrefined, and unwelcome sexuality; it is no accident that the word “hircine” carries the
secondary meaning of “lustful” (“hircine, adj.”). Though Pan is, like Derrida’s centaurs,
the crucial emblem of a “double—human and animal—nature” (Beast 85), he is much
more debased than these charismatic hybrids who serve as “civilizing heroes, masters,
pedagogues” (Beast 85). By contrast to the regal equine beauty of centaurs, Pan appears
ugly and deformed, frustrated and bestial, more creaturely than divine.
Pan’s meaning has “varied widely” over two and a half millennia of literary
representations (Merivale 1). At some point during the Middle Ages, Pan’s symbology
fused with the iconography of the Christian devil, who sprouted horns and hircine legs
alongside a ravenous sexuality and an alluring, oft-fetishized penis.36 This goatish,
seductive devil was a dangerous link to paganism who was believed to seduce women
into witchcraft, causing many innocents to be burned on the altar of fantasy. The clear
aesthetic link between Pan and the Christian devil is especially interesting given Pan’s

Jack Fritscher notes that the goat “is consistently associated with the devil” (23). Celia R. Daileader
reads the fascination with the devil’s penis in the middle ages as a racialized phenomenon, anticipating
“the modern myth of the hyper-sexual black male” (1).
36
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associations with Jesus in Romantic literature (he was, after all, the patron of shepherds
and flocks).37 Furthermore, as the next section will elaborate, Pan’s devilish sexuality
suggests the way witchcraft and bestiality become conjoined under the umbrella of
deviance and demonism.
Pan was a minor literary figure throughout the Renaissance, after which he
disappears from the literary imagination only to experience what Ronald Hutton calls a
“sudden re-emergence as a major god in the verses of Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelly”
(44).38 For the Romantics, Pan was an “Orphic, or pastoral” figure (Merivale 74), a
convenient secular avatar for their poetics of biophilia. The late nineteenth century saw
an “astonishing proliferation” of Pan-figures and the repurposing of this deity as part of a
transatlantic paganist revival that came to America in “Emerson’s designation of
Thoreau in 1842 as ‘young Pan under another name’” (Merivale 74, 130).39 Pan figured
prominently in the poetry of Algernon Swinburne, the writings of Aleister Crowley, and
the fiction of D.H. Lawrence. The Victorian Pan was a shapeshifter, figuring alternately
as “beneficent” and “terrifying” (Merivale 134). Although Pan could be many things,
there were consistent threads in his representation: his shaggy beard and furry hircine
legs remained constant.
Unlike the benevolent, Romantic Pan, Victorian Pan was clearly an emissary of a
threatening, excessive, wild sexuality. Mark De Cicco describes the “nineteenth century
Pan” as a hallmark of Victorian “literature and popular culture” (49), characterized as
For links between Pan and Christ, see Merivale 128-29. Merivale herself points to the “dialectic of Pan
and Christ” (128).
38
The fascinating question of why Pan re-emerged so forcefully at this time is not the subject of the
present inquiry. For more on that issue, see Hutton’s chapter “Finding a God” and Merivale’s book Pan
the Goat-God.
39
As Merivale notes, Walt Whitman was also compared to Pan by his contemporaries and Hart Crane
wrote of a “Panis angelicus” (130, 264n.75).
37
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“dark, vengeful, disruptive being: a monstrous prophet of apocalypse and queer
embodiment” (49). Reading Pan’s role in the work of Algernon Swinburne, Elizabeth
Barret Browning, and Arthur Machen, De Cicco identifies what he calls “the queer
Gothic Pan” (53), a “monster of an increasingly anxious age” and an avatar of a manic
(53), unrestrained sexuality bubbling beneath the skin of Victorian sexual prudence. Pan
became an “animalistic, horned—and horny—goat-god, a being utterly lacking in
empathy and driven by an untamed, hyper-sexualized id” (57). It seems that the most
constant characteristic of the idea of Pan is the fluctuation between opposites. From the
Greeks to the Victorians, Pan remains “double in his essence” (Borgeaud 121),
embodying “contrasting twin aspects” such as “longing and animality” (Borgeaud 121).
De Cicco details how the queer Gothic Pan could instigate “a maelstrom of conflicting
emotions, hovering between horror and desire, panic fear and exultation” (50)—a
modern incarnation of panolepsy. It is the experience of just this maelstrom—of poles of
feeling held in fierce magnetic tension—that provides the aesthetic groundwork of my
project. And it is here, in the flickering field of tension, that we leap from Pan to panic.
The term “panic,” as I use it throughout this project, is intentionally slippery,
frenetic, disjointed. The panicked aesthetics explored in this study draw on Sianne
Ngai’s work in texts such as Ugly Feelings (2005) and Our Aesthetic Categories (2012).
Panic, here, is a cousin of Ngai’s “minor” and “generally unprestigious” feelings (6),
which, as Ngai points out, are certainly capable of producing “‘major’ works” of
literature and are no less deserving of “canonical distinction” than traditional,
charismatic emotions like love (11). Panic can mean “fear,” it can refer to panic disorder,
and it can mean the kind of aesthetic pleasure you take skiing a steep slope or turning the
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pages of a thriller. Wild animal encounters make us panic. One thing that is clear about
panic is that it is bestial. There is a vitality and animality to panic: it is a biological state,
an occasion, like sex, when we feel our own animality most vividly. Panic, like Pan, is
creaturely and curmudgeonly, finicky and frazzled. Panic fizzles unpredictable. It will
catch you by the tail.
One of the affective foundations of America was the panic fear that linked dark
magic and the Pan-like Christian devil with the conjoined threats of the wilderness,
savagery, animality, and unbridled sexuality. Though American Studies has in recent
years focused on national-security affects such as terror and paranoia, it is clear that
panic is central to the nation’s affective genesis. From Cotton Mathers’ gothic nightmare
of the invisible world to Mary Rowlandson’s fearful encounter with a “vast and desolate
wilderness” (312), panic has been a structuring principal in the American zeitgeist. Mark
Stein, author of American Panic (2014), notes that national panic “dates back to the 1692
Salem witch hunt” (1), a trauma involving twenty-one executions—nineteen human and
two canine. Stein continues to trace the history of genealogy in America, tracing the
thread of panic through the “ethnic cleansing” of Indigenous peoples (7), slavery and the
Civil War, anti-Chinese racism, homophobia, and twenty-first century Islamophobia. Far
from an aberration, panic seems to be a fairly normal occurrence across American
history, worthy of a position alongside Richard Hofstadter’s famous declaration of the
“paranoid style” of American political discourse (4).
It seems no coincidence that in the panicked postmodern mood of the nineteen
eighties, when Jean Baudrillard was writing about the “[p]anic-stricken production of the
real” (7), the authors of the Panic Encyclopedia saw “Donald Trump” as an ambassador
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of “[p]anic patriotism” and one of the “self-nominated American heroes of the marketplace” (Kroker, Kroker, and Cook 14). The spectacular 2016 election of Donald Trump
demonstrates, among other things, the movement from a culture of terror to a culture of
panic. Wall panic, carcereal panic, state-sanctioned murder panic, black lives and deaths
panic, fake news panic, climate change panic, nuclear panic, misogyny panic, cyber
panic, Putin panic, fraud panic, coal panic, job panic, gun control panic, Stormy Daniels
panic. These are just a few of the panics Trump has seemed, with his uniquely asinine
brilliance, to engineer.
Modern scientists know relatively little about panic. Researching “the PANIC
circuit” (261), a system that causes “psychic pain” to humans and other animals in
conditions of “emotional distress” (261), neuroscientist Jaak Panskepp explains that
“[n]euroscience is struggling” to articulate and analyze the emotional experiences that
humans generally accept as given (261). The confusion around panic carries over into
more recent neurobiology as well; studying panic attacks in humans and rodents,
neurobiologist N.K. Leibold and his team conclude that the “underlying
pathophysiology” of panic attacks and panic disorder “is not well understood” (58). The
medical history of panic disorder is complex enough that Jackie Orr has addressed it in
her book-length study, Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder (2006).
Traditionally characterized by “dizzy spells, breathing difficulty, chest pains, and heart
palpitations” (Orr 216), panic disorder, Orr shows, is also enmeshed in a larger system of
“human manipulations” and “drug-disease couplings” such as the “multi-million-dollar
circuiting of panic with Xanax in the 1980s” (254). Taken in its entirety, what Orr’s
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book suggests is that there is no one clear physiological root of panic disorder. This
debilitating condition is slick and slippery, tricky to pin down.
As with many emotions, there is also a storied relationship between panic and art.
Panskepp gives voice to the enigmatic nature of his discipline: “One of the great
mysteries of psychology is the nature of the ‘something’ that Walt Whitman extols in his
masterpiece ‘I Sing the Body Electric’” (261).40 It is significant for this study that not
only does panic remain a site of scientific opacity for neuroscientists, but that this
particular scientist would turn to literature as his spokesperson for the mysterious inner
lives of emotions.41 In a gesture familiar to readers of popular scientific texts,42 Panskepp
suggests here that literature continues to offer one of the best realms for the exploration
of psychological and emotional experience.
What, then, is the literary form of panic? It is certainly a cousin of “conflict,” that
central keyword in creative writing pedagogy. There is also a uniquely American poetics
and narratology of panic. In her book Panic Fiction: Women and Antebellum Economic
Crisis (2014),43 Mary Templin details the genre of economic panic fiction in early
American literature. Characterizing her specifically economic antebellum panic fictions,
Templin notes astutely how carefully “panic authors” navigate “the affective states most
commonly associated with panic—fear apprehension, frenzy” (12). Panic is also a
generative force in American captivity narratives and gothic stories by the likes of Mary

Despite the lapse of time since 1998, Panskepp’s more recent works, such as The Archaeology of Mind
(2012) do not indicate that the mysteries of emotional life have been resolved or fully mapped.
41
Later on in his chapter on panic, Panskepp uses Homer’s Odyssey to elucidate his analysis (263-4).
42
For example, in Biophilia, E.O. Wilson invokes Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick and Edgar Allen Poe
(11).
43
Focusing specifically on antebellum women’s writings in response to economic crises, Templin notes
the way “[p]anic texts tread carefully around the representation and production of emotional response”
(13), a comment that certainly holds for the narratives and poetics of species panic I analyze here.
40
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Rowlandson, Harriet Jacobs, and Edgar Allen Poe. In the twentieth century, panic
characterizes the subdued angst of Elizabeth Bishop’s poetry and the raunchy queer
phantasmagoria of Allen Ginsberg’s Howl before colouring more recent works of manic
overdrive such as Mark Leyner’s My Cousin, My Gastroenterologist to the masculine
and class structure narrative hysterias of George Saunders.44 Panic is certainly a central
and longstanding American literary mood.
One thing that conjoins all the senses of panic I’ve discussed is its doubleness.
Panic is the force that arrests you even as it sets the body into high alert, and as an
emotive literary phenomenon it is characterized by poise, tension, and frenzy. Haraway
has noted that “Freud is our great theorist of panics of the Western psyche” (11), and one
of the insights Freud gives us—in method if not in content—is how naturally narrative
and animality come together in the psychic-literary corpus. Freud’s oeuvre, as Dana
Seitler notes in her analysis of “Freud’s Menagerie” (31), is almost as rich with animals
as it is with sexuality and neuroses. In addition to being a psychoanalyst, Freud was an
expert literary critic and creator, turning the psychic anecdotes of his patients into
dazzling speculative fictions. With Freud as one of its guides, the project to follow
threads narrative and animality together in the aesthetic clutch of panic. If, as I have
argued, panic is an originary American affect, one of the central ways it manifests is
through the threatening eros of nonhuman animals. What makes Americans panic? The
threat of the wild, the creaturely, and the savage—the wail in the cornfields and the beast
within.

For Bishop’s relation to panic, see Lionel Kelly’s edited collection Poetry and the Sense of Panic:
Critical Essays on Elizabeth Bishop and John Ashbery (Editions Rodopi B.V., 2000).
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Panic, like eros, can be many things. In what follows, I don’t want to be
explicitly pro- or anti-panic. Rather I want to watch and track the squirms and twitches
of panic and eros as they struggle and merge in the American literary corpus. What I
want to focus on, following thinkers like Dominic Pettman and Donna Haraway, is the
inherent animality of sex and the way animal bodies work their way into human erotic
entanglements. Sex and desire are mired in the earthly, the creaturely, the filthy, the
murky, and the milky, and the literature I examine works through the meanings of erotic
impurity. Literature, in a fascinating twist, can be one of the safest realms of exploration
of nonhuman eros, a place where it’s permissible to fantasize and to cultivate
compassion and care through the porous membranes of interspecies encounters. Species
Panic is primarily a study of interspecies erotics in American literature; it just so
happens that one of the recurring effects of such eros is the species panic complex,
which becomes, in my archive, its own genera—an identifiable, if variegated, species of
literary form.
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Part I: Manimalities, Animaladies
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Chapter One:
Homo-Canine Exceptionalism on Jack London’s Great White Male Frontier
Interspecies eroticism is not always sexy. Though many recent critics have celebrated the
queer and liberating potential of literary representations of human-animal love and
desire, this chapter examines the more sinister possibilities of such eros and urges
researchers to proceed with caution into the plains and caverns of trans-species erotics.
Through a reading of Jack London’s 1903 novella The Call of the Wild, this chapter
shows how interspecies erotics can serve as a vehicle for racial, colonial, and gender
hegemony. While critics such as Michael Lundblad and Lillian Carswell have made
important headway in reading the productive possibilities of interspecies erotics in The
Call, I emphasize some of the more nefarious outcomes of human-canine intimacy on the
trans-species, masculine frontiers of London’s wild. Heeding Zakiyyah Iman Jackson’s
call for increased attention to “categories of race, colonialism, and slavery” in animal
studies and posthumanism (“Animal” 671), this chapter stresses the conjoined racial and
sexual problematics looming in this story of human-dog love.
London’s most famous dog tale, situated at the heart of the adventure mythos of
America, The Call simultaneously tells a story of human-dog love and of rampant,
human-enabled canine violence. Here male humans and dogs become the privileged
subjects of a narrative of vigorous education, permissible “boys will be boys” carnage,
and a pulsating, eroticized, wild life accessible to certain males of certain species.
Ultimately, this saga of species drift allows the tale’s canine protagonist,45 a St.

My concept of species drift is an augmentation of Arthur Kroker’s notion of “body drift” (3), a Butlerian
vision of the body as essentially multiple and incoherent: “we no longer inhabit a body in any meaningful
sense of the term but rather occupy a multiplicity of bodies—imaginary, sexualized, disciplined, gendered,
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Bernard/Scotch shepherd named Buck, to gain temporary access into the purview of a
very particular and privileged figuration of humanity: London’s ideal human—white,
Nordic, imperialist, and male, personified here by the story’s human protagonist, John
Thornton, a gruff and roaming frontiersman who gladly accepts Buck into the fold of the
human. Once he gains access to the cradle of human privilege through a protracted tryst
with Thornton, Buck becomes a prosthetic extension of white colonial violence. Granted
access into the sphere of what I call “homo-canine exceptionalism,” this kingly animal
comes to serve as an avatar for London’s white, male fantasy of conquering the wild
north. Insofar as his queerness is admitted into the homonormative fold of homo-canine
exceptionalism, Buck becomes a kind of avatar for a particular formation of human
species identity. Running Carla Freccero’s vision of the symbiogenetic “transspecies
becoming” through the concepts of American exceptionalism and human exceptionalism
(178), the term “homo-canine exceptionalism” suggests the way that dogs and humans
join together in an (often hegemonic) interspecies field of power. The concept of homocanine exceptionalism is central to the concerns of this article insofar as the term
assumes what dogs reveal: that human power is not only human power, that it also
operates through the organization of nonhuman life, the privileging of some species at
the detriment of others, and the extension of human power to certain favoured animals.
In what follows, I navigate some recent movements in dog-friendly and dog-critical
literature and criticism before demonstrating, via The Call, one particular iteration of the

laboring, technologically augmented bodies” (2). Kroker draws on the genomic concept of “genetic drift”
in order to theorize this drifting corpus (3), a body that moves “episodically, randomly, between the pull of
social networking technologies and the always constraining push of individual autobiography” (2). This
posthumanist understanding of the body as “circulating, fluid, borderless” lends itself easily to the larger
body of the species (3).
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more sinister side of dog love: London’s attempt to establish, through Buck, the
proliferation of Euro-canine blood in the north. Proceeding through a roughly linear
reading of The Call, I home in on key moments—the death of the novel’s single
prominent female character, the mobilization of Buck’s violent urges through an
athleticized practicum involving non-human animal murder, and Buck’s final slaughter
of a group of Indigenous humans—that show how London leaves his readers with a
string of sacrificial victims of the man-dog bond to enable his male colonialist dream of
Nordic conquest of the frontier. In its theoretical burrowings, this chapter explores the
overlapping tunnels of animal studies, queer theory, and Americanist literary studies in
order to emphasize the sinister side of human-canine eros. Dog love can enrich and
edify, and the anti-normative elements of interspecies eros can certainly ruffle heteroand homonormative feathers; but human-animal eros can also serve the more nefarious
agendas of the planet’s most murderous, territorial animal: humankind.

As a species, humans tend to love dogs; literary critics and creators are no exception.46
Animal studies critics often claim love of dogs as a radical point of entry towards new
ways of engaging, erotically, politically, and affectively, with “the animal.” Kathy Rudy

As Harriet Ritvo points out, prior to “the nineteenth century, books about dogs were few and far
between” (86), but as dog-fancying grew in popularity throughout that century publishers sought to meet
the demands of “the increasing audience of middle-class dog fanciers” (Ritvo 86). After 1900, the
profusion of dog literature did not slow down. Leaders of the twentieth-century literary dog pack include
Jack London stories such as The Call of the Wild (1903), “Bâtard” (1904), and White Fang (1906),
Virginia Woolf’s Flush: A Biography (1933), and J.R. Ackerley’s My Dog Tulip (1956). In the last two
decades or so, a rich and fruitful array of nonhuman-oriented scholarship in the field that has become
known as animal studies has set out to greet this flourish of literary representations. Works such as
Marjorie Garber’s Dog Love (1996), Alice Kuzniar’s Melancholia’s Dog (2006), Kathy Rudy’s Loving
Animals (2011), David L. Clark’s “On Being ‘the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany’” (1997), and Michael
Lundblad’s The Birth of a Jungle (2013) have used dogs as catalysts for studies that probe, trouble, and
transgress inherited understandings of species categories.
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uses her personal history with dogs—“dogs have been the most vibrant, colorful, and
important players in the landscape of my life” (604)—as a catalyst for her argument that
“intense connections between humans and animals could be seen as revolutionary, in a
queer frame” (605). Donna Haraway begins a book about “the myriad of entangled,
coshaping species of the earth” with the guiding question “[w]hom and what do I touch
when I touch my dog?” (When Species Meet 5, 3). Elisabeth Arnould-Bloomfield begins
a 2015 PMLA article by asking “[w]hat happens when I watch a creature suffer or when I
share in my dog’s joy” (1467).47 Garber provocatively claims that “it is the dog that
makes us human” (42). The dog, theoretically animated by such thinking, becomes the
paragon of the animal par excellence. It is safe to say that animal studies is preoccupied
with dogs, and that scholars in this field consistently invoke their own relationships with
canine pets as grounds for a larger interspecies compassion. In recent animal studies
research, the fetishization of the dog as a redemptory emblem has often been coupled
with a radical anti-normativity critics locate in interspecies erotics. In his discussion of
The Call, Lundblad asks, “how might interspecies pleasure relate to better ways of
thinking about relationships between human and nonhuman animals?” (63). Lundblad
concludes that such pleasure “allows us to see how these texts can model alternative
possibilities” (71). Likewise, Kuzniar writes that “dog love has the potential to question
the regulating strictures and categories by which we define sexuality, eroticism, and
love” (Melancholia’s Dog 109). Similarly, Susan McHugh notes that the “queer
spectrum of interspecies intimacies” between humans and dogs “might lead to an entirely
different ethics of intercorporeal relations” (117). Such claims can be productively
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Arnould-Bloomfield also repeats this question verbatim at the outset of her concluding paragraph
(1474).
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complicated through the guiding question of the present inquiry: how radical, really, is
dog love?
It is important to question the prevalent claim that interspecies erotics—and in
particular dog love—is a radical, liberating, or edifying force. In the past few years a
flurry of intersectional thinking has opened animal studies up to generative dialogue with
fields such as queer theory,48 gender studies,49 critical race studies,50 Indigenous
studies,51 and disability studies.52 What such work as a whole has demonstrated is that
nonhuman animals cannot be considered beyond or apart from the human power
structures that mediate and structure their lives, deaths, ecologies, interspecies social
networks, and planetary living conditions.
There are many reasons to think critically about species-transgressive intimacy,
love, and desire. First, interspecies erotics, in its vast and storied varieties, can look from
a certain vantage like an intrinsically violent relation. In order for humans to engage
physically with nonhuman animals, we must first domesticate them, and domestication is

48

There is, of course, a ready and productive overlap between queer theory and animal studies; see, for
example, GLQ 21.2-3, an enormously stimulating special issue on “Queer Inhumanisms,” edited by Dana
Luciano and Mel Y. Chen.
49
See, for example, Donna Haraway’s When Species Meet (University of Minnesota Press, 2008), Carol J.
Adams’ The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (Continuum, 1990), and
Stacy Alaimo’s Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times (University of
Minnesota Press, 2016).
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Important texts in this field include Mel Chen’s Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer
Affect (Duke 2012), Claire Jean Kim’s Dangerous Crossings: Race, Species, and Nature in a Multicultural
Age (Cambridge 2015), and Michael Lundblad’s The Birth of a Jungle: Animality in Progressive-Era U.S.
Literature and Culture (Oxford University Press, 2013).
51
See Kim TallBear’s essay “An Indigenous Reflection on Working Beyond the Human/Not Human” in
GLQ 21.2-3 as well as the essay collection Intimate Nature, edited by Linda Hogan, Deena Metzger, and
Brenda Peterson.
52
The major work at the intersection of animal studies and disability studies is Sunaura Taylor’s Beasts of
Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation (The New Press, 2016), a book that shows how dominant
visions of ableism “not only affect disabled individuals and the able-bodied population, but also the
nonhuman animals with whom we share this planet” (21).
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certainly a close cousin of exploitation.53 This relates to the second most obvious
problem, the always-loaded question of consent at work in human-animal love. Finally,
consideration of the human-canine bond in particular leads to the question this chapter
will examine at length: what species and people do certain human-nonhuman love
relationships exclude and harm? How does inviting certain animals into the privileged
fold of the human—a category that is always already raced, gendered, and ableized—
reinforce the troublesome Orwellian maxim that some species, some types, are more
equal than others? Beyond these general concerns raised by interspecies erotics, there is
the more specific problem of the privileged position of dogs, our “partners in the crime
of the human evolution” (Haraway, Companion 5). According to ecologist Kelsey E.
Witt, although the “exact origin of domestic dogs is uncertain” DNA evidence suggests
that canine “domestication could have taken place in excess of 33, 000 years BP [before
present]” (105). Certainly, “dogs were domesticated before the advent of agriculture”
(Witt et al, 106), meaning that humans have lived alongside canines longer than goats,
cattle, or chickens. As Haraway evocatively details in The Companion Species
Manifesto, Human-dog affection is perhaps the oldest and most familiar form of

Darwin himself compared domestication to slavery: “[a]nimals—whom we have made our slaves we do
not like to consider out equals” (Notebooks 228). More recently, Marjorie Spiegel has made a similarly
provocative argument through the image and text in her 1988 book The Dreaded Comparison: Human and
Animal Slavery (36-7). Gary L. Francione’s book-length debate with Robert Garner, The Animal Rights
Debate: Abolition or Regulation (Columbia 2010) offers a useful summary of the two major positions on
animal domestication: abolitionism and welfarism. Francione, who takes a radical abolitionist approach, is
perhaps the most virulent critic of animal domestication writing today, demanding that humans “cease
bringing domesticated nonhumans into existence” (1). In Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights,
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have offered a rigorous and nuanced analysis of this topic, advancing a
“citizenship model for domesticated animals” and analyzing a group called “liminal animals” (101, 210)—
rats, squirrels, raccoons, so-called “wild animals” that “live, and have always lived, amongst us” (210).
The robust and ongoing debate around the highly contentious topic of animal domestication lies, however,
beyond the purview of my own research and expertise.
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interspecies intimacy. No wonder, then, that humans love dogs: the rewards of this love
are writ deeply on many of our genetic and ancestral narratives and traditions.
Recent scholarship probing the intersections of racialization and human-canine
relationships informs my own critical approach to what I see as a traditional overemphasis on the role of dogs and dog love in animal studies. Recent works by scholars
such as Claire Jean Kim, Carla Freccero, and Harlan Weaver have helped to temper this
trend by examining the links and overlapping oppressions of racialized humans and
canines. As Kim demonstrates in her analysis of star NFL quarterback Michael Vick’s
dogfighting notoriety, dogs can become racialized: “The pit bull is now raced Black in
the American imagination” (272). On the flip side, as Weaver notes, in the media
coverage Vick also became subject to “racialization by animalization” through his
association with pit bulls (Weaver 347).54 While certain dog breeds such as pit bulls and
Presa Canarios can become aligned with racial otherness in the white cultural imaginary
(Freccero 189), Tyler Wall demonstrates how dogs can also be brought into the
privileged fold of whiteness. Wall notes that in the United States the “breed
problematically known as ‘German Shepherd’ and ‘Alsatian’” has become aligned with
racism and systemic police brutality “against black people” through its service in the
American K-9 unit (865, 863). Following the trail of Wall’s analysis of the K-9 as an
enforcer of racial terror, I add a specifically literary focus on dogs as aides to a project of
Nordic-Anglo dominance in The Call.
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The incident as a whole is a case study in the often conjoined and overlapping oppressions of racism and
speciesism, circulating through the vortex of the bestial. The popular media’s association of Vick’s
behaviour, as a black athlete, with barbarism, hip-hop culture, and animality lead Megan H. Glick to argue
that during this case Vick became an ambassador of “the specter of imagined black male violence that
haunts US public culture” (640).
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The remainder of this chapter shows how The Call of the Wild serves as a literary
exemplar of the sinister side of dog love, a textual site of homo-canine violence as it
plays out on the rugged manscape of London’s northern American frontier. By making
this argument, I do not mean to situate London’s tale as a literary boogeyman, to be
culled from libraries and university course outlines. The Call certainly has its merits; the
tale’s attendance to species drift, exploration of interspecies eros, and advocation of the
value of nonhuman animal life are all commendable and ahead of their time. Ethologist
Konrad Lorenz praised the text for its scientific veracity and realistic portrayal of canine
behaviour (McHugh 214). As Carswell notes, “London’s dramatization of animal minds”
in The Call and his other dog stories “challenged deeply entrenched views about the
mental capacities of animals” (307).55 Furthermore, The Call is a truly post-Darwinian
text insofar as it dramatizes, in John Bruni’s words, a “fluid model of evolution that
destabilizes identity” (61), particularly species categorization. This tale welds a join
between the human and canine species, to some extent debunking human exceptionalism
by opening a space for species flux built on the crucial “ongoing co-evolution of humans
and their companion species, dogs” (Bruni 62). Nor is The Call’s achievement limited to
its function as a visionary text vis-à-vis animal consciousness and evolution. It is also a
commendable aesthetic achievement. The tale is, in the words of Jacqueline TavernierCourbin, “unique in its appeal to readers of all ages, social classes and civilizations”
(20); there is good reason why since its publication The Call has been “the most widely

Bruni tempers this claim, noting that London “denies his canine actors the power of abstract thinking
and evidence of complex reasoning” (61). Yet, crucially, “London remains suspicious of claims about
human superiority” (Bruni 61).
55

56
read American novel in the world” (Tavernier-Courbin 20). It is a “an exhilarating tale of
adventure” (Tavernier-Courbin 20)—a dense, evocative, propulsive tale of struggle and
might in harsh climes coupled with profound, melancholy explorations of the primal
mnemonics of deep time. What I add to evaluations of The Call offered by the likes of
Carswell, Bruni, and Tavernier-Courbin is an emphasis on the (homo)erotic bond
between Thornton and Buck, the sense in which the dog becomes an avatar for the
mastery of a particular and troubling vision of the human. The dog, in London’s hands,
becomes, via erotic connection, a dangerous prosthetic extension of the human body. The
Call, so appealing to the American popular reader, also advocates Nordic supremacy and
a particular vision of the privileged (white, male) human, defended through canine
violence. The text’s popularity, therefore, renders its message of white male homocanine conquest all the more nefarious.
Steeped as he was in the ideology of social Darwinism,56 instances of London’s
racism are not difficult to locate.57 Some of his most racist works, such as the 1917 social
tract against on immigration, “The Human Drift,” are basically unreadable in their
bigotry. But London’s unsettling social Darwinism emerges most clearly in “The Salt of
the Earth,” an essay written in 1902, the same year he started work on The Call. Here
London refers to “breeds and breeds of men” (103), emphasizing that “superior races”
are justified in their execution of the will to dominate “the weak breeds” (106).
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See Métraux (46) and Tavernier-Courbin (9).
Disparaging remarks about Asians in the 1904 dispatch “Beware the Monkey Cage” cause John R.
Eperjesi to argue that London “fixed the idea of yellow peril in the minds of turn-of-the-century
Americans” (108). Yet, as an astute reader of Darwin, London was not a card-carrying humanist. He
acknowledges the arbitrary and anti-teleological forces governing Darwinian evolution, and refers to
humanity as “pigmy man” (“Salt” 102). What London does show, through The Call, is the way animals
can be enfolded into human visions of exemplarity. Buck becomes a paragon of what might be usefully
termed “American animal exceptionalism,” demonstrating how certain animals—German shepherds,
American eagles, Canadian beavers—become cornerstones of nationalist ideologies.
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Acknowledging that evolution would eventually shift the terms of the game, London
deemed that the fittest breed from the vantage of the early twentieth century was “the
Anglo-Saxon race” (“Salt” 104), which consists of “the English-speaking people of the
world” (“Salt” 104). Clearly, London’s mind at the time of writing The Call was
brimming with notions of white Anglophone superiority, a worldview that the text itself
certainly bears out.
The first stage of The Call’s voyage into darkness is Buck’s gradual process of
growing into violent mastery. The Call is a paeon of homo-canine intimacy, a story of
“passionate love” that crooningly yokes a man (Tavernier-Courbin 100), Thornton, with
his canine companion, Buck. Before the lovers meet, though, Buck must endure a period
of protracted suffering in which he develops from a regal Californian loafer into a brutal
avatar of the North. The tale’s action begins when the racialized laborer Manuel steals
Buck from his indolent life in the “sun-kissed Santa Clara Valley” (3), to be sold into the
Arctic. After this, Buck’s affiliation with human violence begins to develop through the
cruel handling of his first, vicious tamer: “his madness knew no caution. A dozen times
he charged, and as often the club broke the charge and smashed him down” (8). Soon
after arriving in the harsh wilderness of the Klondike to work as a sled dog for the mail
carriers François and Perrault, Buck witnesses the gory death of his canine friend Curly
at the jaws of a pack of “wolfish creatures” (12). For Buck, the Klondike involves an
ongoing struggle against starvation, and, after being sold, the wretched agonies of
hauling the sled for the naïve, reckless, and feminized American gold seekers Mercedes,
Hal, and Charles. After Thornton rescues Buck from the cruel and incompetent
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Americans, the novel’s racy thematic of interspecies eros begins to burn through the
harsh ice of the Klondike.
The bond that develops between Thornton and Buck is resoundingly,
shudderingly erotic—Lundblad memorably describes their relationship as one where
“erotic fireworks . . . light up the wild” (7). After Thornton rescues Buck from the
incompetent, feminized American trio, their interspecies courtship builds through
anthropo-sexualized foreplay involving dirty talk and love bites before Thornton purrs
(London 52, 60), at the pivotal moment, “[a]s you love me, Buck. As you love me” (60).
Although this relationship is clearly thick with the froth of eros, we should nonetheless
be cautious about concluding, with Scott Derrick, that “London employs a narrative
teleology aimed at the construction of heterosexual masculinity to repress and
marginalize a finally unacceptable and disruptive homoeroticism” (111). One weakness
of reading The Call in this way is that it mutes the potential valences of the interspecies
homosocial. It presumes that Thornton and Buck’s love affair would culminate in sexual
fulfilment or the frustrated lack thereof, rather than accepting, with Lundblad, that The
Call suggests “that a whole range of erotic pleasures and behaviors between humans and
animals are possible” and that “interspecies erotics” should not “be seen only as a
substitution for intrahuman desires” (67). Though Lundblad does not actually name any
of the myriad “pleasures and behaviours” to which he alludes, I agree with his warning
against the panic response that too-quickly reduces interspecies erotics to a pathologized
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bestiality or a sublimated human-human desire.58 Nonetheless, as I stress here, there is a
clear sinister underside to the interspecies eroticism at work in The Call.
If animal studies scholars have tended to overlook the sinister side of dog love,
Americanist critics such as Mark Seltzer, Jonathan Auerbach, and most recently John
Bruni take a more level approach to London’s complex, multifaceted, and at times
problematic portrayal of the privileged canine. The traditional critical view reads Buck
as primarily a metonymical tool, a canine literary prosthesis. Tavernier-Courbin typifies
this line of thinking: “London’s use of a fur-coated hero allows him to say much more
about the human situation than would otherwise have been acceptable” (21). The use of a
canine protagonist, in other words, allows London to more covertly express his
philosophical and socio-political agendas. Notably, this ventriloquism adds a metafictional level to the dynamic of homo-canine exceptionalism—the literary canine
becomes a puppet designed to achieve mastery for the human author.
More recent critics have tempered such claims, tending to read Buck, at least
partly, as a genuinely canine character rather than a placeholder. Although Mark
Seltzer’s memorable identification of London’s wolf-dogs as “men in furs” suggests a
kink-shaded story-world where man-dog love becomes a “displacement of sexual desire
between human males” (Seltzer, Bodies and Machines 167; Lundblad 63), the recent
critical consensus wisely steers away from reading London’s dogs or wolves as bare
allegories. In fact, the allegorical reading has become something of a straw target.
Lundblad, for example, claims that “readings of The Call of the Wild (1903) and White

Lundblad calls “bestiality” the “only available signifier” of interspecies erotics (67), ignoring the term
“zoophilia.” Most humans who have sex with nonhuman animals today self-identify as “zoophiles” or
“zoos.”
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Fang (1906) tend to choose between either an emphasis on human sexuality dressed up
as animal representation or an assertion of ‘realistic’ animal stories devoid of
interspecies sexuality” (48). What Lundblad’s critique seems to miss, though, is Seltzer’s
crucial point that London’s “men in furs” demonstrate “the redrawing of the uncertain
line between the human and the animal” (Seltzer, Bodies and Machines 170). Likewise,
Auerbach, who certainly does not ignore the wolfish eroticisms of London’s fiction,
notes that “The Call of The Wild’s very resistance to transparent allegory . . . is
remarkable insofar as we continue to imagine London’s hero as a dog despite all his
complex mental attributes” (91). Auerbach and Seltzers’ analyses of the plasticity of
species boundaries in The Call prefigure Lundblad’s analysis as well as my own. The
Call does not offer an easy allegory; rather, it dramatizes a complex, if at times
phenomenologically problematic, canine character immersed in a literary tapestry
interwoven with complex and myriad symbols and propelled by the fluttering winds of
species drift.
The Call is above all a eugenic tale of Nordic man-dog conquest. London
explores the thematics of genetic/breed superiority through Buck, whom the author
presents in regal terms from the outset of the novel: “For he was king” (5). The nobility
in Buck’s blood runs deeper than traceable pedigree; it is an atavistic, Nietzschean
predisposition to dominance. Unlike Toots, the diminutive purebred Japanese Pug who
lives alongside Buck in California, Buck achieves royal status from his large size, his
innate nobility, and his very hybridity. London’s primary “fascination” was the “the
figure of the wolf-dog hybrid” (Carswell 323), a uniquely versatile being at the fringe of
civilization and the wild. Buck thus embodies the curious admixture present in many of
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London’s idealized characters; he is genetically virtuous but not over-civilized, well-bred
but prepared to tackle and mount the sublime adversity of nature.59
Buck thus comes to demonstrate the complex ways in which animals correspond
to and trouble human categories of race. Harriet Ritvo points to the intersection between
animal companions and human class identity in nineteenth-century Britain, where
“keeping a well-bred dog metonymically allied its owner with the upper ranges of
society” (96). The right pet, in other words, served as a racial-social prosthesis, enabling
a person to transcend barriers of class and blood. Just as animals could elevate human
social status, so they could take on undesirable human racial baggage. Jackson speaks to
the historical distinction between the “black ‘savage’” and “white humans and animals”
(678), demonstrating how racialized people may not be granted full entry into the fold of
“the human” while certain nonhuman animals (Buck) may be permitted to enter the
sanitized purview of whiteness. To what extent did ideologies such as London’s help to
create such a hauntology of animalization-racialization? Certainly, London’s text
demonstrates the way certain racially sanctioned forms of queerness—Buck and
Thornton’s exemplary love—are permitted to exist within bubbles of racial privilege
while certain others—Michael Vick’s relation to his “queer kin” (Weaver 349)—become
the subjects of phobic racial scrutiny, paranoia, and fear-mongering.
In The Call, gender triangulates the complex and contested race-species
taxonomic continuum. One of the primary agendas of The Call’s homo-canine

Tavernier-Courbin correctly notes that London remained fascinated “by the clash between conflicting
concepts” (9). Hence he was “at once a racist, a Nietzschean, a fascist, a humanist, an animal lover, an
animal hater, a socialist, an elitist, a spiritualist, a materialist” (9). It is this highly Nietzschean tendency to
revel in tension rather than advancing a clear philosophical program that makes London both frustrating
and enormously rewarding as an object of analysis. Nonetheless, the first three leanings Tavernier-Courbin
identifies—a “racist, a Nietzschean, a fascist”—are perhaps the most prominent.
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exceptionalist conquest is the purgation of the feminine from the North. London’s
dramatization of the homo-canine conquest of the vast and harsh northland is certainly
far removed from the view of “nature” as traditionally “female” (Merchant 10), widely
held at the time of London’s writing.60 Buck’s newfound habitat is neither the “female
earth and virgin earth spirit” nor the “nurturing mother” (Merchant 11, 10); it is on the
contrary aggressively, relentlessly, and tenderly male. It is no secret that London, at least
in his depictions of “the great white male north” (Seltzer, Bodies and Machines 167),
was not a particular fan of women and femininity. Jennifer Mason notes that The Call
“contains few female characters of any species” and that the “novel’s most prominent
female dog, Curly, dies on her first day in the Yukon” (161).61 Likewise, Scott Derrick
suggests that London distinguishes between a “homosocial love of men and an eroticism
phobically rejected as lower class filth and feminization” (110). London’s mythos, then,
destabilizes the traditional nexus of class/gender, casting a femininity traditionally
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Carolyn Merchant is writing critically, here, about the notion, prevalent throughout the nineteenth
century, that nature and the wilderness were feminine spaces in need of masculine conquest. Such a view
appears in Frederick Jackson Turner’s touchstone 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in
American History.” In Anette Kolodny’s words, for Turner, “the West was a woman” (136), ready to be
conquered and fertilized by male colonialist endeavour. It is just such a view that Merchant, author of The
Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (Harper & Row, 1980), sets out to expose
and correct. London, however, approaches the gendering of nature from a different angle, evincing clear
disdain for the feminizing influence of civilization and a desire to return to the primal masculinity of the
imaginary, primordial wild. As Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson point out in their
Introduction to their incisive volume Queer Ecologies, London’s turn to the masculine wild, is, in fact,
symptomatic of a larger cultural shift: In “the late nineteenth century” North American cities became,
increasingly, “emasculating spaces of domesticity” (3), creating “a huge amount of social anxiety,
particularly for elite white men” who sought solace in the outdoors, “a new space for elite enactments of
white male superiority” (3).
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In a similar vein, Bruni writes of London’s “masculine drive for power and mastery” and The Call’s
“erasure of female animal bodies” (69).
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marked as civilized as instead scornfully plebeian. The feminine, here, represents only
chaos, decadence, and confusion.62
London’s attempt to purge the domestic feminine from his vision of the north
emerges most clearly through the death of Mercedes, The Call’s only female character of
note. Mercedes is “pretty and soft” (46), demands superfluous “chivalrous treatment”
(46), slows her party down by refusing to walk and weighing down the sled (46), and
near her final moments succumbs to a bout of “hysteria” (50). A tone of severe
heterosexual panic colors Mercedes’ brief and fatal sojourn in the Klondike. This woman
has made an unwarranted approach on the male body of the north—her insistence that
she bring an overloaded tent with her onto the dangerous thin ice of the Klondike trails
may even be the novel’s only allusion to heterosexual sex between humans (41)—
perhaps she wants the tent so she can copulate with her husband in private. London’s
hetero-masculine panic activates here, mirroring the familiar patterns of homosexual
panic, in a moment of heated violence when he sends Mercedes and her feminized
cronies to a humiliating and gratuitous death: “Mercedes’ scream came to their ears . . .
and the whole section of ice gave way and dogs and humans disappear. [sic] A yawning
hole was all that was to be seen. The bottom had dropped out of the trail” (50). London
constructs his narrative so that Mercedes’ scream comes as a delight—she has been
nothing but an irritant and a tyrant to the heroic Buck. Nonetheless, Mercedes’ dying
wail reverberates hauntingly as the last cry of the single notable human female in the
London’s phobic response to femininity is at least in part a panic regarding the erosion of the frontier.
Amy Kaplan argues that in the nineteenth century “the discourse of domesticity was intimately intertwined
with the discourse of Manifest Destiny” and that “‘woman’s true sphere’ was in fact a mobile and
mobilizing outpost that transformed conquered foreign lands into the domestic sphere of the family and the
nation” (24, 25). Kaplan’s argument is that the process of nation-building was in fact a movement of
domestication—London’s masculanized wilderness could never survive long-term against the encroaching
march of the feminized domestic.
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story. Homo-canine exceptionalism, as London articulates it in The Call, is not only a
space of racial exclusivity; it also offers no place for the human female. In the tale,
Mercedes’ hubristic death—the Americans carried far too much equipment over the
thinning spring ice—also comes just after the deus ex machina when Buck meets
Thornton, his “ideal master” (52), emphasizing the sense that this sudden and decisive
amputation of the novel’s feminine appendages lays the ground for the subsequent
flourishing of the novel’s main male-male interspecies romance.
Death—human and animal—is central to London’s mythology of the North.
London developed his ideal of the homo-canine exceptionalist northland during his own
stay in the Yukon.63 Among the most powerful encounters with nonhuman life during
this period surely took place during the passage over Chilkoot Pass, from Dyea towards
the Yukon, which London and his companions hazarded in August 1897. Here they
encountered a “morbid tragedy of dying horses” (Walker, Jack London and the Klondike
69), a standard experience when heading to the Yukon, where routes were usually
“permeated with the stench of rotting horseflesh” (Labor 101). Hundreds of equines had
been imported as pack animals but could not travel the treacherous slopes. They perished
ignominiously, “almost to an animal” (Walker, Jack London and the Klondike 69), their
enormous bodies rotting in the mudholes that lined the trail. This early glimpse of animal
life in the Klondike confirmed the hardline “survival of the fittest” stance London would
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In contrast to the mythos he successfully created, London may not have known much about dogs or dogsleds after surviving one unprofitable winter in the north. The question of London’s affiliation with sleddogs during his time in the Klondike remains, as Franklin Walker notes, “a matter for conjecture” (147).
Whatever his own personal involvement, the culture of human-canine relations in the northland had a
profound influence on London’s literary development.
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subsequently mine in his fiction. Further, it must have instilled in him the sense that life
in the northland depended on the covenant between men and dogs.
Learning to enact the homo-canine colonization of the wild, Buck must begin to
compete and kill. It is during Buck’s first hunt, a harried chase after a snowshoe rabbit
while he is still living with the couriers François and Perrault, that Buck encounters and
defeats his sled-team rival, Spitz. While Lundblad rightly notes that this passage evokes
“an erotics of the animal body expressed through the thrill of the hunt” (Lundblad 65),
what is perhaps most striking about the passage is London’s choice of the word
“intimate.” Much like sex, killing in the primal sense involves oral contact with a variety
of body parts, the exchange of body fluids, and a state of exhilaration and heightened
stimulation. Further, as philosophical ethologist Dominque Lestel notes, in the act of
eating the flesh of another creature one initiates a “metabolic relationship” between
bodies (165), suggesting an intimacy at work in the digestive process. Buck’s hunt,
though, veers away from the erotics of eating and towards a different kind of intimacy:
an athletic contest. When Spitz and Buck finally turn on one another, they meet in a
clutching scramble of “passion” and “bitter rage” while the onlooking pack sings “a
hell’s chorus of delight” (29). The scene has the feel of orgiastic ritual, where flesh
meets flesh and body fluids converge. After his victory, Buck becomes “the dominant
primordial beast who had made his kill and found it good” (30). In the original structure
of the wolf pack, such a contest would have been social/sexual, two males competing to
become the “breeding male” and gain access to the “breeding female” (Marvin, Wolf 33).
But there are no canine females in this picture, nor even any canine homosexuality.
Mastery, here, becomes an end in itself. Buck’s prize is receiving “the duties of
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leadership” on the sled team (33), and the lesson stitched into this novel of love is that
Buck will be rewarded for violence and domination.64
As if training to dominate the wild,65 Buck’s journey requires him to complete
feats of athletic prowess involving varying degrees of violence. When a rich
troublemaker offers to bet Thornton that Buck can’t pull a thousand pounds, Thornton
agrees to bet a thousand dollars he doesn’t have on Buck’s physical prowess. The
narrator’s statement that Thornton makes this foolish bet because his “fighting spirit” is
“aroused” underlines the more general sense that the athletic competition is a sublimated
version of more corporeal instincts (59). Symptomatic of ancient traditions of men
watching and wagering as animal bodies compete, eroticism pervades this moment of
athletic intimacy. Buck’s ultimate victory is spurred on by Thornton’s “soft love curses”
and the famous whisper (60): “[a]s you love me, Buck” (60). Lundblad has pointed to the
erotics between Thornton and Buck in this scene (64), so palpable that they make the
spectators retreat “to a respectful distance” (The Call 61). But what has not been

Human-canine athletic intimacy is also one of the fundaments of the frontier-making project. In A Dog’s
History of America, Mark Derr details a late-nineteenth-century American hunting trip in which five men
and a retinue of pointers slaughtered 1, 262 animals, including “127 bison, 2 red deer, 11 antelope, 154
turkeys, 5 geese, 223 teal, 45 mallards, . . . and 11 rattlesnakes” (175). The dog, as the companion and
handmaid of eager sportsmen, was a crucial part of the massive-scale eradication of wildlife on the Great
Plains in the latter half of the nineteenth century, of which the bison has become the most potent exemplar.
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The wild and the wilderness are tricky and slippery concepts, which ecocriticism has for some decades
sought to dismantle. In his 1995 essay “The Trouble with Wilderness,” William Cronon reveals the
physical and imaginative constructions underlying common ideas of the wilderness and suggests that the
troublesome and illusory concept of the wilderness contributes to “our culture’s problematic relationships
with the nonhuman world” (102). Such work demonstrates, crucially, that there is no pure point of
demarcation between the wild and civilization. Another spin on the wild has emerged recently at the nexus
of queer theory and critical race studies. Tavia Nyong’o offers a helpful articulation of the emerging
consensus: “wildness has emerged as a motif in a coalescing intellectual project interested in moving
beyond humanist and state-centered politics and theories” (258). Seeking to reinvigorate the concept, Jack
Halberstam’s essay “Go Gaga” couples Fred Moten’s black anarchism with José Esteban Muñoz’s vision
of “queer potentiality” (125), finding the best exemplars of the wild in “[p]erformative excess” (128) such
as the howls of punk diva Rhoda Dakar. My own use of the term the “wild” in this article is grounded in
the way London used it in 1903: as something primitive, violent, and enormously compelling, a
“transcendent nature” free of “the contaminating taint of civilization” (Cronon 102).
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emphasized is the way in which Buck’s body becomes a prosthetic vehicle for
Thornton’s success. Buck’s muscles, “hard as iron” (59), evoke both a state of phallic
excitement and a sense of the mechanical. This is, notably, a particularly technological
feat of strength—Buck is fastened into a sled normally pulled by ten dogs. Spurred on by
Thornton’s voice, man and dog become yoked here by a litany of human technologies—
sled, collar, voice, text. The author occupies the canine point of view as the human
character both mechanically restrains his lover and spurs him on with vocal commands.
As much as this is an erotic moment, it is also a moment about bodies and technologies
coming together in the push and pull of prosthetic species drift.
As the novel moves towards its climax of Anglo-Saxon wish fulfillment, Buck’s
athletic trials become increasingly violent. Affirming his place as a representative of a
“superior” species, yoked into the fold of homo-canine exceptionalism, Buck partakes in
the all-too-human custom of killing for sport. Catherine Bates notes that “[t]he hunt has
been associated with heroic masculinity from very early in the literary tradition of the
west” (1), and it is in this recognizably human theatre—ritualistically slaughtering
nonhuman animals—that Buck finally earns his canine manhood. After killing a large
black bear and two wolverines (67), Buck initiates an extended, sensational
confrontation with a bull moose. Although the narrator claims that Buck kills only “to
eat” (68), his impulse to take down a bull moose emerges clearly as an impulse to prove
mastery, a Nietzschean “will to power” (Genealogy 77). 66 He becomes, in other words, a
fetishized Anglo-Saxon incarnation of the kind of predatory, masculinized animality
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It is well known that London was a great admirer of Friedrich Nietzsche; Auerbach writes, for example,
of London’s “preoccupation with Nietzschean supermen” (95).
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Freccero, building on Jacques Derrida’s notion of carno-phallogocentrism, characterizes
as “carnivorous virility” (183). Here Buck becomes the nonhuman prosthesis of a racist,
white, human will to dominate non-white humans and the vast majority of species
deemed to be killable. Buck, who has no problem murdering snakes, ptarmigans,
chipmunks, rabbits, beaver, and fish (68), goes after this moose not just for sustenance
but also for sport: “he wished strongly for larger and more formidable quarry” (69).
What Buck is developing, then, is not a taste for meat but a thirst for an unpleasantly
human-like brand of mastery and domination. Recent evidence on the social organization
of Canis lupus has been moving away from the traditional understanding of “a strictly
hierarchical structure of dominance and submission” in favor of viewing wolf packs as
“quasi-democratic” societies (Marvin, Wolf 31, 34). Seen in this light, Buck’s escalating
bloodlust makes him not more wolfish but more violent, aggressive, wasteful, and
greedy. In short, more human. In his violent rampages, Buck leaves Thornton behind but
maintains his metonymic connection to a violent, imperialist human exceptionalism.
If London’s campaign of Nordic bestial imperialism—Buck loosed on the wild
and devouring creature after creature for food and sport—is not already troublesome
enough, a responsible conclusion of this analysis demands sustained attention to his final
feat of carnal ferocity. Buck’s last sportive victory serves as a racially charged apex of
canine virility’s triumph over the frontier. After defeating the moose, Buck returns to
John Thornton to find that the camp has been pillaged by a group of fictional Indigenous
“Yeehats.” The Yeehats have killed John Thornton, and Buck responds in the novel’s
climax of species panic, becoming “a live hurricane of fury” (72), tearing several throats
open before driving off the tribe, thus gaining their respect. One way to read Buck’s
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ultimate slaughter is as a psychoanalytic self-overcoming, a “kind of parody of the
primal horde of sons whom Freud imagines as slaying the father in Totem and Taboo . . .
. Having tasted men’s blood . . . the dog-hero is finally free to become Top Wolf”
(Auerbach 110). But this Freudian reading too simply differentiates between species,
dividing canine and human into isolated spheres and eliding racial, ethnic, and gender
particularities that persistently complicate species identity. The other, more explicit way
to read the climactic flurry of canine-human murder is as a twisted act of love. The
narrator is explicit: this outburst of violence occurs “because of [Buck’s] great love for
John Thornton” (72). Buck, here, does not simply slaughter any old human. He
massacres a swarm of Indigenous rivals, serving as a posthumous prosthesis for the
white masculinist dream of homo-canine exceptionalist conquest. Buck, after deciding to
return from the wild to his human lover, loses his point of entry into the covenant of
homo-canine exceptionalism, leading to a carnal frenzy of species panic against the
racialized outsiders who have removed Buck’s prosthetic connection to human power.
Thornton, the human part of the prosthetic-erotic equation, dies in the end, and
Buck permanently enters the wild. But is this a complete, unproblematic return to innate
wildness? Three central pieces of textual evidence suggest otherwise. The first is the one
I’ve lingered on above—Buck’s vengeful slaughter of the Indigenous marauders in the
name of white human-canine exceptionalist mastery. Even after the death of his human
lover, Buck continues to enact violence in the name of a Nordic exceptionalism from
which the Indigenous peoples are excluded. He is, in other words, the blond and Nordiccoded representative of London’s literary project of purification. Second, Buck’s
entrance into the wild is one of reproductive colonization. After a few years, “the
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Yeehats” take note of “a change in the breed of timber wolves; for some were seen with
splashes of brown on head and muzzle, and with a rift of white centering down the chest”
(74, emphasis mine).67 Buck has dominated the pack enough to become the breeding
male, spreading his seed among the females and permanently marking the wild with his
genetic signature—the unmistakable mark of whiteness spreading through the north.
This final, crucial gesture relocates Buck from the realm of male-male interspecies
erotics into a more repronormative vision of fertilization and colonization of the wild.
Crucially, though, dogs and wolves are distinct species. So, while sex between Canis
lupus and Canis familiaris is relatively commonplace, it remains a species-transgressive
act. In his colonization of the wild, Buck makes the wolves of the future less wolfish,
marking the denizens of the wild with his innate prowess, coded through his dubious
affiliation with London’s vision of Anglo-Saxon “nobility,” emphasized here through the
genetic signature of whiteness. In the wild, Buck quickly becomes a leader of wolves,
“running at the head of the pack” and “leaping gigantic among his fellows” (75). Rather
than becoming-wolf, Buck is an overcoming-wolf, a Nietzschean übercanine shimmering
under the “glimmering borealis” (75), a Nordic halo beaming through the murk of the
wild.
Ultimately, Buck is able to subdue the wild because he is not of the wild. Said to
move “imperiously” and to “carry himself in right royal fashion” (4), Buck has from the
beginning been naturalized as a leader. And even as he returns to his primitive
Lundblad reads this moment as demonstrating the “mark of Buck’s heterosexual ‘success’ at
propagation” (64), and certainly this analytic is present. One way to read Buck’s sexual development is
according to the familiar “it’s just a stage” framework of homoeroticism, which Jeff Nunokawa describes
in the context of Tennyson’s In Memoriam: “a developmental model of male sexuality . . . establishes the
homoerotic as an early phase that enables and defines the heterosexual” (428). Buck, then, having moved
through his queer phase of privileged interspecies queerness, enters the fold of intraspecies
heteronormativity after Thornton’s death.
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animalism, Buck retains an aura of a European-coded human exceptionalism. In the end,
London describes Buck as a kind of superwolf: “a great, gloriously coated wolf, like, and
yet unlike, all other wolves” (74). Though he has access to the terrain, purview, prey, and
claim to “wildness,” Buck remains importantly distinct from the native timber wolves. It
is crucial to recall Buck’s pedigree: he is half St. Bernard and half Scotch shepherd.
According to the American Kennel Club’s The New Complete Dog Book, the St. Bernard
originated in Europe between 1660 and 1670 (400). Currently the national dog of
Switzerland, the breed received its official name in 1880 and was recognized by the
American Kennel Club (AKC) in 1885. The Scotch shepherd is not an AKC-recognized
breed but is presumably related to the Border Collie, a breed of sheep dogs from the
England-Scotland border region. Purebred or not, Buck is unmistakeably European. As
John Grier Varner and Jeanette Johnson Varner note in Dogs of the Conquest, European
dogs have long been instruments of colonial violence. Playing “a significant part in the
conquest” of Spain (xiii), dogs were often involved in “brutality” and “‘man’s best
friend’ functioned in the conquest as a lethal weapon of war” (xiv). While a Europeandescended dog such as Buck is a transplant on the continent and a descendent of
colonialist violence,68 wolves are indigenous to the Americas. Buck’s mastery over the
Klondike timber wolves, then, serves as an unsavoury reflection of the dog-aided
European subjugation of Indigenous peoples across the Americas.
An astute reader might ask, here, whether I am overstating the extent to which a
dog can be complicit in the project of human colonialism. The question of Buck’s
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Some Indigenous groups did keep domestic dogs before European contact, but this was relatively rare
(Varner and Varner xiv).
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relative agency and autonomy is a crucial one for animal studies, and, as I noted
previously, London is a progressive writer of animal minds.69 Certainly, there is room to
sympathize with Buck on the grounds that he has little choice regarding his master,
whether that master be Thornton or London himself. Furthermore, a dog’s nature is to be
obedient and subservient to human mastery, therefore Buck’s complicity is limited; Buck
is simply attempting to make the best of his own situation by serving a beloved master
and following his instincts. My own analysis, though, reads Buck as a product of
London’s literary project of homo-canine exceptionalist myth-making. I am reading
Buck primarily as a literary artifact, but it’s important to recall “the indelible link
between an animal signifier and its referents, as well as the purity of the natural ‘real’”
(Chen 101). I am reading Buck, here, primarily as a symbolic animal. But I also believe,
as a literary scholar, that symbols matter, and matter enormously—that symbols, indeed,
are one of the most fundamental ways we make, shape, and navigate our psychological
worlds. Buck, as literary technology, becomes a tool in the service of a human
ideological project—one that has come to look, given more than a hundred years of
hindsight, nefarious in its celebration of human-enabled Euro-canine mastery over the
Indigenous people and animals of the north.
If Buck, as literary artifact, remains fixed to his authorial human creator, as
character he also retains a genuine emotional attachment to his sometime human
master/lover. Even after Buck has left human civilization behind for good, human-canine
love haunts the story’s denouement. Buck’s melancholic return to the site of Thornton’s
death to howl, “long and mournfully” (75), after his departed bosom buddy suggests a
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For a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the role of choice in The Call see Carswell 314-16.
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continuation of Buck’s attachment to the human. Rather than fully turning away from
humanity and entering the anonymity of the wild, Buck remains a champion of the
human-canine bond. Significantly, the book ends with a flash-forward summary of
Yeehat glimpses of Buck travelling among the wild wolves: a “gloriously coated”
creature running “at the head of the pack” and habitually “slaying” the Yeehat hunters as
well as their dogs (74). In addition to his reproductive triumph, Buck also continues to
freely kill “the noblest game of all,” clearly killing Yeehat men for sport. Even as he
calls out over heath and knoll for his lost white companion, Buck continues to people
canine world with white-coated wolf babies while murdering the Indigenous denizens of
the Klondike for pleasure. He comes to embody, in other words, a menacing fantasy of
white frontier conquest and Indian killing—a great white wolf howling across the
disappearing frontier.
Jack London was born in San Francisco in 1876, just a few years after the end of
the California Gold Rush. Clifford E. Trafzer and Joel R. Hyer characterize California in
the mid-nineteenth century thus: “Holocaust is an excellent word to use to describe the
terror, death, and destruction brought to Native Americans in California during the era of
the Gold Rush. One might also use the words extermination, debasement, or genocide to
depict Indian-white relations from 1848-68” (1). Mexico ceded California to the U.S. in
1848, after which white violence against Indigenous peoples steadily escalated. In the
1860s, the native peoples were routinely terrorized by volunteer militia groups and more
organized military campaigns and “[b]y 1870, the native population had declined to
20,000 people from 40,000” (Trafzer and Hyer 30). Prominent among the Californian
Indigenous groups were the Yahi people, a name London presumably had in mind when

74
he invented his fictional “Yeehats.” Born into a world of frontier conquest and selfeducated into social Darwinist ideology, London situates his most famous and
memorable book around a climactic scene of Indigenous people being killed by the
mouth of a European-descended canine. This troubling vision of the colonization of the
wild by white men and their Nordic canine prostheses serves as a cautionary exemplar of
the dangerous undercurrents of dog love. In spite of the temptation to celebrate dog love
as a point of entry into “the animal,” London’s fantasy of human-canine colonial mastery
remains a dream we would do well to enter with caution.
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Chapter Two:
Anal-Animal Eroticism in Hemingway’s Corrida

Athletic confrontations between bulls and men have long presented spectacles of malemale interspecies erotics. The Spanish bullfight is, according to James Serpell, the
“nearest modern equivalent” of “Roman orgies of animal abuse” (219). In his 1988 study
Bullfight, social anthropologist Garry Marvin notes that the entire drama of the “corrida
de toros” (“the running of the bulls”) rides on the notion of “compenetrado” (85, 159),
meaning “the closeness of the body of the man with that of the bull” (159). The matador,
accompanied by a ceremonial coterie of men and ritualistically clothed in a dazzling
“suit of lights” (Marvin, Bullfight 160), flirts with the deadly bovine body, gracefully
working as close as he can to the massive bulk of the bull without succumbing to the
deadly passivity of violent receptive penetration. The interspecies sexuality of this
exchange is so palpable that, according to cultural lore, bullfighters “are believed
occasionally to ejaculate during a particularly exhilarating and intense performance”
(Pink 57). The drama of the bullfight hinges on the success of one male animal
attempting to feminize and emasculate the other in an eroticized staging of species
domination.70 The athleticized male champion of the human species battles a powerful,
dangerous, hyper-male and hyper-sexualized perfect physical specimen of the wild.71 If,
as I will argue here, the bull is a symbol of a threatening anal eroticism that must be
subdued to ensure the conquest of a phallic order, then the bullfight enacts a bizarrely

The Spanish bullfight is about simultaneously diminishing the opponent’s wildness and masculinity: “In
the corrida, the bull’s essential wild nature is gradually removed and the animal is, on a behavioural level,
emasculated because the man refuses to allow it to exercise its wilful maleness” (Marvin, Bullfight 161).
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Marvin notes that it is crucial for aficionados that the fighting bull or “toro bravo” is “regarded by
Spaniards as a wild animal” (Bullfight 87).
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queer spectacle of hetero-assertion. Here each male animal desperately attempts to
dominate and penetrate the other precisely so that the threat of male-male eros may be
eliminated via death, enabling a return to the heteronormative order. Bullfighting,
strangely, becomes a queer moment of interspecies eros designed to nullify human
queerness through the performative sacrifice of the threat of anal eroticism.
Jake Barnes, the protagonist of Ernest Hemingway’s major 1926 bullfighting
novel The Sun Also Rises, enters the novel having been queered by a permanent genital
disability: his penis has presumably been amputated by a war wound and he is therefore
rendered incapable of traditional forms of heteronormative sex.72 Agonizingly, he retains
his lust for women such as his tragic paramour Brett Ashley. Jake’s sexual affliction,
then, takes place in the umbra where enforced sexual passivity overshadows desire. It
has been routinely noted that like much of Hemingway’s work The Sun Also Rises
demonstrates the fragility and vulnerability of the hetero-masculine ideal Hemingway
ostensibly championed.73 Jake Barnes’ homoerotic desire for Pedro Romero and Brett
Ashley’s masculinization through assertiveness and risqué, boyish hairstyle certainly
invite such a reading.74 What has not been explored is the way Hemingway develops
Jake Barnes’ masculine vulnerability through a remarkably queer bovine eros. While
queer studies and disability studies have been cozy theoretical bedfellows for some time

Though the precise nature of Jake’s genital dysfunction remains ambiguous throughout the novel, what
is clear is that he cannot have sex. In an interview with George Plimpton, Hemingway provides the clearest
hint to the nature of Jake’s dysfunction, stating that Jake’s “testicles were intact and not damaged. Thus he
was capable of all normal feelings as a man but incapable of consummating them” (Bruccoli 120).
73
See, for example, John S. Bak’s Homo americanus (2010), Debra A. Moddelmog’s Reading Desire
(1999), and Scott St. Pierre’s article “Bent Hemingway: Straightness, Sexuality, Style” (2010). For a
comprehensive overview of the history of otherwise-than-straight readings of Hemingway, see Bak, 53-57.
74
In spite of her gender-bending boyishness, Brett’s body is clearly feminized: she is “built with curves
like the hull of a racing yacht” (22). She is a bent figure, troubling between rigid 1920s notions of
prescribed gender performance.
72
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now, this chapter’s methodological supposition is that the nonhuman focus of animal
studies can productively triangulate this dialogue. Reading The Sun Also Rises in the
wake of Leo Bersani’s attempt to reformulate the anus as a productively negative queer
space apart from the gay and straight dangers of “phallocentrism” suggests that this
novel dramatizes the process of Jake Barnes coming to terms with the non-phallic
sexuality inherent in his disabled body (Bersani 28).75 Significantly, Jake’s process of
becoming queerly heterosexual entails a protracted tryst with nonhuman animals. In
Pamplona, Jake hungrily watches a beautiful boy performing violently and erotically
with a series of bulls. Jake’s role as a spectator of human-bovine eros in Pamplona
resembles what Kathryn Bond Stockton calls “an interval of animal” (94), a passing
stage wherein Stockton’s “queer child” negotiates early homoerotic desire through
exchanges of intimacy and affection with domestic animals (106). Although critics
generally read the bulls in The Sun Also Rises as avatars for phallic male sexuality—
prosthetic testicles and penis extensions—this chapter reads the bull as a symbol of anal
eroticism, arguing that Hemingway uses Jake Barnes to explore the (tragic) possibilities
of a non-phallic sexuality through the athleticized and eroticized bovine body. The bull,
here, takes on the baggage of the threat of anal sexuality—a sexuality Hemingway
pathologizes as both animalistic and disabled, but a sexuality he also explores tenderly
and genuinely in the novel’s searching melancholy.

In his queer-canonical 1987 essay “Is the Rectum a Grave?,” Leo Bersani critiques the “idolatry of the
cock” and suggests that the “rectum” may be “the grave in which the masculine ideal” can and should be
“buried” (28, 29).
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Jake Barnes as Queerly Disabled Heterosexual

Throughout his oeuvre, Ernest Hemingway weaves a complex tapestry of masculine scar
tissue.76 Writing in the shadow of World War I, Hemingway was perhaps one of the first
and most articulate voices describing what Mark Seltzer would later call America’s
“wound culture” (Serial Killers 21). Mirroring Jake’s absent penis, the shadow of World
War I lurks hauntingly over the action of The Sun Also Rises. One extraordinary thing
about Parisian life in the early 1920s would have been an astonishing increase in
disabled bodies.77 The world Hemingway encountered in the years leading up to writing
this text was a world newly strewn with disability, and in The Sun Also Rises
Hemingway explored questions of masculinity and disability through the spectacle of the
corrida. The chapter to follow reads Jake Barnes’ wound through the confluence of
queer theory, disability studies, and the threatening presence of anal-animality.
Thanks, largely, to Nancy R. Comley and Robert Scholes’ groundbreaking work
Hemingway’s Genders (1994), the past two decades have witnessed a flourish of
scholarly work questioning the traditional image of Hemingway as a hyper-hetero
author. If, as Bak writes, the “marriage of Hemingway and queer theory” once seemed
“[u]nlikely” (53), this emergent critical conversation provides a clear indication of the

As Thomas Strychacz notes, “[w]ounded and traumatized male characters fill the pages of
[Hemingway’s] fiction” (“Masculinity” 279). Moddelmog surveys the proliferation of male wounds in
Hemingway’s canon, a robust list ranging from Harry Morgan’s amputated arm in To Have and Have Not
to Santiago’s skin cancer in The Old Man and The Sea (121-2). John S. Bak takes note of an entire subcategory of “sexual dysfunction novels” (58), including A Farewell to Arms, For Whom the Bell Tolls, and
the posthumously published The Garden of Eden. If not a repetition compulsion, wounds and disability are
clearly a recurring interest for Hemingway.
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As Clancy Sigal notes, “In the actual Paris where the novel takes place you always saw mutiles de
guerre on the streets, war-mutilated men on crutches or wearing eye patches, or hopping along on one leg
or, in the case of double amputees, moving on rollers” (54).
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relevance and potential of reading Hemingway beyond his self-styled legacy as a posterboy of a white American hunter-ravager mythos.78 Such research has opened the door to
the closet of Hemingway’s work, demonstrating that exciting, provocative, and
important readings of Hemingway’s writing are available beyond familiar forms of sex
and gender normativity.
One of the places where the queer approach can merge with disability studies is
in Hemingway’s clear obsession with “the male wound” (Strychacz, “Masculinity” 280).
As Dana Fore notes, Hemingway’s work offers compelling terrain for analysis from the
perspective of disability studies.79 Examining the particulars of Jake Barnes’ queerly
disabled heterosexuality also helps to establish the parameters of the dynamics of analanimal eroticism in Hemingway’s novel. In its inherent resistance to normative notions
of human bodily coherence, disability studies shares commonalities with the fields of
posthumanism and animal studies.80 As Cary Wolfe’s work shows, liberal humanism has
constructed an imperialistic paragon of subjectivity—the human body—built on the
backs of an army of the subjugated others against which it defines itself (women, queers,

At the biographical level, critics have taken varied stances on the question of Hemingway’s relative
queerness. Travelling an astonishing distance from biographer Jeffrey Meyers’ panicked assertion that
“there is not a shred of real evidence to suggest that Hemingway ever had any covert homosexual desires
or overt homosexual relations” (202), Comley and Scholes conclude their book thus: “Have we been trying
to show that Hemingway was gay? No. If anything, we have been trying to show that such a question is too
simple” (143-44). Moddelmog follows Comley and Scholes’ deliberately inconclusive stance, not arguing
that “Hemingway himself was homosexual” but insisting that “homosexual desire was among the desires
he felt and depicted in his fiction, and we do a disservice to him and ourselves by not coming out and
naming this desire for what it is” (85). These queer-friendly works endeavour to read Hemingway as more
than the masculinist caricature he became, and to unveil the anxieties that undergirded this construction.
79
“The Sun Also Rises articulates ideas currently debated within the field of disability studies . . . . An
examination of these new concepts, in turn, allows a re-evaluation of Hemingway’s attitudes towards
wounds and masculinity” (33).
80
Cary Wolfe argues that animal studies and disability studies are “two of the most philosophically
ambitious and ethically challenging” field of cultural studies to emerge in recent years because they “pose
fundamental challenges” to the liberal-humanist tradition and its model of subjectivity (“Learning From
Temple Grandin” 110). For a forceful critique of Wolfe and Grandin’s turn to disability, see Anat Pick’s
Creaturely Poetics, 204n10.
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racialized peoples, disabled people, nonhuman animals and everyone else not welcomed
into the purview of full humanity). Both animal studies and disability studies attempt to
corrode this violently normalizing vision of the human body.
Lennard J. Davis emphasizes the importance of temporality in the cultural
machinery of disability: “When one speaks of disability, one always associates it with a
story, places it in a narrative. A person became deaf, became blind, was born blind,
became quadriplegic. The disability immediately becomes part of a chronotope, a timesequenced narrative, embedded in a story” (Davis 3). In the context of The Sun Also
Rises, this urge to chronologize disability takes on another important valence; there is a
ubiquitous fantasy of recovery at work in this novel and the discourse around it. A
representative critic, Fore suggests that Jake’s story is about a “journey towards
psychological wholeness” (339), as if he needs to find a way to compensate for his
disability. Critics generally presume that part of Jake’s psychological journey is the
attempt to regenerate his missing penis. I would like to suggest that one of the things
Jake must relinquish is the fantasy of recovery, an impulse leading to an imaginary and
always unattainable wholeness. Instead of overcoming his disability, he needs to learn to
inhabit what Davis calls the “disabled moment” (4).
Jake Barnes embodies a radical conjunction of queerness and disability. His
queerness first emerges at the end of the novel’s first chapter, when he announces his
“rotten habit of picturing the bedroom scenes of [his] friends” (13). Here Jake signals
that his own sexuality is both voyeuristic and abnormal, implying that sexual identity
will be one of the novel’s thematics. The word “rotten”—which will reappear in a later,
crucial moment of self-diagnosis—is a vital index of Jake’s understanding of his own
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sexuality as something perverted by disability. When he solicits the attentions of the
snaggletoothed prostitute, Georgette, the odd nature of his sexuality manifests physically
for the first time: “She touched me with one hand and I put her hand away” (15). Jake
recoils from Georgette’s touch, presumably directed towards the genitals. When she asks
about his reaction, he admits that he is “sick” (15), or sexually abnormal. What is
perhaps queerest about this is not that Jake is sexually ‘dysfunctional’ but that he
initiates a dalliance with a prostitute in spite of his dysfunction. Whether or not he is
capable of making love to Georgette, he wants to perform heterosexuality with her,
theatrically introducing her to Robert Cohn and other friends as his “fiancée” (18). Jake
lampoons heterosexuality in a fashion reminiscent of the closeted man, enacting public
displays of sexual normalcy without having to actually perform in the bedroom.
The Sun Also Rises is, among other things, a novel about homosexual panic. This
is characteristic of a writer who, in the words of biographer James R. Mellow, “despised
male homosexuals throughout his life” (168).81 The literary exploration of panic more
generally is also germane for a writer whose oeuvre was affectively characterized by a
recurring fixation on “the almost sensual arousal-state of fear” (Mellow 307). In
Hemingway’s work, confrontations with fear—often in the form of a formidable animal
foe—tests and measures and ultimately determines manhood. Early in The Sun Also
Rises when Brett arrives at the bal musette accompanied by an entourage of young gay
men, Jake’s jealousy boils over into homophobic rage: “I was very angry. Somehow they
always made me angry. I know they are supposed to be amusing, and you should be
tolerant, but I wanted to swing on one, any one, anything to shatter that superior,

The distinction “male” is crucial here, as Hemingway was a friend and great admirer of the literary icon
Gertrude Stein, a known lesbian.
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simpering composure” (20). As a prototypical homosexual panic response, Jake’s violent
loathing towards these men seems to be shot through with pangs of anxious desire. He
wants to “swing on” one, suggesting not just a need for bodily intimacy in the only
hetero-acceptable fashion but also prefiguring the idea of the “swinger” which, according
to the Oxford English Dictionary, would come to mean both a “homosexual” and
someone who is “sexually promiscuous” by the mid-twentieth century (“swinger,” def.
3c). His rage when confronted with these homosexual men bespeaks a desire to connect
with them in violent passion, an experience he fantasizes about as a kind of shattering—a
shattering, perhaps, of the mandates of a phallic heterosexuality he is unable to properly
enact. Jake’s desire to shatter the composure of these young gay men in this early
moment of panic offers an early sign of a tendency that can be characterized as a
shattering into anal eroticism. One of the major things Jake fears about these gay men is
what they represent in terms of himself: the potential jouissance available to him in the
form of the non-phallic erotic life he both loathes and longs for.
It is not the relatively transparent presence of same sex desire that is the root of
Jake’s queerness; it is his disability.82 The novel retains crucial ambiguity regarding the

Jake’s queer desires surface prominently during his homosocial fishing fling with Bill Gorton in
Burguete. Here Bill and Jake flirt with the limits of acceptable homosociality as Bill offers a testimony to
their intimacy—“I’m fonder of you than anybody on earth” (116)—that would mean he was a “faggot” in
New York but is utterable in Spain (116). Moddelmog affirms that this moment “indicates Bill’s awareness
of the instability of the line separating homosocial and homosexual behavior and desire” (97). However,
Jake does not admire Bill’s body the way he does those of other men such as Robert Cohn: “He was nice
to watch on the tennis court, he had a good body, and he kept it in shape” (45). In this instance, it seems
that the male body is an appropriate object for interest so long as it is athleticized. Later, as J. Gerald
Kennedy notes, Jake becomes enchanted with another man: “homosexual attraction underlies – and
intensifies – Jake Barnes’s later admiration for the bullfighter Pedro Romero” (155). When he meets
Romero, Jake is taken aback by a youthful vision of the male sublime: “He was the best-looking boy I
have ever seen” (163). This encounter anticipates the bullfighting scenes, where Jake’s descriptive voice
hones in and lingers on Romero’s body in rare, dynamic lyricism. While Jake clearly experiences a
legitimate, if frustrating, desire for women such as Brett Ashley, as narrator he actually spends more time
describing beautiful male bodies than female.
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precise nature of Jake’s sexual disability, offering Jake’s cryptic self-assessment (“a
rotten way to be wounded” [31]) and a colonel’s assertion that he has lost “more than
[his] life” in the war as its clearest hints on the matter (31). While Wolfe incorrectly
asserts that Jake “is a steer” (Animal Rites 135)—a bull without testicles—the main line
of Hemingway criticism disputes such claims on the grounds of Hemingway’s comments
during the Plimpton interview.83 While it is common for critics such as Nina Schwartz to
speak of Jake’s “castration” (49), according to Hemingway’s remarks in the Plimpton
interview Jake is not in the technical sense castrated (though he is castrated in the
Freudian sense).84 Whether or not we accept Hemingway’s meta-commentary as
unfalsifiable, it is crucial to establish what the text does make explicit: Jake has a genital
wound and is incapable of having a mutually satisfying sexual relationship with Brett;
Jake cries thinking about Brett (31); Brett claims she is in love with Jake and vice versa
(33, 183); they are aroused by each other (26); they kiss (25, 34). Far from precluding
such an interpretation, this textual evidence coupled with Hemingway’s commentary
suggests that anal eroticism might be the most satisfying form of sex available to Jake.

Stoneback, for example, insists that “there is absolutely not one word or implication or gesture that in
any way associates Jake with a steer” (234). Though there clearly are links, such as Jake’s role as a herder
of Brett’s lovers paralleling the steer’s task in the bullfighting arena, Hemingway’s comments do suggest
an important technical distinction between Jake’s condition and the steer’s. Drawing elaborate parallels
between the characters in the novel and the specific roles played by various animals in the bullfight,
Dewey Ganzel argues that Jake is not a generic steer but a “cabestro” (27), the specific type of steer that
manages the bulls in the arena.
84
In his authoritative study, Castration: An Abbreviated History of Western Manhood (2000), Gary Taylor
notes that Freud, in the twentieth century, began to interpret castration in relation to the penis rather than
the testicles: “castration—in humanist Europe, as in previous societies—attacked the scrotum. In
twentieth-century psychoanalysis, by contrast, castration has been redefined as an attack on the penis”
(91). Critical of the psychoanalytical tendency to simply follow Freud while overlooking the nature of
“castration as a changing historical practise” (92), Taylor himself sets out to track the “history of the
transformations of the male genitalia in the centuries between Middleton and Freud” (92). While
psychoanalysis marked a shift in emphasis from the testicles to the penis, casting the concept of castration
more loosely as a generalized threat to make genitals, I would like to emphasize that Jake Barnes is not
technically castrated.
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Further, it suggests that the male anus is a place one or both of them is unwilling to go in
their erotic travels together.
If Jake is not capable of phallic intercourse, what is he capable of sexually? Such
physical possibilities remain relatively unexamined in Hemingway criticism. While
Stoneback makes a quick and dismissive reference to critics who suggest that “some
form of oral or manual sex” may be possible for Jake (64), this is just the tip. Most
obviously, Jake is capable of using sex toys with Brett. This need not mean that he will
augment his lack, simply that he can complement it. Considering Breanne Fahs and Eric
Swank’s assertion that “people have used dildos . . . since at least 3rd century Greece, and
that modern rubber dildos first appeared in the nineteenth century” (667), Brett and Jake
would have more than likely had some familiarity with sexual tools. In spite of Jake’s
absent penis, the pair would have been able to practise their heterosexuality with
prosthetic aids, which as Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner point out would “from
most point of views count as queer sex practices” (564). By augmenting Jake’s disabled
penis with prosthetics, in other words, they would be able to enact a kind of queer
heterosexuality.
While it is clear that Jake would be able to use some combination of sex toys and
oral/manual stimulation to help Brett reach orgasm, there remains the functional question
of Jake’s orgasmic potential. Anatomically speaking, his best nexus of sexual pleasure
most likely lies in the anus. In Gay Men and Anal Eroticism, Steven G. Underwood
seeks to destigmatize “the anal taboo” (5). For Underwood, hetero-masculine identity
requires a panicked denial of the fact that a man’s anus can be entered: “In an attempt at
uncompromising manliness, he’s banished one of his most sensitive erogenous zones to
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where, sadly, no one will ever touch or acknowledge it” (5). In language saturated in
profound and striking melancholy, Underwood takes a remarkably different tack to
Freud, suggesting that the normative dismissal or repression of male anal pleasure is
itself tragic. Underwood also notes that anal sex is highly stigmatized in Western society:
“The message that anal sex is repulsive, unnatural, and unlawful is deliberately and
subliminally hammered into us all of our lives” (6). Recent research, however, suggests
that this claim requires reconsideration. Heterosexual anal intercourse, in fact, has a long
and storied history. Kimberly R. McBride and J. Dennis Fortenberry note that Peruvian
ceramics dating back to 300 AD depict “heterosexual anal intercourse . . . more than any
other sexual act” (123). They also point out that “attention to heterosexual anal sex in the
popular culture has risen over the past decade” and that “images of heterosexual anal sex
are . . . highly prevalent in pornographic films and Web sites” (123-4). Donald Calsyn et
al conservatively estimate that “among US adults . . . 5% of women” have engaged in
receptive anal intercourse (2451). Despite this pervasive cultural interest in and
widespread practice of heterosexual anal sex, the erogenous potential of the male anus—
“loaded with nerve endings and . . . extremely sensitive to erotic stimulation”
(Underwood 8)—remains largely ignored. As far as the reader knows, Jake, like most
straight-identified men, has lived his life without exploring such erotic possibilities.
The subject of anal eroticism occupies a conspicuous void in Hemingway
studies.85 If, as Susan Fraiman has suggested, there is a “pussy panic” at work in animal
studies (100), there is certainly also a “butt panic” at work in the criticism on

Beyond Hemingway’s obvious discomfort with male homosexuals, he also seems to have had an
anxious interest in anal sex—around 1924 he wrote a short story, “Summer People,” which featured a
graphic anal sex scene apparently intended to humiliate an acquaintance, Katy Smith (Mellow 278).
85
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Hemingway’s novel. Wolfe, in an extended analysis of Jake’s anxiety about being
“stuffed” (Animal Rites 132-5), does not consider the possibility of anal phobia even as
he suggests that Jake feels feminized, animalized, and castrated by his wound. Fore, who
laments the fact that “[c]ritics have barely considered the idea that Jake could achieve
sexual satisfaction in nontraditional ways” (338), retreats at the threshold of the anus.
While Dana Fore rightly notes that “it is possible for severely disabled people to achieve
sexual satisfaction by re-training their bodies to feel erotic pleasure in different ways,
through different erogenous zones” (338), he neither names the implied erogenous
zone—the anal-prostate circuit—nor considers the possibility that both disabled and nondisabled people might simply choose to practise and enjoy anal eroticism without being
compelled to do so.
An anal-positive reading may help to shed new light on Jake’s plaintive question:
“‘Don’t you love me?’
‘Love you? I simply turn all to jelly when you touch me.’
‘Isn’t there anything we can do about it?’” (26)
Jake’s query is not driven by mere curiosity; it may be a direct request for Brett to get
creative with their sexual life. Brett’s ensuing silence offers a direct challenge to Nahal’s
claim that the pair later engages in some “perverse” sex act (44). Jake infers from her
body language that “there’s not a damn thing we could do” (26), though Brett’s panicked
response—“I don’t want to go through that hell again” (26)—suggests that they have
tried, unsuccessfully, to experiment sexually. Though there are clearly possibilities for
Jake and Brett to have a mutually beneficial sex life, Brett is unwilling to pursue nonphallic sex with Jake. This does not necessarily indict Brett—she’s not at fault for what
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she may or may not be into—but it does suggest that she retreats, panicked, from the
threatening threshold of the male anus, that untapped reservoir of pleasure. Perhaps what
she finds threatening is the animality lurking within that cavity.

The Beast in the Anus: Anal-Animal Eros and Sexological Theory

Situating Hemingway’s novel in its 1920s context invites a foray into the contemporary
discourses of sexological and psychanalytic theory, and such an excavation reveals a
clear and vital link between anal eroticism and animality. The bullfight, therefore, comes
to stand for the male coterie Jake joins in Pamplona as a ritual of literal animal death that
represents the symbolic death of anal-animal sexuality—slaughtering the bull purifies the
masculine bullfighter and spectator from the threat of the perverse, sexual, anallyoriented beast within.
Psychoanalysis and sexology, two of the most prominent theoretical paradigms
emerging in the early twentieth century, were from their beginnings driven by a
conjoined and panicked fascination with animal bodies and human sexual “perversions.”
More specifically, these disciplines demonstrated a poignant double-fascination with
animals and anal eroticism. Extrapolating from the emergent scientific paradigm of
Darwinian evolution, psychoanalysis and early sexology sought to bury animality and
non-normative eroticism together in the closets of humanity’s primitive, bestial past. Of
course, doctors such as Sigmund Freud, Havelock Ellis, and Richard Von Krafft-Ebing
were radical thinkers for their time and often demonstrated progressive views about
sexuality. For example, Freud makes it clear in his Three Essays on the Theory of
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Sexuality (1905) that he should “not be accused of partisanship” with respect to his
analysis of anal eroticism (18). Freud does not mean to propagate the “disgust” that
surrounds this sex act (Three Essays 18), merely to note it. In spite of this ostensible
neutrality, however, Freud and his colleagues understood the tendency to enjoy anal
eroticism as a resolvable pathology that held one back from achieving normal adult
sexuality. Furthermore, sexology and psychoanalysis drew a link between anal eroticism
and humanity’s primitive animal past. The psychoanalytic attempt to establish penilevaginal intercourse as the normative mode of human sexuality also ended up situating
the beast in the anus.
Sexology was from its inception driven by species panic, here iterating as the
pronounced anxiety that surfaces when human exemplarity is challenged by external and
interior “animal” sexuality—the beast in the closet, the sexual primitivity of the human
species. On the first page of his discipline-formative 1886 work Psychopathia Sexualis,
Richard Von Krafft-Ebing distinguishes between human and animal sexuality: “Man
puts himself at once on a level with the beast if he seeks to gratify lust alone, but he
elevates his superior position when by curbing the animal desire he combines with the
sexual functions ideas of morality, of the sublime, and the beautiful” (29). In his attempt
to establish normative human sexuality, Krafft-Ebing makes the anti-Darwinian move of
placing humans above other animals in the hierarchy of being. More importantly, he
identifies sexuality as a specifically animalistic impulse, an inner bestiality that must be
augmented with more refined aesthetic and moral functions to create a scenario where
humans can both have sex and transcend the animality of sexual urges. Krafft-Ebing’s
attempt to assert the superiority of the human species was, of course, linked to an
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anxious desire to treat and normalize “pathologies” including “pederasty,” “inversion,”
and “zoophilia,” (309, 406, 305).86 Krafft-Ebing places homosexuality on a spectrum of
sexual disorders that includes sex with animals, militating to ensure that a correct human
sexuality is also a homospecies sexuality.
The development of the science of sexual pathology emerged alongside the
newly minted scientific definition of human species status. Strangely, the significance of
the word “species” typically goes unnoted in examinations of Foucault’s famous claim
that after the year 1870 “the homosexual was now a species” (Sexuality 43). In order for
the homosexual to become a species, the concept of “species” in its modern scientific
incarnation had to come into being. Foucault uses the year 1870, precisely 11 years after
the publication of Darwin’s Origins, as his index for the emergence of the homosexual
species. The concept of the species itself therefore takes hold alongside the medical
diagnosis of sexual perversion in an attempt to simultaneously identify the human and, in
spite of Darwin’s recognition that the human animal occupies an unexceptional position
on the organic continuum of life,87 to renounce the animality of certain human sexual
drives. Given the Darwinian framework’s emphasis on reproduction, it is strange, if by
now familiar, that the human sexuality that came to be privileged was reproductive—the
exact type of sex animals practice freely and rigorously in phantasmagoric states of
nature.

Mel Y. Chen notes that “since the beginning of European and American sexology in the nineteenth
century” (102), sexologists have used homosexuality as a “limit case” for a conception of “natural” human
sexuality (102). In much of this work, “the animal itself becomes sexuality” (Chen 103).
87
In the Descent of Man, Darwin writes that “the difference in mind between man and the higher animals,
great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind” (151).
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Like Krafft-Ebing, Freud wanted to distinguish refined, normative human sexual
behavior from its animal origins. In his early case studies and later in Civilization and Its
Discontents, it becomes clear that Freud shares Krafft-Ebing’s view of modern human
sexuality as an edified version of a primitive animal instinct. Certainly, Freud often used
animals as a key to understanding the sexual neuroses he analyzed.88 Freud’s later case
studies are replete with the importance of animals as symbols of human sexuality, and
his hypothesis about the “Wolf Man” learning sexual lessons from watching an “animal
coitus” involving “large white dogs . . . copulating” illuminates the ways in which
animals—the proverbial birds and the bees—often serve as primary didactic metaphors
for human sexuality (215).89
Freud’s work dramatizes a sustained link between animality and anal eroticism;
both the “Wolf Man,” and the “Rat Man” exhibit sexual neuroses rooted in primal scenes
where animals and anality mingle. The Rat Man’s neurosis derives from a tale of
military torture whereby a soldier is forced to have rats crawl into his anus and the Wolf
Man’s disorder originates in a dream involving wolves apparently threatening to
“devour” him (Three Case Histories 13, 187). In both instances, Freud’s diagnosis is the
same: the patient’s neurosis originates in an “unconscious homosexuality” that leads to a
sublimated “anal eroticism” (Three Case Histories 274, 52, 230). Freud’s analysis of the
“Wolf Man” reveals, further, that the “anal-erotic disposition” is distinguished by
“archaic traits” such as the desire for rear-entry intercourse (which Freud viscerally

Dana Seitler notes that the relation “between animals and sexuality” becomes “one of psychoanalysis’s
most operative metaphors” (38).
89
Havelock Ellis likewise takes note of the primacy of what he calls “Mixoscopic Zoophilia” (Erotic
Symbolism 71), wherein “young persons” receive “sexual pleasure” from “the sight of copulating animals”
(Erotic Symbolism 71).
88
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describes as featuring “the woman bent down like an animal” [199, 196]). Pairing this
moment with Freud’s well-known analysis in Civilization and Its Discontents—wherein
the human moves beyond its “earlier animal nature” by rising up on the hind legs and
transcending its erotic-olfactory relation to “urine and faeces” (55)—demonstrates that
the psychoanalytic claim of normative human sexuality involves a movement away from
the conjoined threats of animal sexuality, primitivism, and the eroticized anus.90
Freud’s work was hugely influential both in the America of Hemingway’s youth
and in the mid-1920s France where he conceived The Sun Also Rises. In Hemingway:
The Paris Years, biographer Michael S. Reynolds traces the connection between
Hemingway and Sylvia Beach, best known as the publisher of James Joyce’s Ulysses and
a formidable force on the 1920s Parisian literary scene (11-14). Reynolds notes that from
1921-1925 Hemingway frequently visited Beach’s “bookshop and lending library” (The
Paris Years 12), a trove containing many sexological books, including Havelock Ellis’
Studies in the Psychology of Sex and Erotic Symbolism. Kenneth S. Lynn notes that in
1919 Hemingway “immersed himself” in Ellis’ Studies in the Psychology of Sex (132),
which includes an entire volume on sexual inversion. While it remains unclear whether
Hemingway ever read Freud, he certainly was familiar with—and interested in—
sexological theory during the years leading up to the composition of The Sun Also
Rises.91 Reading Erotic Symbolism, Hemingway would have encountered Ellis’ analysis
of the “great importance” Freud located in the anus as an “erogenous zone” (133). In an
Crucially, Freud doesn’t see the movement away from the animal past as necessarily a good thing. It is,
for him, the very source of “repression” and “nervous disease” (Civilization 55, Three Case Histories 80).
The human drive towards refinement is a major source of human neuroses for Freud. Nonetheless, the
association of anal eroticism with primitive animality remains.
91
Freud’s potential influence on Hemingway has mostly remained unmentioned by critics, a striking
omission considering Kenneth G. Johnston’s illumination of the clear similarity between Hemingway’s
“iceberg analogy” model for fiction writing and the Freudian schema of the unconscious (69).
90
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earlier chapter of the same text, Ellis details a veritable menagerie of “animal
perversions” ranging from the tickling of dogs to sex between humans and crocodiles
(83, 72, 87).92 In Erotic Symbolism, Ellis merges animal eros with the Freudian view of
anal eroticism in a single sexological study that Hemingway apparently read eagerly.
Reading The Sun Also Rises in light of Freudian theory also unearths a clear
connection between Hemingway’s text and Freud’s considerations of anal eroticism:
Jake Barnes’ relation to money. Freud writes that “[a]nalysts have long been agreed” that
“the treatment of money” is “among the most important manifestations” of “anal
eroticism” (Three Case Histories 230). Money, for Freud, takes on “the physical interest
which was originally proper to faeces, the product of the anal zone” and thereby
becomes a substitute for anal stimulation (Three Case Histories 230). Read in this light,
Hemingway’s repeated elaborations of Jake’s attitude towards money take on increased
significance. Early on in the novel, Jake takes stock of his accounts: “The letters were
from the United States. One was a bank statement. It showed a balance of $2432.60. I
got out my check-book and deducted four cheques drawn since the first of the month,
and discovered I had a balance of $1832.60” (30). Why does the reader need this much
information about his finances? This passage, firstly, informs the reader that Jake is quite
well off—rent in Paris at this time was about ten dollars per month (Stoneback 63).
Coming at the pivotal moment just after a failed sexual liaison with Brett and just before
Jake’s melancholy genital self-examination in the mirror, though, this account-taking
takes on a deeper narrative weight. Not only does it reveal the amount of money Jake

Ellis also notes that bestiality is most common among “dull, insensitive, and unfastidious persons” such
as “primitive peoples” and “peasants” (Erotic Symbolism 79). Although Ellis is in fact quite sensitive
regarding the question of whether human-animal sex merits punishment (Erotic Symbolism 88), he
nonetheless associates this act with a primitive, regressive human sexuality.
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has, it also offers the first inclination of Jake’s almost neurotic fastidiousness with
money, a theme that Hemingway threads loudly through the novel (Reynolds, “The Sun
in its Time” 47). Read in the Freudian context, Jake’s decision to count his money as
soon as he has turned away from his unrealizable desire for Brett sets up a poignant
correlation between Jake’s obsessive monetary fastidiousness and his emerging anal
eroticism.
Another contemporary of Hemingway’s who explores the link between animality,
the anus, and the sun is French philosopher Georges Bataille. Bataille, who has received
less than his due credit in recent work by the “antisocial thesis” school of queer theory, 93
is key for Bersani as a precursor of his own notion of “the self which the sexual shatters”
(25). Echoing Bersani, Bataille’s writings from 1927-1929, collected under the title
Visions of Excess, use the anus as an emblem of a life-affirming nihilism beyond
prevailing social orders. Conjuring Freud’s narrative of mankind’s rise up from four legs,
Bataille notes that with the development of erect posture the “human anus secluded itself
deep within flesh” (Visions 77). This is a regrettable obfuscation for Bataille, who sees
the anus as a site of “ecstatic brutishness” (Visions 78). Though he retains the correlation
between anality and animality, in “The Solar Anus” Bataille wishes to redeem the anus,
reclaiming it as an “erotic revolutionary” force through a fusion of an ecstatic animality
and a “torrid and blinding sun” (Visions 8, 9). The sun, of course, bears considerable
significance for Hemingway’s novel, which Bataille would later praise as a testament to
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Lee Edelman does not reference Bataille in No Future or in his more recent book with Lauren Berlant,
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explicit theoretical methodology (23). Significantly, both Edelman (Sex, Or The Unbearable 16-17), and
Halberstam (21), turn to animal representations as ways to push beyond the confines of normative
thinking.
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the author’s “profound honesty and passion for truth and excellence” (“Hemingway” 7).
Stoneback notes that Jake Barnes exhibits “[h]eliophilia—love of the sun and
sunbathing” (280, 281), a trend that was growing in popularity in the 1920s. The most
prominent moment of heliophilia occurs in San Sebastian, after Jake has left Pamplona
and the claim of afición behind him. Jake’s complete submission to the sun, in other
words, takes place after he has relinquished the promise of phallic virility he hoped the
bullfight might offer. In the narrative temporality of the novel, the sun comes after the
penis. Significantly, Freud’s analysis of Dr. Schreber hinges on the signification of the
sun as “a sublimated symbol for the father” (Three Case Histories 130). The sun, in
Freud’s analysis, symbolizes Dr. Schreber’s desire for the father, linking it back to anal
eroticism. Reading Hemingway’s sun in the Freudian-Bataillean nexus, then, might offer
a revisionary interpretation of Hemingway’s title—if Jake’s penis is no longer capable of
erection it is the sun-as-anus that will “also rise” in its stead.
Bataille not only ties the erotic power of the sun to the anus, he also excavates the
palpable sexuality at work in the bullfighting spectacle. In his 1928 novel Story of the
Eye, published under the pseudonym Lord Auch, Bataille describes the bullfight as an
inexorably erotic performance:
When the bull makes its quick, brutal, thrusts over and over again into the
matador’s cape, barely grazing the erect line of the body, any spectator has that
feeling of total and repeated lunging typical of the game of coitus. The utter
nearness of death is also felt in the same way . . . . It is well known that at such
thrilling instants the women jerk off by merely rubbing their thighs together.
(56-7)
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Shortly after the publication of The Sun Also Rises, then, Bataille saw the spectacle of
the bullfight as an overwhelmingly pornographic event where death, athleticism, and the
animal body served to arouse the human—notably female—spectator. The deadly
contest between men of different species becomes, here, an erotic performance to be
pleasurably consumed by the female viewer. Bataille was at the time also profoundly
interested in the animal anus: “There is no child who has not at one time or another
admired, in zoos, these filthy proturberances” (Visions 75). The nonhuman animal body,
displayed in the zoo, becomes in Bataille’s schematic reading little more than an anus
designed to satisfy human erotic curiosity. Setting aside the ethics of this, what is clear is
that Bataille offers the crystallization of a theoretical moment when a changing human
sexual paradigm—one that was highly curious about anal eroticism—could be explored
through the bullfight and other venues of interspecies erotics.
Given his reading of sexology and his heavy handling of Jake’s economic
fastidiousness and love for the sun, Hemingway may well have been setting Jake up as a
character study in anal eroticism. Certainly, he did endeavour to explore in Jake the
(tragic) possibilities of a non-phallic sexuality through the athleticized and eroticized
animal body. Hemingway’s composition refracts the sexological fascination with
animals and the anus, suggesting that on some level these two threats—the “beast
within” and the eroticism lurking in that most hidden, private orifice—need to be worked
through in conjunction. Placing Hemingway’s work in the context of sexology and
psychoanalysis reveals the remarkable generation in the 1920s of this strange moment
when theory passes, via the solar anus, through the development of anal-animal
pathology and into the bull’s ring.
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The Bull’s Ring

Though the history of bovine-human interaction is long and multi-faceted, the bull has
long held an erotic symbolic significance for agrarian cultures. Domestic cattle have
been intricately linked with human civilization for thousands of years: “The bovine—
idolized, eulogized, and sometimes denigrated in the art, music, religion, literature, and
drama of man—is more closely interwoven with the fabric of man’s culture than any
other animal” (Sims and Johnson 16). Likewise, agrarian cultures have almost
ubiquitously understood the bull as “the supreme example of masculine strength and
ferocity in nature, the epitome of fertility and virility” (Velten 31). For as long as the bull
has operated as a central symbol in human society, it has been a manifestly erotic
signifier.
In contemporary Western culture, bovine erotics are endemic not only to the type
of drug-fueled rodeo high jinks represented by the 2013 film Dallas Buyers Club but also
in the bizarre and widespread practice of riding mechanical bulls. Comedian Amy
Schumer parodies the latter ritual in the episode “80s Ladies” of her controversial
feminist television series Inside Amy Schumer. While competing for male attention at a
bar, Amy asks her female friend why a woman would ride the mechanical bull and the
friend earnestly replies, “So people can see what you look like when you fuck, that’s the
point. My cousin got married from that.” The woman who rides the bull becomes, like
female bullfighters (Pink 52), both sexy and “tough,” capable of mastering the simulated
ferocity of the male animal body. This makes her, as Schumer’s friend emphasizes,
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“marriage material,” and makes riding the mechanical bull into an animal-mediated stage
in the modern mating ritual of the heterosexual bar scene. In the episode Amy’s friend
goes first, providing an eager sexual performance aboard the electronic bovine body
amid encouragement from an announcer and a crowd of whooping men. Amy’s
subsequent attempt and total failure aboard the bull suggests the fundamental
ludicrousness of this rite of passage, but the role of the animal presence remains implicit
in Schumer’s feminist commentary. The male announcer’s plaid shirt and cowboy hat,
coupled with his emphasis on saddles and “cowgirls” makes this rodeo simulacrum into
a campy performance of stylized, animal-themed innuendo. Bovine erotics offer a crucial
window into the contemporary American zeitgeist, the bull’s body intervening in the
pick-up bar—the sphere of human courtship—in order to lubricate human courtship with
eroticized performance.
More subtly, The Sun Also Rises explores a comparable nexus of interspecies
erotics in its focus on the Spanish bullfight. If, as Joshua Schuster argues, “[t]here are
very few animals in modernist literature” (22), Hemingway provides a striking exception
to the rule. Nonhuman animals are a pervasive, violent, and erotically charged force in
Hemingway from the bull “roaring blood” in the early short story collection In Our Time
through the “bloody-headed lion” of “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber” to
Santiago’s aquatic tormentor (105, 140), “the fish” of The Old Man and the Sea (83).
Hemingway’s bulls have often been read as sacrifices on the altars of male human
(hetero)sexuality.94 In The Sun Also Rises bulls becomes a prosthetic of a different sort

Arnold E. Davidson and Cathy N. Davidson note that in The Sun Also Rises “love of the bullfight
confers masculinity by association” (94). Similarly, Wolfe affirms that Jake’s expertise in boxing and
bullfighting render him “culturally the quintessential man’s man” (Animal Rites 125). Strychacz likewise
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from that which Buck became in The Call of The Wild. Rather than avatars of white
human eugenic-imperialist conquest, Hemingway’s bulls become augmentations of the
male genital prowess Jake has lost; they become prosthetic penises, indicators of the
fantasy of phallic regeneration at work in this novel.
The bullfight is a decidedly queer spectacle. There are several levels of radical
queerness at work in this drama. First, the clearly erotic interactions between man and
bull in the arena suggests a queerness insofar as interspecies erotics is a non-normative
sexual event. Second, there is the fact that both bull and bullfighter are male. Whatever
symbolic structures might play out here, at the literal level the bullfight offers an
intimate physical encounter between males. Finally, in terms of male-male erotics—
human male penetrating a vagina-less animal body—the most likely inference is that the
bull represents non-phallic eroticism, with anal eroticism being the most likely
candidate. The bull is a definitively male creature whose ceremonial role is to be
penetrated by a man. The slaughter of the bull, therefore, enacts a fantasy of the death of
the eroticized anal orifice and the threat it poses to male sexuality and human species
identity. Human male heterosexuality is thus established at the cost of animal life.
Bovine genitals and sexuality are paramount to the ritual of the Spanish bullfight.
Functioning genitals are, in fact, precisely what defines the bull as bull. While the steer
has a penis but not testicles, the bull is, in technical language, an “entire male” (Velten
9); it is an adult male with intact testicles and a functioning penis. Beyond the bullfight,
the triumph of athletic human masculinity over nonhuman wildness often requires the

argues that in Hemingway’s “bullring, men are made or unmanned” (Theaters 53). Sociologist Linda Kalof
supports such arguments when she writes that sport in general involves “a ritualized display of masculinity
achieved by feminizing the opponent” and includes bullfighting among “displays that validate masculinity
and heterosexual virility” (439).
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animal body to publicize its virile sexuality. As Marjorie Spiegel points out, deer hunters
“try to kill the most ‘virile’ of the males, those with the biggest antlers. If they are
successful at ending this life, they have proven their own manhood” (61). Just as hunters
measure their manliness by the length of their buck’s antlers, so bullfighters and
aficionados require the bull’s horns and cajones to be visible—and visibly
formidable95—to signify the wild masculinity they subdue. The apparent “possession of
testicles” is so important for the fighting bull’s appearance that “if it is seen to have only
one properly formed testicle” its value will vastly decrease (Marvin, Bullfight 91). The
bull’s testicles—evidence of its virile masculine sexuality—must provide ocular proof of
physical perfection to properly enact the foreplay of sauntering, genitals exposed and
fiercely penetrable, before the consumptive eyes of appraisers and spectators who,
among other things, want to look at bovine testicles.
Another way humans control the sexuality of fighting bulls is through enforced
chastity; fighting bulls are rarely allowed to have sex with cows and for the most part
they are “sexually intact males . . . forced into a life of virginity” (Marvin, Bullfight 92).
Apart from demonstrating the extraordinary biopolitics at work in the human regulation
of bovine sexuality, the human handling of bovine sexuality demonstrates the heady
ooze of sexuality lathering the bullfighting scene itself. The toro bravo must have
formidable testicles and a vigorous, wild libido, but this libido is reserved for encounters
with the matador. Intraspecies eroticism, in the bull’s case, is actually forbidden to create
a more exciting scene of interspecies eros. The entire life of the fighting bull thus
requires the human manipulation of bovine sexuality, from management of the breeding
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“The horns in particular should be well formed and undamaged” (Marvin, Bullfight 101).
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processes to the examinations of the bull and the assurance that it not ejaculate before the
match to the final cathartic moment of public man-bull confrontation.
The male bullfighter is a strangely queer champion of normative masculinity.
Marvin’s analysis of the bullfighter’s dress and behaviour shows that the matador
demonstrates both the epitome of masculinity and a queer transgression of “normal”
maleness. When preparing for a contest, the bullfighter is joined in his bedroom by a
coterie of men who help him dress, attend his “toilet,” and make sure there are no
“wrinkles in his silk stockings” (Marvin, Bullfight 147). The bullfighter’s clothes are not
“part of normal men’s clothing” and his manner in the ring (Marvin, Bullfight 147),
particularly “the gyrating in front of the bull and the thrusting of the pelvis towards it to
encourage it to charge” (Marvin, Bullfight 146), are not “the normal movements of a man
towards another male” (Marvin, Bullfight 146). Matadors have been publicly
homosexual (Pink 56-7), a fact which, strangely, does not inhibit their hyper-masculine
persona.96 It turns out that the matador occupies an orientational grey zone, blurring the
gay/straight binary which in its present form is no doubt much younger than the corida.
Part of what makes the bullfighter hyper-masculine in Spanish culture is the fact that in
the bullfighting arena the matador must paradoxically “behave ‘like a woman’ to prove
that he is a man” (Schwartz 66). The matador offers his own masculinity to his bovine
partner, knowing that his performance may allow the audience to accuse him of having
“no cajones” (Marvin, Bullfight 162). And so he puts on silk stockings, a pony tail, and
an elaborately gilded blazer and readies himself to penetrate or be penetrated. Not unlike

Comley and Scholes argue that “Hemingway’s notion of decadence in bullfighting” should be
considered alongside his “interest in homosexual bullfighters” (122).
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the performance of a modern leather queen, the matador’s parodic enactment of
masculinity unsettles normative body codes precisely in its excessive activation of them.
The role of women in bullfighting is a fraught issue that circles around the
queerness of the spectacle. As Sarah Pink notes, the role of women in the bullfight has
been largely occluded from a myth that constructs the bullfight as a specifically
masculine endeavour (47). Historically, women were allowed no part in the bullfight
except for serving occasionally as rejoneadoras, bullfighters who attack bulls on
horseback in order to weaken the animal before it faces the matador (Marvin, Bullfight
160). Pink traces a history of female bullfighters from the 1930s to the 1990s, using the
famous torara Christina Sánchez to attempt to shift the traditional anthropological
framework of the bullfight. Though the numbers of female bullfighters remain miniscule
compared to the amount of toreras (Fener xvii), the success and prominence of
matadoras have steadily increased in recent decades. This rise in popularity shifts the
matrix of possible erotic performances in the arena, but it does not straighten the
queerness of the corida. To the average aficionado, women entering the bullfight are
likely to be considered “lesbians” or “marimachas (a masculine woman)” (Marvin,
Bullfight 164). Significantly, Pink points out that “Christina Sánchez claims to have
metaphorical balls” (51) and thus calls the “masculine/feminine” distinction into
question (52).97 The female bullfighter, then, does not so much destabilize the masculine
ideal of the bullfighter so much as she claims that identity in a queer performance,
highlighting the extent to which the bullfight has long been a queer spectacle where

Marvin points out that this phenomenon works both ways: “Just as the man who performs badly is liable
to lose his cojones, so the woman who attempts to perform at all is liable to gain them, at least in the eyes
of the public” (Bullfight 163).
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bodies that do not appear traditionally male gain access to masculinity by demonstrating
courage and athletic prowess.
However queer the bullfighting spectacle may be, the interspecies eros at work
here does not enact a liberatory queerness. Instead, interspecies eros here depends on a
violent and cruel treatment of nonhuman animals in the name of art and tradition. While
bulls have been routinely loved, worshipped, and eroticized, they have also been
slaughtered, tortured, and maimed in the name of athletic contests between men. Unlike
cattle and steer, bulls have generally been killed and tortured not for meat but for sport
and spectacle. Nor has the bovine anus been immune from human athletic cruelty. As
James Serpell points out, modern rodeo “performances hinge on the violent subjugation
of living animals, some of which are deliberately incited to frenzied violence by raking
them with spurs, constricting the genital region with leather straps, or by thrusting an
electric prod into the rectal area” (225). The shadow of the bull’s anus, here, becomes a
site of torturous, non-consensual penetration.
Existing in its current form since the eighteenth century with a history dating
back to the year 1090 (Velten 59), the Spanish bullfight offers a more explicit display of
public violence against animals. As Marvin notes, fighting bulls may be tortured before
the spectacle: “It has been known for bulls to be weakened by the administration of
drugs such as laxatives, by having sandbags dropped on their backs, or by having their
horns meddled with” (Bullfight 5). While researchers have estimated the number of bulls
killed per year in the Spanish bullfight at 4, 500 and 17,000 (Preece and Chamberlain
486), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) puts the figure at
approximately 40,000 (“Bullfighting”). Hemingway saw the bullfight as a spectacle of
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art rather than cruelty or violence, insisting in his nonfiction account of bullfighting,
Death in the Afternoon, that the bullfight is not a “sport” but a “tragedy” (16). Although
when it is done badly the bullfight can become a theatre of violence (Death 22-3), in its
ideal form it depicts the death of the bull as a beautiful tragedy rather than a sadistic
spectacle (Death 16). It is worth noting that Hemingway did not think that a true animal
lover could stomach the spectacle of the bullfight, thus suggesting that he does not think
of himself as among the “animalarians” (Death 9). For Hemingway, the bullfight is a
symbol of the primal possibilities of human art, and the capacity to stylistically ornament
the very conditions of life and death.
Whether it is a sport or an art, however, the bullfight remains an athletic
spectacle; the matador must move gracefully and be in peak physical condition, and as
Hemingway remarks, the bull must be a near-perfect physical specimen. In addition to
having two visible and formidable testicles, fighting “bulls by law are required to be
from four to five years old, free from physical defects, and well-armed with sharppointed horns” (Death 26). The bulls, then, recall a prototypical element of athletic
discourse insofar as they initiate an understanding of the normative or even supernormative body. The athleticized animal, here, is either suitable or physically
“defective,” contributing to McRuer’s ideological paradigm of “compulsory ablebodiedness” by distinguishing between normal and abnormal rather than among various
possible ways of being embodied.
Hemingway’s early career—from In Our Time (1925) to Death in the Afternoon
(1932)—demonstrates a profound and recurring fascination with the aesthetic
possibilities enacted by the ritualized meeting of man and bull in the Spanish bullfight.
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Strychacz affirms that Death in the Afternoon is also Hemingway’s “most important
aesthetic manifesto” (Theaters 125), with vivid bullfighting descriptions doubling as
“displaced accounts of writing, and vice versa” (125). Bullfighting, for Hemingway,
becomes the very paradigm of creativity and writerly masculinity. What seems to
fascinate Hemingway most in the bullfight is the climactic moment when the sword of
the bullfighter enters the body of the bull. Hemingway offers his first lyrical evocation of
fatal man-bull entry in chapter 12 of In Our Time:
When he started to kill it was all in the same rush. The bull looking at him
straight in front, hating. He drew out the sword from the folds of the muleta and
sighted with the same movement and called the bull, Toro! Toro! and the bull
charged and Villalta charged and just for a moment they became one. Villalta
became one with the bull and then it was over. (105)
The primal unity of this encounter reels with the orgasmic, little-deathly feel with which
Hemingway in later works would continue to evoke the primordial interspecies intimacy
he found in bullfighting. This recurring evocation of bovine-human oneness reads as a
translation of Freud’s definition of eros in Civilization and Its Discontents: “[a]t the
height of erotic passion the borderline between ego and object is in danger of becoming
blurred. Against all the evidence of the senses, the person in love asserts that ‘I’ and
‘you’ are one” (3). Just as sex and death are, for Freud, parallel circuits in the human
psychological mechanism, both seeking the dull warmth of passivity and the cessation of
want, so the erotic and the thanatological become linked for Hemingway in the
overdetermined scene of the matador’s deadly penetration of the bull.
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In The Sun Also Rises, bullfighting reaches its pinnacle as a glorified spectacle of
queer and fatal interspecies erotics during Romero’s spectacular performance on the day
after he has been pommelled by the jealous boxer Robert Cohn. With a rhetoric of
hypnotic rapture, Jake describes watching Romero dance with the bull in search of the
perfect opening for penetration:
The bull’s tail went up and he charged, and Romero moved his arms ahead of the
bull, wheeling, his feet firmed . . . . At the end of the pass they were facing each
other again. Romero smiled. The bull wanted it again, and Romero’s cape filled
again, this time on the other side . . . . Romero had to make the bull consent with
his body. He had to get so close that the bull saw his body, and would start for it.
(218)
The raised tail of the bull signals the prominence of the nonhuman anus, that shamelessly
displayed orifice which, when exposed by the naked animal, incites human panic about
our own most anxiously hidden orifice.98 The tail, of course, is raised in aggression,
signalling the way in which the bull comes to function as a charging, raging anus
offering the bullfighter two options: to kill and penetrate or be entered and die. The
preferred choice is clear, and the erotic climax of the novel occurs as Romero finally
“woos a bull to death” (Moddelmog 96):
The bull charged as Romero charged. Romero’s left hand dropped the muleta
over the bull’s muzzle to blind him, his left shoulder went forward between the
horns as the sword went in, and for just an instant he and the bull were one,
Romero way out over the bull, the right arm extended high up to where the hilt of

Bataille notes the human fascination with exposed animal anuses: “There is no child who has not at one
time or another admired, in zoos . . . the anal orifice” (Visions 75).
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the sword had gone in between the bull’s shoulders. Then the figure was broken.
There was a little jolt as Romero came clear, and then he was standing, one hand
up, facing the bull, his shirt ripped out from under his sleeve. (218)
After a vigorous post-coital shudder, Romero withdraws from the animal and stands in
shredded garb before the adoring crowd. The bull lies down to die and Bill offers a
whispered elegy: “There he goes” (219). The dazed finality about this moment hums of
sex and vulnerability. Critics have often read this moment as manifestly sexual. Dewey
Ganzel, for example, argues that Hemingway’s use of the word “consent” emphasizes
the “sexuality of the relation between bullfighter and bull” (40). What is most useful for
this analysis, however, is not the claim that the bullfight is erotic but the way that the
particular anal-animal eroticism implied by this meeting of males becomes conjoined to
inevitable death.99 Mortality is central to the burlesque of the bullfighting arena, where
the bullfighter must either kill or be killed.
While most critics are savvy to the obvious eroticism of Hemingway’s
bullfighting scenes, scholars generally render male sexual identity in phallic terms. The
predictable penile signifier of the bullfighter’s sword becomes crucial in such
readings.100 But if the bull is coded masculine and the bullfighter is a man in drag, what
exactly is the bullfighter penetrating when he delivers the fatal thrust? Coupling
Bersani’s diagnosis of “the heterosexual association of anal sex with a [feminizing] selfannihilation” with the fact that the primary eroticism remaining to Jake is non phallic
(29), it seems reasonable to suggest that the slaughter of the bull becomes an attempt to

Reading this same moment, Davidson and Davidson tellingly remark that “[t]he final erotic embrace of
man and beast is about annihilation” (96).
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For example, Thomas Strychacz suggests that Romero’s deadly “gesture demands the crowd’s attention
and respect while reminding it of the stylized (phallic) thrust that dispatched the bull” (Theaters 54).
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annihilate the threatening dark matter of anal eroticism. While the bullfighter gets to
have his cake and eat it too, destroying the offending orifice as he triumphantly enters it,
Jake, the passive spectator, is left to imagine himself into the fantasy as either ravaged
bull or self-annihilating penetrator. If he sees himself as the bullfighter, then he’s a man
in drag simultaneously entering and destroying his own erotic future. If he fancies
himself a bull, then in the bullfight he is fucked to death.
What the bullfight clearly does not do for Jake is allow him to regenerate his
penis. If the bullfight offers Jake a vicarious phallic masculinity, that masculinity is an
inevitable failure—its promise fading as quickly as the hopes and dreams invested in the
male orgasm. If it offers him a place to imagine the future of his own anal eroticism, then
that fantasy ends in his own death. By dangling the carrot of a vicarious bovine penis and
offering only anal death, the bullfight becomes what Lauren Berlant calls a “cruel
optimism” (1)—a “relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility
whose realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible,
and toxic” (24). In Jake’s case, the fantasy clearly fails through the former mechanism.
If, as many critiques have argued, he invests in the hope that the bullfight will
temporarily or permanently regenerate his penis, what he instead finds is a ritual that sets
out to sacrifice the non-phallic eroticism to which he does have access in the name of the
penis he lacks. If Jake wants to grow a penis, he will have to get comfortable with
prosthetics.101

As Elizabeth Grosz points out in Volatile Bodies, it is possible for prosthetics to become part of one’s
concept of one’s own body: “External objects, implements, and instruments with which the subject
continually interacts become, while they are being used, intimate, vital, even libidinously cathected parts
of the body image” (80). Margot Weiss extends this argument to the sexual arena, arguing that sex toys
such as SM tools “become a part of the body” and “transform one’s body in the image of one’s desire”
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Although the bullfight plays out the recurrent shattering of Jake’s psycho-sexual
fantasy of regeneration, the spectacle augurs more than just the death of sex. It also
initiates the heady heterosexual affair between Brett and Romero. It is here that bovine
eros begins to emerge as a tangible presence beyond its symbolic role as a stand-in for
regenerative phallocentrism or anal eroticism. From the outset, Hemingway establishes
the affair as an interspecies love triangle: “Pedro Romero had the greatness. He loved
bull-fighting, and I think he loved the bulls, and I think he loved Brett” (216). Because
Hemingway’s definition of afición—“[a]fición means passion . . . . An aficionado is one
who is passionate about the bullfights” (131)—does not require a love of bulls, it is
strange that Romero has an affective attachment to the animals he must kill. He need not
love these bulls, he need only love the ritual of their slaughter.102 This superfluous love,
then, complicates the charged erotics of the man-bull encounter. Further, the connective
tissue of the comma yokes Romero’s interspecies attraction to bulls to his more
normative homospecies interest in Brett. There is some clear seepage between Romero’s
love of bulls and his desire for Brett, but the flow of interspecies eros is not
unidirectional. Along with Romero and the rest of the bull-fanciers, Brett demonstrates a
highly eroticized interest in the bovine body. The first time she sets eyes on a bull in
Pamplona, Brett remarks, “My God, isn’t he beautiful?” (139). Later on, Mike calls the
bulls “lovely” (141), the same word Brett will use to describe Romero when she first
sees him (165). Finally, after watching Romero’s first bullfight, Brett announces that
she’s “limp as a rag” (168), suggesting via post-coital language the vicarious sexuality at

(133). Criticism that reads Jake’s missing penis as a fundamental or irrevocable lack, then, exemplifies a
masculinist-organicist fetish of the natural penis which Jake could variously and virtuosically leave behind
through prosthetic play.
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As someone whose vocation is bull murder, it might be wiser if he didn’t love the animals.
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work in witnessing the dance of bull and bullfighter. Brett finds something arousing in
the primal power of the bovine body, so much so that her desire for Romero begins to
appear as a sublimation of her lust for bulls.
The function of the bull’s corpus as the lubricant of Brett and Romero’s erotic
connection becomes most explicit when, after he has most triumphantly ‘become one’
with his final bull, Romero approaches Brett and hands her the animal’s severed ear
(221). What does it mean that he gives Brett the bull’s ear instead of, say, a horn? In The
Ear of the Other (first published in French in 1982), Jacques Derrida—no doubt the
twentieth century’s most insightful theorist of the ear—describes that organ as
“uncanny” (33). This remark surely refers to Freud’s characterization of the vagina as
uncanny (The Uncanny 151),103 a referent again emphasized when Derrida describes the
ear’s “invaginated folds” (36). According to such an understanding, the slaughtered
bull’s ear, an externalized and highly visible orifice, comes to serve as the sign of the
defeated animal—the beast reduced, feminized, invaginated. “Don’t get bloody” Romero
quips (221), grinning as he hands Brett the ear, and what can he intend but a reference to
menstruation? Rather than offering the horn, synecdoche of phallic domination, he
proffers the invaginated ear. Romero’s bestowal of this bloody, disembodied orifice
associates Brett’s body with the vanquished bull’s, calibrating her as the new target of
masculine conquest. After the gift of the bovine ear, Romero and Brett abscond for
Madrid, suggesting that with his dazzling performance of masculine heroism, Romero
has successfully overcome the threat of animal-anal eroticism; having brilliantly defeated
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Freud writes, specifically: “there is something uncanny about the female genitals” (The Uncanny 151)
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the anus in its bovine guise and reducing the virile, deadly beast to the lifeless flesh of
the invaginated ear, Romero is free to pursue a normalized vision of heterosexuality.
It turns out, however, that the affair collapses altogether in lieu of the bull. In
Madrid, detached from the sacrificial bovine bodies that initiated and sustained their
relationship, the romance quickly deteriorates. Romero demands that Brett grow her hair
out to make her “more womanly” (242), requiring a more vigorous performance of
femininity to make the post-anal, post-animal heterosexual coupling more legitimate.
Brett refuses, explaining herself in a pivotal discussion with Jake: “I’m thirty-four, you
know. I’m not going to be one of these bitches that ruins children” (243). Considering
that Romero is nineteen years old, it is tempting to read this moment in light of an earlier
reference to older American women who seduce young bullfighters away from their
vocation (172), meaning that Brett is acting benevolently on Romero’s behalf.104 There is
also a resounding sense in which Brett seems to have simply lost interest in Romero now
that they are removed from his glory in the bullring. Crucially, though, Brett’s refusal of
the hyper-normative hetero role Romero constructs for her also reflects a genuine
resistance to the bourgeois ideal of marriage. When Brett discovers that Romero wants to
marry her and create a situation where she can “never go away from him” (242), she
recoils. Her remark about not wanting to destroy children, then, may also speak to her
desire not to bear children. Not wanting to be “a bitch who ruins children” means both
not wanting to sacrifice Romero’s career on the altar of domesticity and refusing to
produce a litter of her own.

For more detail on this claim, see Stoneback 289. For a defense of Brett’s character in the context of the
question of her relative “bitchiness,” see Roger Whitlow’s essay, “Bitches and Other Simplistic
Assumptions” in Brett Ashley (ed. Harold Bloom, Chelsea House, 1991).
104
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This ultimate refusal of repronormative domesticity is a crucial part of Jake’s
reconciliation with Brett in the end. Earlier in the novel, Brett affirms that she “can’t
stand it” when Jake touches her. Likewise, Jake is tormented in her presence, feeling
“like hell” when he’s near her and at ease after she leaves town (34). In the end, after she
has had her affair with Romero and rejected him, Brett and Jake are finally able to
encounter each other without anxiety: “Brett moved close to me. We sat close against
each other. I put my arm around her and she rested against me comfortably” (247). This
easy physical proximity may not seem to suggest a particularly harmonious connection
but, in light of the toxic jealousy and rampant sex panic that characterizes Brett and
Jake’s previous encounters, it resonates with remarkable calm. What unites Brett and
Jake in this moment is their final, mutual rejection of the fantasy life Romero represents:
the sacrifice of anal eroticism in the service of a repronormative domestic order.
In the end, as he sits in the taxi with Brett, comfortably rubbing shoulders, he
sees through the empty dream of anal-animal slaughter and hetero-phallic supremacy. In
contrast to most critics,105 I think the end of this novel is not about frustration or
disappointment but about relief and refusal. Jake does not ultimately accept the status
quo of medical and sexological pathologizations of disability, queerness, and the
animality that was thought to exist alongside sexual abnormality. Jake may be resigned
in this final moment, and he certainly is cynical, but he is also alone with Brett and
touching her, for the first time in the novel, without panicking. In this sense, Jake and
Brett are coming together at last to engage in a kind of intimacy beyond optimism. If he
can’t ultimately “be with” Brett, Jake can at last be alongside her now without being

Fore, for example, discusses the novel’s “downbeat ending” while Ganzel sees the action of the novel
as a paradigm of spiritual failure, and its characters as anguished creatures of a perverse fate” (333, 26).
105
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tormented by the false hope that some day they will be together as ‘normal’
heterosexuals. Shattering the fantasies of The Sun Also Rises demands a relieved
acknowledgment that Jake’s penis is not going to grow back and that the heaving,
panting terror of anal eroticism will arise from the scene of its slaughter.
While it may be tempting to read the end of Jake Barnes’ story for its queer
failures or resolutions, it is important to recall that animal life is at stake in the bullfight.
While people might advocate for the queer redemptive possibilities of dog love and other
seemingly benign forms of interspecies erotics, no one is likely to argue that the
interspecies eroticism at work in the bullfight is anything but violent. In the story of the
bull fight, the bull is sexed to death. While Jake Barnes ultimately walks away from this
scene of ritualistic slaughter and may walk towards his own anal-erotic future, a litany of
sexually used and discarded bovine corpses smears the trail of his narrative arc. Whether
or not there is some beat-down consolation in the end of The Sun Also Rises, the
aesthetic spectacle of the bullfight as a conjoined testament to human and hetero
supremacy lingers hauntingly over Hemingway’s foray into the dark corridors of analanimality. The Spanish bullfight is an ancient tradition, a primal residue of the attempt to
dramatize human species supremacy. Here many animals die needlessly, and animal life
itself becomes encoded into a zoopolitical power-over-life in which humans manipulate
animal sexuality on a massive scale for their own aesthetic and erotic pleasure. By
enacting the victory of human “intelligence” over “animal force” (Marvin, Bullfight
104), the matador overcomes the threatening wild and subdues the beast in the anus—
resolving species panic through an act of erotic domination. The bullfight seeks to defeat
the conjoined threats of animality and anal eroticism in its repeated, stylized
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performance of athletic human exceptionalism. Animal death itself becomes a human
erotic pleasure in the bullfight—a moment of jouissance condensing larger desires for
anal-animal eroticism into a brief and explosive sublimation. What this strange spectacle
reveals above all is the way the spectacular queerness of man-bull interspecies erotics
folds backwards into the linked regimes of heteronormativity and human exceptionalism,
securing the beast and the anus as the proper targets of a highly elaborate mechanism of
ritual death. The queerness of interspecies erotics is, in this instance, not something that
threatens the dominant orders as a genuine challenge; it is merely a temporary aberration
permitted precisely so that the order can be continually recharted and reclaimed in a
zoopolitical repetition compulsion. Precisely because of the slipperiness of species
difference and because of the plasticity of the human notion of proper heterosexuality,
regimes of heterosexual and homospecies normativities can proleptically counter real
menace by unsettling and exceeding themselves in the governed and crucially temporary
aberration of the festival, a phantasmagoria where queer interspecies eroticism blooms
and flourishes and gets resolved, allowing the spectators to return to their husbands, their
day jobs, their siestas. In the bullfight the queer possibilities of interspecies erotics rise
up brilliantly, passionately, radically. And die.
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Chapter Three: Human Continuums, Trans Andys, and Cyberotic Triangles in Do
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?

Philip K. Dick’s 1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? envisions a fantasia
of species panic. There are three main sites of panic in the novel: 1) the threat the
android represents to the perceived autonomy of the human, 2) anxiety regarding
extinction and depletion of nonhuman animals, and 3) the approaching death of the
human species. These realms of anxiety swirl around the question of what it means to be
a human animal in a world of depleting organic life and rapid technological proliferation.
This chapter argues that humans, androids, and electric and ‘genuine’ animals do not
exist in isolation in Do Androids Dream.106 On the contrary, they occupy shifting
positions on a series of spectrums the novel sets up, where human, animal, and machine
bleed into one another in a network similar to what Donna Haraway has called
“interspecies biotechnosocial relations” (“Reconfiguring Kinship” 366). Posthumanist
thinker Dominic Pettman situates contemporary human existence in the midst of what he
calls the “cybernetic triangle” (7), an “unholy trinity of human, animal, and machine”
(5). In what follows, I couple Pettman’s terminology with Sedgwick’s theorization of
erotic triangles in Between Men in order to address an issue which has been largely
overlooked in scholarship on Dick’s novel: the interplay of human, animal, and android
sexuality.
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The distinction between real and electric animals in this novel is at best tenuous, as Sherryl Vint points
out when she describes the “unstable boundary in the novel between real and artificial animals” (119). As
in the cases of Deckard’s toad and the Rosens’ owl (60, 241), it is often difficult to differentiate between
organic and artificial animals. Because electric animals can so effectively simulate the ‘real,’ Dick invites
the reader to speculate that there are no longer any real animals on Earth.
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If one accepts the novel’s invitation to think of the androids as a species, then the
plot becomes in large part a dramatization of interspecies desire. In Do Androids Dream,
Pettman’s ‘cybernetic triangle’ is also an erotic triangle—a network of desire passing
between humans, animals, and androids which I will call a “cyberotic triangle.” This
cyberotic triangle embodies the larger anxiety of the novel as its protagonist, bounty
hunter Rick Deckard, struggles to balance a human sexuality caught between animals
and androids. Deckard’s sexualized species panic parallels the more general crisis of
human identity after “World War Terminus” (15), an identity challenged by animals and
machines and pushed from a naturalized category into something more like what
Pettman calls the “humanimalchine” (6), a shifting position on a spectrum of species
being. This chapter argues that animals persistently mediate Deckard’s various sexual
relationships with androids, thickening the already heady froth of interspecies desire.
After arguing that interspecies desire is queer and that Dick’s androids offer exemplary
paradigms of trans embodiment, I conclude that while interspecies desire can offer
productive reconceptualizations of sexuality beyond the reductive category of the
human, the queerness at the heart of Deckard’s sexual explorations is not a priori radical.
To elaborate the concept of species panic and its intrinsic relation to interspecies desire,
this chapter couples the concerns of animal studies and posthumanism with those of
queer and transgender theory, synthesizing these positions through their shared
commitment to unstable frameworks of gender, sexuality, and embodied identity.107
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Outside the context of this analysis, transgender theory, posthumanism, and queer theory already form a
methodological cluster. This connection plays out clearly in The Transgender Studies Reader (Ed. Stryker
and Whittle), which includes Donna Haraway’s proto-posthumanist “Cyborg Manifesto,” Jack (then
Judith) Halberstam’s article on “posthuman gender” in The Silence of the Lambs (Halberstam, “Skinflick”
582), as well as an essay by Jay Prosser—“Judith Butler: Queer Feminism, Transgender, and the
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Brought to bear on the subject of species being, queer and transgender theory help to
situate the human animal within a malleable framework of species being, what I term the
“human continuum.” Using the sense of “across” that underpins both the word “queer”
(Sedgwick, Tendencies xii) and the prefix “trans-” (Hayward 258) as a motif, this
chapter undertakes a series of theoretical crossings, reading across and between animals,
humans, species, fictions, methodologies, bodies, organisms, sexualities, and machines.
Critics have historically read Do Androids Dream as a characteristic, if
particularly masterful, example of Dick’s “authentic” science fiction oeuvre (Huntington
152).108 Of course, Dick’s astonishing body of fiction, consisting of 44 published novels
and over a hundred short stories, is far from thematically or generically reductive. In
addition to a career-long commitment to traditional science fictional themes such as
space exploration, artificial intelligence, and extraterrestrial life, Dick’s work
experiments with the alternate history genre (The Man in the High Castle), draws on the
hard-boiled detective tradition (Do Androids Dream),109 and explores diverse themes
such as mental illness (Martian Time-Slip), psychedelic drugs (A Scanner Darkly), and
postmodern scepticism about the ‘real’ (The Simulacra, The Three Stigmata of Palmer

Transubstantiation of Sex”—which traces the ubiquitous, if often unacknowledged, presence of
transgender concerns and motifs in early queer theory. Likewise, The Transgender Studies Reader 2 (Ed.
Stryker and Aizura) offers a section on “Transsexing Humanimality,” where researchers such as Myra J.
Hird, Mel Y. Chen, and Joan Roughgarden mine the rich theoretical territory at the junctures of animal
studies and transgender theory. Natalie Corrine Hansen points out that “animal studies and feminist and
queer analyses partner productively in thinking about material and semiotic relations across differences
and about related questions of embodiment, subjectivity, and agency” (Hansen 87). I venture that it is safe
to add posthumanism and transgender theory to Hansen’s list. I do not mean to elide the differences
between these importantly distinct disciplines, only to identify their points of confluence and their shared
concerns with notions of bodily malleability, a crucial concept for this chapter.
108
For a comprehensive overview of criticism up until 1998, see Carl Freedman’s “Editorial Introduction”
to the special issue of Science Fiction Studies focusing on Dick’s work (15.2).
109
Although Do Androids Dream straddles the generic boundary between science fiction and the hardboiled detective novel, to my knowledge no critic has offered a sustained reading of this novel in the
context of the latter theme.
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Eldritch).110 Dick’s highly imaginative oeuvre engages with a virtuosic breadth of
literary schools and subject matter. Nonetheless, above all else Dick’s literary career
demonstrates a sustained fascination with imagined technological futures. N. Katherine
Hayles suggests that Dick’s central theme is the tenuous relationship between
“cybernetic technologies” and “the fabric of the world” (160). Hayles shows how several
of Dick’s novels imagine androids as the representatives of this uneasy borderline:
“Consistently in his fictions, androids are associated with unstable boundaries between
self and world” (160). The android, in Dick’s work, comes to stand in for the various
ethical grey zones brought about by technological progress.
As an exemplar of Dick’s continued thematic engagement with an increasingly
technological human existence, Do Androids Dream has often been interpreted as a
cautionary tale. Sheryl Vint describes the conventional response: “There is a general
critical consensus that the novel’s major concern is with alienated, modern,
technologized life rendering humans increasingly cold and android-like” (112). While
the novel certainly legitimates such readings, Vint seeks to push the discussion in a
different direction: “I want to focus attention on an aspect of the original text neglected
in both the film adaptation and criticism: the importance of animals, electric and real”
(111).111 Despite her avowed commitment to Dick’s under-analyzed animals, Vint’s
essay soon reveals that conscientious analysis of Do Androids Dream cannot dissociate

These, of course, are only a few of Dick’s manifold thematic interests. Others include conspiracy,
surrealism, religion, all of which are manifest in Do Androids Dream. For a comprehensive overview of
Dick’s thematics, see Eric Karl Link’s chapter “The Themes of Philip K. Dick” in his book,
Understanding Philip K. Dick (U of South Carolina P, 2010).
111
Vint does not credit Simon A. Cole, whose article “Do Androids Pulverize Tiger Bones to Use as
Aphrodisiacs?” (Social Text 42) places Do Androids Dream directly into the fray of animal studies through
a concern with extinction.
110
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the question of the animal from the question of the android.112 To talk about animals in
any depth, here, necessarily requires some discussion of androids. Vint herself, along
with many other critics, has acknowledged this necessity (115). What has not been
acknowledged, however, is the inversion of this equation: just as discussions of animals
in Do Androids Dream require analysis of androids, so critical concern for animals in
this novel may require attention to android life. For Do Androids Dream does not offer
discrete categories for analysis but a complex web of continuums and triangles.
To be clear, the cyberotic triangle is not equilateral. This is no democratic threeway. Rather, as with most erotic triangles, some parties get left out. In this case it is
Deckard who does all the desiring. The android Rachael Rosen does a convincing, if
pushy, job of seducing Deckard: “Go to bed with me and I’ll retire Stratton” (195,
emphasis in original). But Deckard in fact initiates the liaison (182), and shortly
afterwards it becomes clear that Rachael only has sex with him to mitigate his ability to
kill androids (199). While Deckard lusts after androids, Rachael apparently has sex for
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The line Vint draws between animals and androids has a valuable place in the criticism on this novel.
The point was first made by Ursula Heise in 2003: “the distinction between humans and androids is not
exactly symmetrical in the novel to the one between real and electric animals” (“From Extinction to
Electronics” 74). Because androids are “organic” (198), they do not map seamlessly onto the electric-real
dichotomy which the novel sets up and gradually deconstructs. Heise’s analysis, however, overlooks some
important evidence from Dick’s text: “The electric animal, he pondered, could be considered a subform of
the other, a kind of vastly inferior robot. Or, conversely, the android could be regarded as a highly
developed, evolved version of the ersatz animal” (42). Androids and electric animals do exist on a
spectrum in Dick’s novel. Deckard wants to keep this spectrum fundamentally distinct from the organic
human-animal continuum, but ultimately all of these distinctions become plastic. Because of the
malleability of the tentative lines between life-forms in this novel, is at best tricky and at worst
counterproductive to conceive Dick’s animals and androids as discrete subjects of analysis. Vint’s own
essay quickly acknowledges the “homologous situations of androids and animals” (114), before troubling
the apparent “human/android distinction” and advancing an argument that largely depends on Deckard’s
relationship to the android Luba Luft (115, 120). To demonstrate Vint’s dependence on androids for a
project about animals is not to devalue her work. On the contrary, this demonstrates her point that Dick’s
novel probes “the ethics and ambiguities of what it means to be human” (115). Animals and androids
become inseparable components of this project insofar as they both crucially inform Deckard’s
understanding of his nature as a human animal.
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rational reasons. She expresses a curiosity about Deckard’s wife and the possibility of
living as his concubine (197, 198), but she does not demonstrate lust or passion. As he
does throughout the novel, Deckard, here, drives the plot’s erotic movement. Following
René Girard, Sedgwick becomes the great thinker of erotic triangles in the late twentieth
century. Sedgwick argues against the dubious hermeneutic tendency to treat erotic
triangles from the perspective of a “deadly symmetry” (Between Men 27). The
responsible thinker, Sedgwick suggests, should attend to the “thorough asymmetries
between the sexual continuums of men and women” as well as the marginalized “status
of women” in traditionally male-driven erotic triangles (Between Men 25). Shifting this
focus to include the nonhuman, I would like to maintain Sedgwick’s language and insist
that there is a vital asymmetry at work in the cyberotic triangle of Do Androids Dream.
This novel does not offer a straightforward triangle of animals, humans, and androids.
Rather, there are triangles within triangles here, hierarchies within hierarchies, spectrums
within spectrums. Human, android, and animal are neither entirely distinguishable nor
readily definable as such. But the straight white human male, Deckard, lies at the centre
of this complex network of sexual and species being. Should the reader, then, sympathize
with Deckard’s species panic or celebrate the fact that his multiple entrenched positions
of privilege are under threat? This is a question towards which my analysis will drive.
The sexual relationship between Deckard and Rachael propels the psychological
drama of this novel, but android-human erotics are not the only form of interspecies
desire at work here. Rather, android-human romance takes place alongside a peripheral
erotically charged relationship between human and nonhuman animals which persists
throughout the narrative, most palpably in Deckard’s desperate “need for a real animal”
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(42). To include animals in the cyberotic triangle is not to suggest that Deckard is
explicitly interested in having sex with nonhuman animals. My purpose, instead, is to
highlight the various ways in which animals facilitate and augment Deckard’s sexually
charged relationship with female androids, particularly his romance with Rachael Rosen.
One prominent force flowing through the cyberotic triangle is menace; human
existence threatens animal existence, android existence threatens human and animal life,
animal existence threatens android self-identity. To exist within the cyberotic triangle,
then, is to occupy the uneasy interstice of erotic desire and existential menace. Not only
do these three species variously threaten one another, the distinction between them is
also under threat. To be human on Earth, in this novel, is to belong to a species status in
perpetual peril: “Loitering on Earth potentially meant finding oneself abruptly classed as
biologically unacceptable, a menace to the pristine heredity of the race. Once pegged as
special, a citizen, even if accepting sterilization, dropped out of history. He ceased, in
effect, to be part of mankind” (16). In the ruthlessly eugenic world Dick imagines,113
quantifiable reproductive potential becomes the primary indicator of inclusion in the
human species. Here the punishment for abortion is lifetime imprisonment and men wear
“radiation-proof lead codpiece[s]” to protect against the always-encroaching threat of
infertility (50, 19). The codpieces point to a technological augmentation of the human
body which paradoxically allows that body to remain human. This paradox recalls the
posthumanist understanding of the body as Hayles defines it: “the posthuman view
thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending
or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that

Adam Pottle offers a salient reading of Do Androids Dream in the context of the “American eugenics
movement” (np).
113
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began before we were born” (3). This posthuman model of the body grafts easily onto
Do Androids Dream, where, much like the current world, physical augmentation is so
common that it is bad manners to “inquire whether a citizen’s teeth, hair, or internal
organs would test out authentic” (8). For Hayles the posthuman condition necessarily
involves a kind of panic: “the prospect of becoming posthuman both evokes terror and
excites pleasure” (283). Perhaps, then, the species panic Deckard deals with throughout
the novel derives from a refusal to accept the transition from human to posthuman being.
Yet the organic ‘core’ of the human male—protected by a lead codpiece—remains
intact. In light of this analysis, it is significant that the definitional threshold of male
humanity occupies the site of the sexual organ. Reproductive capability defines the
human as human, and the potential to reproduce subsists at the genital level, in the very
organs where the android female assaults the frontier of human being.
Reproductive capacity alone does not qualify one as human; one must be able to
reproduce genetic material of a certain calibre. Those who can “reproduce within the
tolerances set by law” retain the privilege of potential emigration to the extra-Terran
colonies (8), while biologically inferior individuals—called “specials” in the novel
(24)—must remain on Earth and face further degeneration beneath the radioactive layer
of “omnipresent dust” (8). One such special is John Isidore, a delivery driver for the
“Van Ness Pet Hospital” (19), a business which restores mechanical animals and, like all
such businesses, poses as a service for genuine pets. At the time of his introduction to the
novel, Isidore, having “failed to pass the minimum mental faculties test” (19), has
become “in popular parlance a chickenhead” (19). When Isidore’s boss Hannibal Sloat
uses the word “chickenhead” for the first time (77), Isidore responds with dejection: “I d-
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d-don’t like to be c-c-called a chickenhead” (79). Until this moment, Isidore had valued
the fact that Sloat “accepted him as human” (19). Now, he faces a moment of species
panic; his very humanity is in jeopardy. The pejorative connotation of the word
“chickenhead” strikes the reader as strange in a novel where association with animals is a
clear social benefit. Yet the meaning is clear: Isidore’s brain is subhuman. This
assessment becomes problematic insofar as it posits a scale of humanity where less
intelligent equals less human and, presumably, more intelligent means more human. If
Isidore’s brain renders him subhuman, the synthetic brain can potentially make androids
more human than many humans: “the new Nexus-6 brain unit had from a sort of rough,
pragmatic, no-nonsense standpoint evolved beyond a major—but inferior—segment of
mankind” (30). The rhetoric of the subhuman has led Adam Pottle to argue that this
novel criticizes the “American eugenics movement” (np), but here it also shows that
intelligence inadequately defines the human. If intelligence measures humanity, Isidore
is less human than the androids. Isidore’s subhuman brain reveals that the category
‘human’ is not a naturalized status but a tenuous position of privilege which the so-called
human subject may easily lose.
This is where empathy enters the slippery equation of the novel. Because
androids can become more intelligent than humans, bounty hunters such as Deckard use
the criterion of empathy to police the species boundary through the “Voigt-Kampff
scale” (58). Deckard begins by believing that humans experience empathy while
androids do not (30), but the novel gradually corrodes this demarcation. When Deckard
realizes that he feels more empathy for Luba than fellow bounty hunter Phil Resch
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(142),114 the criterion of empathy breaks down and the reader comes to understand that
the boundary between human and android life is “constructed rather than natural” (Vint
115). Sexuality, it turns out, lies at the heart of Deckard’s species panic: “it’s sex. Wake
up and face yourself, Deckard. You wanted to go to bed with a female type of android”
(143). As Resch diagnosis it, sexual desire is the cause of Deckard’s species panic. He
has met the female android Luba Luft, who is all too convincing in her humanness. Her
prowess as an opera singer compels Deckard’s sympathy: “I don’t get it; how can a
talent like that be a liability to our society?” (137). Luba, significantly, self-identifies as
a kind of human parody: “Ever since I got here from Mars my life has consisted of
imitating the human, doing what she would do, acting as if I had the thoughts and
impulses a human would have. Imitating, as far as I’m concerned, a superior life-form”
(134). Luba, here, raises the question of to what extent we are all mimicking humanness,
and implies that perhaps she should earn human status by acting humanity convincingly
enough. She is, at the very least, an expert imitator of the human condition. She seems to
genuinely appreciate art (131), and although Deckard himself remains unaware of his
attraction until Resch identifies it, Luba seems to have an empathic ability lacked by
many humans—that of intuitively sensing when someone exhibits unconscious sexual
attraction (105). As Deckard forces question after question onto Luba, the dialogue
develops the feel of an unwelcome sexual advance. The specter of the animal also
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Although Resch passes the Voigt-Kampff test, the novel invites speculation that the test may be
inadequate and that Resch may therefore be an android. According to Rachael, Resch is the only ‘human’
able to keep retiring androids after sleeping with one (198). He also appears inhuman insofar as he enjoys
the act of killing (137). Of course, the vocation of bounty hunter itself seems to suggest an affinity with
androids. Luba identifies both Resch and Deckard as androids (132, 101), reinforcing the general sense in
which Deckard and Resch, those charged with the task of killing androids, are also the most android-like
‘humans’ in the novel.
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permeates the sexually charged encounter between Deckard and Luba. Dick describes
the concert hall itself as a “whale belly of steel and stone” (97), and Deckard’s questions
involve a wasp, a stag, and a dish of boiled dog (103-4). Finally, when Luba calls her
friends to intervene, Dick repeatedly describes an android posing as a police officer as a
“harness bull” (107). The imagery surrounding this moment reflects the sense in which
animals come to facilitate and ornament interspecies sexual relationships between
Deckard and female androids.
The cyberotic triangle emerges more explicitly in the relationship between
Deckard and Rachael. For their romance is not a two-way affair. Rather, this is a
threesome involving a male human, a female android, and a “black Nubian goat” (169).
During Deckard and Rachael’s liaison, the dynamics of the cyberotic triangle come to
the fore:
‘Take off your coat.’
‘Why?’
‘So we can go to bed,’ Rachael said.
‘I bought a black Nubian goat,’ he said. (191)
Here Deckard draws an explicit link between his desire to sleep with an android and his
need for a ‘real’ animal. Rachael invites him to have sex with her and he responds by
telling her about his new goat—the originary symbol of species transgression that gave
legs and horns to Pan—which they have already discussed over the phone (181).
Speaking to Iran, Deckard explains that he bought the goat because he had “begun to
empathize with androids” (174): “Something went wrong today; something about
retiring them. It wouldn’t have been possible for me to go on without getting an animal”
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(171). Apparently, the purchase of the goat serves to offset the threat to his humanity
represented by his empathic connection with female androids. Since this empathy tends
to involve female androids Deckard wants to have sex with, it is fair to presume that it
derives from sexual desire. Lust for female androids, then, leads directly to his purchase
of the goat. The animal enters the erotic triangle in order to re-establish a balance
Deckard has lost. The ‘black Nubian goat’ completes the cyberotic circuit.
The novel’s rhetoric signals a fetishistic focus on the goat’s body. The phrase
“black Nubian goat” recurs several times, spoken by the animal salesman and by Iran
(169, 171), as well as Deckard himself. The goat’s African heritage invites the
connection which Marjorie Spiegel examines in The Dreaded Comparison: the parallel
between the historical “enslavement of black people” in the United States and the
“enslavement of animals which continues [. . .] today” (35). The goat is a “superb
contender in this year’s market” (169), an assertion which demonstrates the bizarre
correlation between the animal’s status as property and the “ethic of care for precious
living beings” (Vint 119). In a strange twist, the fact that “caring for an animal is the best
and perhaps the only sign of one’s humanity” makes humans want to own/enslave
animals so that they can care for them (Toth 65).115 The female gender of the ‘black
Nubian goat’ also recalls the fate of women during American slavery as Jessica Millward
describes it: “‘marriage’ for enslaved people often meant breeding more bondpeople for
the ruling class” and female slaves “lived in constant fear of sexual exploitation by both
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This double function of animals as both commodities and objects of care recalls contemporary humananimal relations where humans keep and ‘love’ pets that are also their property. Heise states that “the
destruction of animals [. . .] outside the novel may or may not be part of Dick’s implicit social critique”
(“The Android and the Animal” 506). Here, though, Dick certainly seems to question the strange
paradoxes inherent in human treatment of our ‘beloved’ animal property.
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white and black men” (23). The ‘black Nubian goat’ thus evokes the threat of eugenic
‘breeding’ and the historical travesty of slavemasters’ sexual exploitation of their
‘property.’ Dick has already, of course, foregrounded the question of slavery through the
enslavement of androids: “Do androids dream? Rick asked himself. Evidently; that’s
why they occasionally kill their employers and flee here. A better life, without servitude”
(184).116 Deckard invites the android into the human psychological continuum by
concluding that they dream of a better life. As the novel moves forward Deckard
apparently forgets this concession, reverting to an understanding of androids as ‘cold’
machines that seems, increasingly, to be a defense mechanism. Throughout the novel he
demonstrates a deeply conflicted stance towards androids, sympathizing with them one
moment and ruthlessly slaughtering them the next. Deckard’s panicked and paradoxical
relationship to androids parallels the contemporary relationship between many humans
and nonhuman animals—we admire them in parks and the countryside, devour their
flesh when it’s laid out beneath fluorescent supermarket light.
Upon first examining his future property, Deckard is astonished: “The goat, it
seemed to Rick, was beautiful” (169). Deckard probes the goat with the proprietary male
gaze—at once sexualizing and commodifying. Unlike Derrida’s cat, however, the goat
does not look back. The goat has no agency. Rather, it is the obedient object of male
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The novel offers a clear parallel between androids and African-American slaves, opening clear links
between racialization, speciecism, and sexual exploitation. The manufacture of androids is crucial “to the
colonization effort” and in their lives on Mars the androids are “slaves, forced to perform tasks of manual
labor and sex” (Dick 45; Abdul np). The relationship between the sexualized android’s species and racial
status supports Mel Y Chen’s claim that “categories of animality are not innocent of race” (Chen 2012,
104). Deckard’s species panic – raised by his attraction to various androids – recalls the bestiality
prohibition as well as familiar patterns of the miscegenation taboo. The historical tendency to animalize
African descendants during slavery shows us that there is fundamental line between race and species. Pris
Stratton confirms this in Do Androids Dream when she tells Isidore he is “a credit to [his] race” (164).
Species panic and racial panic thus bleed into each other at the site of interspecies desire.
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desire. The goat, in all its passivity, is valuable insofar as it can be owned and controlled.
It is the perfect icon of what Deckard wants—an object of desire which cannot, like his
wife, talk back. The body of the goat, like many female animals in this novel, becomes a
site of admiration and desire that borders on the erotic. Furthermore, the female animal
body figures here and throughout the narrative as a reproductive vessel for the project of
imposed breeding. Like Barbour’s horse and Eldon Rosen’s supposedly real owl (9, 57),
the goat’s primary value lies in its reproductive organs. Before considering the purchase,
Deckard makes sure that the goat is female (169), and when he describes the animal to
Iran he excitedly explains that “maybe later on we can mate her. And we’ll get milk out
of which we can make cheese” (170). The value of the animal is not an intrinsic worth;
rather, it is the promise of future food and babies embodied in the goat’s teats and womb.
Reproductive promise saturates the reader’s first encounter with a female animal: “‘My
horse,’ Barbour declared beamingly, ‘is pregnant’” (9). Barbour explains that he has
impregnated his horse with “some of the highest quality fertilizing plasma available in
California” (9), foregrounding a concern with animal bloodlines that is familiar to
denizens of a world where racing horses and purebred dogs garner economic worth
based on carefully tracked genealogies. Nicole Shukin describes the contemporary world
as one in which “animal life ceases to mean and matter in ways capable of challenging
its symbolic and carnal currency as capital” (225). This assessment certainly extends to
Do Androids Dream, where the “Sidney’s Animal & Fowl Catalogue” determines the
value of animal life (10, emphasis in original). In Deckard’s world, animal care is the
measure of human worth, but the cared-for animal equates to a figure in a directory. No
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more or less than its price, the animal loses its individuality as it becomes a generic
economic value.
According to Vint, the fundamental problem of Deckard’s world is that “animals
are treated as commodities” (119). Vint’s Marxist critique is true to the novel’s message,
but inasmuch as the animal is commodified, here, that commodification is explicitly
sexual. The sexualisation of animals has been largely overlooked in the criticism on a
novel where dealers display their wares on “animal row” (167). This flesh-market of
“big-time animal dealers with their huge glass windows and lurid signs” operates
somewhere in the semiotic continuum between red light districts and fashion district
manikins (167). Aside from Bill the Raccoon (41), most of the larger animals in the
novel are gendered female. But more significant is the fact that they are gendered at all.
In Deckard’s psychological world, gendering is a privilege. When he is anxious to set up
a distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘inauthentic’ life, Deckard thinks of artificial beings
without gendering them. Speaking of his electric sheep, he laments that “[l]ike the
androids, it had no ability to appreciate the existence of another” (42). Genuine animals,
along with genuine humans, have a naturalized access to privileged gender pronouns
while androids and artificial animals—like the pathologized transgender in contemporary
society—must often suffer the pejorative ‘it.’
Not only sexualized through their reproductive potential and the fact of
gendering, animals also play a more palpable role in the erotics of the novel. When he
first sets eyes on the Rosens’ private collection of animals, Deckard feels “a sort of
yearning” followed by a kind of sensory revelry: “Already he could smell them, the
several scents of the creatures standing or sitting” (40). The scent of the animal amidst
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the drab post-atomic world must be potent, perhaps reminding Deckard of pungent
bodily smells produced during sex. Deckard’s encounter with the Rosens’ animals has
something of the feel of an adolescent boy stumbling across a stash of illicit
pornography: “‘I’d like too—’ He broke off. Because, all at once, he had seen their
animals” (40). This opulent collection of animals sets Deckard off guard and gives the
Rosens the upper hand. Shortly thereafter, Deckard begins his game of cat and mouse
with Rachael Rosen, and from then on animals mediate the novel’s human-android
erotics.
When Deckard gives Rachael the Voigt-Kampff test, the cyberotic triangle
emerges in full force. The test’s purpose is to assuage species panic—definitively
differentiating human from inhuman—but the testing process also dramatizes this panic
as subjects display acute anxiety when Deckard challenges their species status. All of
Deckard’s questions involve animals, and many of them probe the meeting place
between animal life and human/android sexuality; one scenario involves a picture of a
naked girl “lying facedown on a large and beautiful bearskin rug” (51); another describes
an intimate bedroom scene where a wall is “attractively decorated with bullfight posters”
(51). These scenarios explicitly pair animals and sexuality, but even the non-sexual
questions bring animal presence into the erotically charged exchange between Deckard
and Rachael. The test itself measures for “the so-called ‘shame’ or ‘blushing’ reaction”
(46). Blushing, of course, goes hand in hand with sexual panic and shame, often
accompanying sexual desires that risk rejection, reprimand, or prohibition. In The
Expression of The Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin notes that “[b]lushing is the
most peculiar and the most human of all expressions” (309). Consciously or not, Dick
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draws on a Darwinian framework in his construction of the definitional threshold of
humanity. Darwin’s account of blush is sexualized and racialized. He writes that
“women blush much more than men” and that (310), while “all the races of man blush” it
is most clearly visible in the “Aryan” complexion (315). In other words, Caucasians
more than dark-skinned people clearly display this tell-tale sign of humanness. Yet this is
an odd demarcation of the human because, as Melanie Dawson points out, “the blush is
also strangely indeterminate as an object of analysis” (207). It is difficult to know
precisely why a person is blushing. Most often, though, the blush is a physiological
response to a sense of shame (Darwin, Expression 315). And shame, as Darwin describes
it, is not too far from panic: “When a person is much ashamed or very shy, and blushes
intensely, his heart beats rapidly and his breathing is disturbed” (Expression 323).
According to psychologists Terri L. Berrera, Kathryn P. Wilson, and Peter J. Norton,
facial flushing, irregular breathing, and a “racing heart” are among the most common
symptoms of panic (876). Physiologically, then, shame and panic form part of a
continuum of similar physiological responses to emotional or mental states. And panic,
like shame, often results in a flushing of the face.
Do androids blush? Perhaps not well enough, yet. But they certainly do panic.
The drama of the test leads to the only moment of explicit homosexual panic in the
novel: “‘Is this testing whether I’m an android,’ Rachael asked tartly, ‘or whether I’m
homosexual’” (49). The moment in its entirety hums and whirs with erotic tension, as
Deckard barrages Rachael with probing questions about animals and sexuality. The
testing process works to a coital rhythm that connotes an unsavoury resonance of sexual
assault. Deckard maintains complete control of the questions, firing them off at his own
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preferred pace, until he reaches a climax, announcing: “‘You’re an android’” (51). While
Deckard’s desire for Luba leads him to purchase his goat, here the play of animals and
sexuality allows Deckard to reach a cathartic conclusion. Because Rachael is not
sufficiently aroused by the process of the test, he renders her nonhuman.
Rachael herself is an archetype of species panic. Her species status is constantly
under threat throughout a novel which implies that to be an android is to exist in many
respects between modes of being. As Stryker, Currah, and Moore articulate it, the notion
of ‘trans-’ offers a helpful framework for conceiving this essential in-betweenness:
‘Trans-’ thus becomes the capillary space of connection and circulation between
the macro- and micro-political registers through which the lives of bodies
become enmeshed in the lives of nations, states, and capital-formations, while ‘gender’ becomes one of several set [sic] of variable techniques or temporal
practises (such as race or class) through which bodies are made to live. (14)
Assuming species status sits alongside race and class as one of the conditions under
which bodies exist, the android body becomes paradigmatically trans. The organic yet
technological android exists at the definitional threshold of species plasticity, occupying
a nebulous interstice between organism and machine, real and electric, genuine and
inauthentic, alive and undead.
The android body, further, serves as a model through which to think all bodies as
nothing more than archipelagos of organism and machine. In “Lessons from a Starfish,”
Eva Hayward states the matter explicitly: “the body (trans or not) is not a clear, coherent,
and positive integrity” (256). Here a clear link between transgender theory and the
posthuman understanding of the body as prosthetic assemblage begins to emerge. Nikki
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Sullivan argues that all body modifications, insofar as they “explicitly transform bodily
being,” are “‘trans’ practices” (552). But what, precisely, is “bodily being,” if not a
perpetual process of transformation—cells multiplying, skin shedding, hair growing,
teeth falling out? Likewise, nearly all human bodies in the contemporary world are
modified—by surgery, dentistry, glasses, wedding bands, hearing aids. Dick’s android,
like Hayward’s transsexual, simply offers a limit condition that exposes the radical
incoherence of all bodies. Of course, in neither case is it easy to live at the limit. Beyond
the “liveable ‘gender trouble’” of the “transsexual body” (Hayward 257), to be a trans
android in Do Androids Dream is to occupy a perpetual state of species panic. The very
nature of the android as species is to exist as a species under threat—of replacement by
the next upgrade, of the inability to self-replicate, of species enslavement, of being
highly human-like and yet fundamentally inhuman.
When he first meets Rachael, Deckard does not know whether she is an android
or a human. Rachael herself, her brain supposedly furnished with “false memories” (59),
allegedly believes herself to be human. When she reveals that she has slept with a string
of bounty hunters and knows the other escaped androids intimately (198-99), her
purported species confusion emerges as a seduction tactic. Nonetheless, species panic
characterizes Rachael’s existence and android existence more generally. More than
Deckard’s manic need to maintain some sense of what it means to be human, the
androids embody a radical uncertainty about what it means to be android. Many of the
androids the reader meets demonstrate deep awareness of their trans nature. This concern
culminates in the question of whether the android qualifies as a living being. Rachael
repeatedly laments that she is “not alive” (198): “It’s an illusion that I—I personally—
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really exist” (189). This concern preoccupies most of the androids in the novel. In a
moment of existential speculation, Pris probes the parameters of life: “‘even animals are
protected by law. All life. Everything organic that wriggles or squirms or burrows or
flies or swarms or lays eggs or— ’ She broke off, because Roy Baty had appeared [. . . .]
‘Insects,’ he said, showing no embarrassment at overhearing them, ‘are especially
sacrosanct’” (161). In this powerful scene, Roy demonstrates the penchant for wry wit
which renders him magnetic, if threatening. He is a unique and captivating individual
who, despite Rachael’s claim that “androids have no loyalty to one another” (191), draws
his companions together as their “natural leader” (158).
When Roy and Irmgard enter the scene, the novel begins to throw serious doubt
on whether the androids are non-empathic. Pris tells Isidore that the androids on Mars
“are lonely” (150), and Deckard finds out that Roy has organized experiments with
“mind-fusing drugs” (185), hoping to give the androids “a group experience similar to
that of Mercerism” (185). Rachael herself, after confessing that she feels “[s]omething
like” empathy towards Pris (189), refers to Roy as a “wonderful, spiritual man” (198).
Perhaps most significant, though, is Rick’s acceptance that Roy loved his wife Irmgard
(223). Moments such as these lead Hayles to an astute conclusion: “If some humans can
be as unfeeling as androids, some androids turn out to be more feeling than humans, a
confusion that gives Do Androids Dream its extraordinary depth and complexity” (162).
Hayles’ insight demonstrates the extent to which androids and humans are not readily
distinguishable in the novel. Rather, android and human both exist, here, on a sliding
scale; some androids are more intelligent than some humans, and some humans are less
empathic than some androids. While Deckard wants to uphold a fundamental distinction
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between androids and humans, the novel repeatedly undermines this endeavour. Roy’s
charisma, passion, and dynamism cause the reader to wonder whether humanity as such
should be a value. Shouldn’t we esteem the androids for their so-called human values—
loyalty, creativity, capacity to love—rather than troubling ourselves wondering whether
the beings who embody these values count as human?
Pris and Roy’s exchange concerns the question of what counts as life. The agony
of android existence remains unspoken in Pris’ caesura. Presumably, what she means to
say is: ‘even animals are protected by law. All life. Everything organic that wriggles or
squirms or burrows or flies or swarms or lays eggs or breeds. But not androids.’
Androids, though endlessly more sophisticated than some animals, are not ‘technically’
alive. They are disposable, and even on some level repulsive to humans. Roy’s
exaggerated claim that insects ‘are especially sacrosanct’ highlights the absurdity at
work in the elevation of all ‘living’ beings above androids in this society’s ethical
system. If the reader permits the android a place on the continuum of life, surely the
android sits somewhere closer to the human than the insect. However, because of an
apparently arbitrary definition of ‘life,’ the androids fall off the continuum altogether.
My addition to Pris’ catalogue of animal qualities—reproductive capacity—is of course
not arbitrary. Likewise, it is presumably no accident that the last item on Pris’ list is
‘laying eggs.’ In this novel, both intellect and empathy prove dubious as qualifiers of the
human, but the capacity to reproduce may well hold as the definitive characteristic of
‘life.’ In a telling moment, just before she and Deckard have sex, Rachael draws the
connection between reproductive capacity and life: “Androids can’t bear children,’ she
said then. ‘Is that a loss?’” (193). Ignoring the question, Deckard simply continues his
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sexual conquest: “He finished undressing her. Exposed her pale, cold loins” (193). The
frigidity of Rachael’s genitals serves to underscore her infertility. Deckard’s desire for
Rachael is a queer desire; though he remains ‘straight’ in his attraction to this
simulacrum of a human woman, by having sex with her he enters the sphere of the nonreproductive. Lee Edelman forcefully articulates a critique of the “compulsory narrative
of reproductive futurism” at work in heteronormative society (21). Contemporary
culture, Edelman argues, associates practitioners of potentially reproductive sex with the
“collective fantasy” of “futurism” (28), while those queer subjects who practise nonreproductive sex embody the “death drive” of the “Symbolic order” (27): “there are no
queers in the future as there can be no future for queers” (30). For Edelman, then, nonreproductive subjects stand in direct opposition to the heteronormative injunction to
procreate. In this framework, Dick’s non-reproductive androids become figuratively
queer.
While animals signify heteronormativity insofar as their primary function is
breeding, androids occupy the opposite symbolic pole alongside the “future-negating
queer” (Edelman 26). Rachael’s persistent appeal to her own barrenness at this pivotal
moment underscores the sense in which it is precisely her infertility which excites
Deckard. After he disrobes her, she continues: “‘Is it a loss?’ Rachael repeated. I really
don’t know. I have no way to tell. How does it feel to have a child? How does it feel to
be born, for that matter? We’re not born; we don’t grow up; instead of dying from illness
or old age, we wear out like ants’” (194). Here, the animal once again mediates the
sexual encounter between Rachael and Deckard. Only this time Rachael appeals to the
Cartesian model of the animal-as-machine in order to include herself in the animal
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world. Furthermore, Rachael’s monologue invites Deckard into the space of queer
sexuality, an invitation he eagerly accepts. While she remains physically passive—just
the way he apparently likes it—she also arouses him with a peculiar kind of dirty talk: ‘I
am a non-reproductive being.’ Not only is the sex between Deckard and Rachael queer
insofar as it is non-reproductive, interspecies desire is, of course, queer by definition. In
her article “LGBTQ . . . Z?,” Kathy Rudy argues that the umbrella term “queer” should
subsume various non-normative sexualities, including zoophilia (612). Insofar as sex
between humans and animals is not sex between a man and a woman it cannot quite be
heteronormative. The fact that Rachael is a highly developed replica of a human female
complicates this issue, but Deckard and Rachael’s sex remains, in at least two senses,
queer.
Rachael’s main point is a lament at her exclusion from the world of ‘reproductive
futurism’ that includes animals and humans but not androids. After they have sex,
Rachael’s animosity towards animals re-emerges as she gruffly dismisses Deckard: “go
on home to your goat” (201). Rachael, here, re-establishes the triangular connection
between her sexual relationship with Deckard and his connection to his new goat.
Further reinforcing the goat’s place in Deckard’s heart, she adds, “[y]ou love the goat
more than me. More than you love your wife, probably” (202). Rachael’s accusation
offers a glimpse of a parallel erotic triangle between Rick, Iran, and the goat.
Significantly, the subject of sex between Rick and his wife comes up just once in the
novel, when Iran jokes about setting her mood organ for “ecstatic sexual bliss” (7); “I
feel so bad I’ll even endure that” (7). Iran’s remark implies that she and Deckard have a
less than voracious sex life. Furthermore, her sexual disinterestedness symbolically
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associates her with android-like ‘coldness,’ a correlation Deckard explicitly reinforces:
“Most androids I’ve known have more vitality and desire to live than my wife” (94).
Iran’s sexual apathy and lack of vivacity suggest that she is an unappealing partner for
Deckard. To what extent, then, does this novel dramatize the fantasy of a man wishing to
‘upgrade’ from a sexless, distant, depressed wife to a newer, more appealing model?
Certainly, Deckard’s choice to set Iran’s emotions to “pleased acknowledgment of
husband’s superior wisdom in all matters” demonstrates his apparent wish to program his
romantic partners into patriarchal subservience (7). His admission that he would marry
Rachael if it were legal (97), along with his wish that he had “gotten rid of” Iran two
years before (94), paints his ultimate return to his wife as a reluctant concession to what
we might term “compulsory intraspecies sexuality”—the obligatory and unexciting
conditions of human-human love. Finished with his excursions in the queer realm of
interspecies desire, Deckard returns home to his beard.
Consideration of Deckard and Iran’s sex life also invites speculation as to
whether they can reproduce, an enquiry that is exacerbated by the fact that they have no
children. In a world where abortion is illegal, birth control may well be out of the
question, which would suggest that Deckard and Iran either never have sex, practise nonreproductive sex acts, or are infertile. There are, of course, no children at all in this
novel. Presumably, in a civilization which uses reproductive capacity to measure human
status, a child would merit as much social credibility as an animal. But there are no
children here, and as much as he craves an animal Deckard never dreams of a human
child. For Edelman, the “figure of the Child” becomes the very telos of the
heteronormative commitment to futurity (25). But in Deckard’s barren, childless world,
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the only representative of the future is a fertile, Nubian goat. The animal, in Do Androids
Dream, thus remains the paradigmatic symbol of heteronormative futurity. In
Sedgwick’s classic “male-male-female” erotic triangles (Between Men 25), one man’s
desire for another veers away from its original object and finds cathexis in the more
‘appropriate’ target, woman. Mirroring this vector, here the goat takes the woman’s
place as the socially acceptable target of Deckard’s transgressive desire for androids. The
heteronormative goat, then, signifies Rachael’s exclusion from human erotic life. What
better target for android rage?
When Deckard returns from his arduous mission, Iran informs him that Rachael
has murdered his goat: “someone came here, got the goat out of its cage, and dragged it
to the edge of the roof” (226). Rachael puts an end to the erotic triangle, at once
extinguishing her relationship with Deckard and executing the hircine companion that
mediated their romance. This is one of two moments in the novel when androids act
viciously towards animals. The other is Pris’ mutilation of the spider, which for Heise
demonstrates that androids are “incapable of understanding and feeling with other living
beings” and for Vint shows a “disinterested [. . .] lack of concern” (“Extinction” 74; Vint
113). Both Vint and Heise use this moment to suggest that cruelty towards animals
reflects the mechanical coldness of androids. But is this coldness objective curiosity or
calculated rage? Rather than inhuman coldness, this violence against the spider may
signify a recognizably human sense of species entitlement. Watching Pris’ violent
pseudo-scientific experiment, Dick invites the reader to recall human cruelty against
animals in the name of science. Further, Rachael’s murder of the goat signifies the
opposite of mechanical indifference; here Rachael submits to raw, irrational emotion.
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Perhaps androids simply loathe their fetishized animal counterparts. Although no sane
human in the world of Do Androids Dream would intentionally kill a living animal,
thousands of years of animal slaughter and sacrifice suggest that Rachael’s action is,
from a contemporary standpoint, remarkably human. Although Deckard dismissively
reflects that she must have an “android reason” for her actions (227), this senseless goatmurder seems to be motivated by naked jealousy and wild anger. Further, it suggests that
there is truth to her claim to love Deckard (194), or at least to an emotional register
beyond rational self-interest. Rachael’s apparently impulsive action is difficult to square
with the irrational coldness both Vint and Heise attribute to androids. Just as they can
dream, it seems that androids can love and rage. The novel, then, not only suggests that
androids should be thought of on the spectrum of being that includes humans and
animals, it also implies that their more human-like qualities might be their most ethically
dubious traits. The anthropophilia Rachael demonstrates thus emerges as among the most
dangerous elements in this complex and volatile network of interspecies desire.
Seeking to recover from his traumatic adventure and the death of his goat, Deckard
travels into the desert, cultivates a relationship with the ‘fraudulent’ prophet Mercer, and
finds an apparently genuine toad. Upon realizing his precious toad is mechanical,
Deckard offers a concession: “The electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those
lives are” (241). Here, Deckard includes electric animals in the spectrum of life. All the
various continuums of the novel bleed together in this gesture. The heretofore distinct
spectrums—between organic animals and humans, electric animals and android—
collapse into each other. Vint reads this moment as a step in the direction of redemption,
suggesting that the novel gestures towards a future “in which humans might be fully
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human again” (125). But is this return to a naturalized humanity really what the novel
advocates?
When Mercer first tells him that “[t]here is no salvation” (178, emphasis in
original), Deckard responds with outrage, furious at the audacity of a faith which offers
no redemption. Ultimately, though, he forms a genuine belief in this counterfeit prophet:
“The only one who was right is Mercer” (234). For Deckard, Mercer becomes more real
in his very inauthenticity. The fact that Mercer represents a uniquely human experience,
then, implies that the threshold of humanness comes to exist for Deckard only as a
necessary fiction, a defense mechanism which allows him to subsist. The human itself,
then, becomes a sham, and Deckard—consciously or otherwise—comes to realize that
his commitment to a naturalized humanity is just as artificial, and just as psychologically
necessary, as Mercer. Rather than a return to a naturalized idea of the ‘fully human,’
then, the novel reminds us that species definitions are essentially malleable. But even if
we accept a provisional category of humanity, what does it mean, here, to be human? In
this novel, to be human is to all but destroy the world you live on, to eradicate millions
of species, to flatten the diversity of the planet, and then to create convincing artificial
versions of yourself only to torture, fuck, threaten, enslave, and kill them. What kind of
rational being, in these circumstances, would want to be human?
In light of the evolutionary panic permeating this novel—where all humans on
Earth face the threat of devolving into ‘specials’—it may be helpful by way of
conclusion to turn to Darwin’s understanding of the concept of species: “the view which
most naturalists entertain, and which I formerly entertained—namely, that each species
has been independently created—is erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not
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immutable” (98). My conclusion, then, is not original. It belongs to Dick, and it belonged
to Darwin before him: species being is a lie we tell ourselves in order to hold our world
together. It is a tentative, transitive category, and what we call a ‘species’ exists only
under the constant threat of extinction and change. To self-identify as human or any
other species is to exist in a perpetual space of species panic. No species remains exactly
the same from one decade, year, or day to the next. Defending one’s species through
violence, as Deckard does throughout the novel, thus emerges as a fool’s errand.
In the final analysis, then, what becomes of desire between species? Does it provide a
liberating bridge across the perceived species gap? Rudy argues that interspecies desire
can offer a productive disruption of “the stability and superiority of human identity”
(611). Setting out to destigmatize erotic connections between species and expose the
bestiality taboo as a bulwark of “human exceptionalism” (605), Rudy writes that “intense
connections between humans and animals could be seen as revolutionary, in a queer
frame” (605). Indeed, interspecies desire can pose productive challenges to prevailing
structures of sexual, political, and ideological hegemony. Interspecies desire can shift
matrices of sexual and species domination, offering affective and biological bridges
across species lines and challenging the reified category of the autonomous human and
its troublesome attendant notions of species privilege, naturalized reproductive sexuality,
and normative bodies.
Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, like Jack London’s The
Call of the Wild and Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, sheds a more cautionary
light on interspecies eros. Dick’s novel demonstrates that interspecies desire, like queer
sexuality more generally, is not necessarily politically radical and is certainly not

142
inherently edifying, redemptive, or laudable. Deckard wants no part of this liberatory
rearticulation of human sexual being. Instead, he wants to have illegal sexual
relationships with technological beings that arguably can’t consent because he is bored
by, can’t handle, or simply doesn’t want sex with his wife. Interspecies sex, in this case,
emerges not as a site of radical or liberating sexuality but as a remarkably conservative
manifestation of a culture of male human privilege that wants to extend itself through
technological augmentation. Queer as his sex with Rachael may be, it is also exploitative
and ethically dubious. Do Androids Dream demonstrates that interspecies desire, while
theoretically radical, can also be profoundly conservative. Deckard does not attempt a
genuine ‘crossing’ through sex with androids. Rather, he belittles Rachael to the end: “I
wish I could do to you what you did to me, he wished. But it can’t be done to an android
because they don’t care” (234). Despite the passion, love, and rage she has demonstrated,
Deckard upholds his panicked fiction that Rachael remains a ‘cold’ machine. The
consolation the novel offers is that the reader may not—indeed should not—think like
Deckard. Beyond Deckard’s conservative, panicked point of view, Do Androids Dream
offers a world of triangles and continuums in flux, where humanity occupies a transitory,
drifting space in a miasmic network of species and sexual being. Among the many vital
challenges this novel sets for its readers in an age when the majority of laptop users have
a technological sex life with internet porn, is to recall that all sex—straight and queer,
within and across species, between animals, media, and machines—requires thoughtful
negotiation and conscientious care.
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Chapter Four:
Lactic Panic and the Erotics of Dairy in Toni Morrison’s Beloved

An enslaved young woman arrives at the Sweet Home plantation: Sethe, a thirteen-yearold girl with bold “iron” eyes (10). The five “Sweet Home men” (9), all enslaved men in
their twenties, swell with desire. They have not lived near a potentially sexually
available woman for years. Though the temptation burns so hotly that “rape seem[s] the
solitary gift of life” (10), they do not make advances. They wait for an agonizing year as
Sethe chooses a partner. Attending her decision, they fantasize about this young woman
as they fornicate with calves (11). What is the function of this graphic, disturbing, and
loaded human-nonhuman sexual encounter at the heart of Toni Morrison’s haunting
1987 slave narrative Beloved?
One of the things that is significant about it is that it is often forgotten. Readers
rarely recall that nonhuman animals figure prominently in the book, let alone the way
those animals figure as sexualized conduits of torture. In conversations about my
research, colleagues who’ve read, studied, and taught Beloved often need to be reminded
about what I mean when I tell them I’m examining interspecies erotics in the novel.
Understandably, most readings of Beloved do not focus on animals or questions of
species identity;117 instead, readers tend to examine the novel’s central themes of
dehumanization, infanticide, memory, and trauma. One of the things that I’m arguing
here, though, is that examination of nonhuman animals in Beloved adds crucial insight
and context to the established and flourishing critical conversation about this novel. In

As Jennifer McWeeny notes, “Beloved is rarely recognized for its critical portrayal of our various
abuses of nonhuman animals” (272).
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what follows, I examine how nonhuman animal eros in Beloved both serves as a
mechanism of torture (corroding righteous struggles for what Christina Sharpe calls
“black humanity” [12]) and destabilizes the claim of species autonomy.
Attendance to the profusion of nonhuman animals in the novel reveals that this
primal scene sets the stage for a series of moments in which slaveholders such as the
tyrannical—and, crucially, bestial Schoolteacher—seek to degrade the enslaved black
body to subhuman/animal status: Paul D is “collared like a beast” (273), works with a bit
in his mouth (69), and feels his self-worth descend below that of the farm’s rooster (72).
Sethe’s husband Halle has a psychotic episode, smearing butter over his face in a
lactophobic/lactophilic spectacle after witnessing two white men pin Sethe down and
drink the milk from her breasts (16). Schoolteacher’s nephews steal Sethe’s breastmilk
“back behind the stable” (200), reducing her to a producer of human dairy. Such
moments of degradation via animal bodies serve to indicate a familiar and painful
rhetoric of dehumanization. These enslaved subjects become animalized in scenes meant
to register the horrific degradation of slavery.
Beyond the crucial points about black dehumanization, though, there is also the
more slippery and nebulous role of nonhuman eros and dairy. Dairy connotes a realm of
connective tissue where humans regularly imbibe the mother’s milk of a nonhuman
animal—a maternal-erotic discharge only produced after reproduction. Dairy, in other
words, offers an ideal physiological site for a study of species malleability and
interspecies erotics—it quite literally serves as a kind of living membrane joining species
together in a metabolic union. Milk, of course, is produced by the female bodies of all
mammals, thus offering a site of affinity between females at the level of class, beyond
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species bonds. But there is also a dark side of dairy—contemporary dairy practices are
rife with sites of animal exploitation, where cattle live in dystopian conditions of
constant enforced reproduction, tragic familial separation, and perpetual bodily
consumption. Enslaved women in antebellum America, as Morrison demonstrates
through Sethe’s pained lactic panic, saw their species status as tenuous and faced a very
real threat of being reduced, “like cattle,” to human livestock, subject to perpetual
breeding and, through the institution of the wet nurse, as purveyors of human dairy.
Most of the criticism on the role of animals in Beloved does not look beyond the
way “Beloved’s animal imagery” demonstrates “the horrors of chattel slavery” by
challenging the “inherent human dignity” of Morrison’s enslaved characters (Valkeakari
167). The available criticism, in other words, tends not to think critically about the idea
of “inherent human dignity” itself, and how such an ideology might contribute to the
crucially linked bondage of human slaves and domesticated nonhuman animals. In his
article “Animal Liberation or Human Redemption: Racism and Speciesism in Toni
Morrison’s Beloved,” Tadd Ruetenik offers a sustained analysis of the complex function
of animals in the novel, arguing that “Morrison’s masterpiece . . . can be read as a
justification of animal exploitation as a condition for the liberation of human slaves”
(318). Jennifer McWeeny, by contrast, maintains that Beloved is a novel that critically
engages “our various abuses of nonhuman animals” (272). Although both arguments
have solid ground in Beloved and throughout Morrison’s oeuvre, it is not my intention to
determine whether Morrison is an anti- or pro-animal writer. What Morrison is, as
Ruetenik acknowledges, is a gifted and virtuosic artist who, in Beloved, dramatizes the
fact that “the issue of human wellbeing cannot be cleanly separated from the
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consideration of animal exploitation” (318)—that the sonic link between chattel and
cattle is more than coincidence. Beloved is a novel that takes for granted the radical
contingency of species taxonomy and acknowledges that the right to name and claim
“the human” in nineteenth-century America belonged to forces of white supremacy.
What I explore throughout this chapter, and what critics have thus far overlooked, is the
way in which animal eroticism and the prevalence of human and nonhuman milk serves
to emphasize the contingency and malleability of species classifications in Beloved.118
This dynamic plays out first and most jarringly through Paul D’s erotic encounters with
animals and then more subtly through Sethe’s panicked and traumatized fixation on
breastmilk. Breastmilk is a crucial thematic throughout Morrison’s oeuvre,119 and in
Beloved the motif of lactic panic plays out powerfully alongside a series of dark and
threatening encounters with nonhuman bodies. Beyond the problematic and overly

The most extensive analysis of the role of animals is Tadd Ruetenik’s article “Animal Liberation or
Human Redemption: Racism and Speciesism in Toni Morrison’s Beloved” (ISLE 17.2 [2010]). See also
Kristen Lillvis’ article “Becoming Self and Mother: Posthuman Liminality in Toni Morrison’s Beloved”
(Critique 54.4 [2014]), Karla Armbruster’s essay “‘What There Was Before Language’: Animals and the
Challenges of Being Human in the Novels of Toni Morrison” (Comparative Critical Studies 2.3 [2004]),
and Jennifer McWeeney’s article “Topographies of Flesh: Women, Nonhuman Animals, and the
Embodiment of Connection and Difference” (Hypatia 29.2 [2014]). Much of this research will be
addressed in more depth later in this chapter. For an analysis of breastmilk in Beloved see Heather Duerre
Humann’s article “Bigotry, Breast Milk, Bric-a-Brac, a Baby, and a Bit in Beloved: Toni Morrison’s
Portrayal of Racism and Hegemony” (Interdisciplinary Literary Studies: A Journal of Criticism and
Theory 6.1 [2004]) and Michele Mock’s article “Spitting Out the Seed: Ownership of Mother, Child,
Breasts, Milk, and Voice in Toni Morrison’s Beloved” (College Literature 23.3 [1996]). See also Reginald
Watson’s article “The Power of the ‘Milk’ and Motherhood: Images of Deconstruction and Reconstruction
in Toni Morrison’s Beloved and Alice Walker’s The Third Life of Grange Copeland” (CLA Journal 48.2
[2004]). Of the latter three writers, none seriously consider the enormous animality signaled by the
importance of breastmilk, an especially odd oversight considering the obvious way Morrison pairs human
milk with an abundance of animal images. Mock argues passionately that breastmilk is the “ultimate
expression of maternal love” but never pushes this beyond the level of human maternity to consider the
broader mammalian thematic of maternal love that hangs darkly over the setting of Sweet Home (118), a
farm that includes a dairy and various ominous scenes involving cows and cow’s milk. Lynda Koolish
notes that the scene when Sethe’s milk is stolen demonstrates “the refusal of whites to perceive a slave
woman as other than a cow to be milked, a breeder of livestock” (425). But, in the fashion typical of the
criticism on this novel, Koolish does not note that this scene of horror takes place on a dairy farm, where
the exploitation of cow’s milk looms darkly and suggestively throughout Morrison’s narrative.
119
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simplistic comparison of the slave plantation with concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs), what does Morrison’s layering of human and animal suffering and
exploitation tell us about the larger system of racist and speciesist hegemony? This
chapter attends to the pandemic eroticism of nonhuman animals in the novel, and to the
backdrop of bovine dairy lurking ominously behind the lactic exploitation of the novel’s
protagonist, Sethe. One of the novel’s ongoing and doubled dramas is that on the one
hand the ideology of slavery tortured slaves by dehumanizing them—rendering them
animal—and on the other hand this ideology removes the possibility of love from slaves’
relations with animals. One of the great tensions of Beloved, when read with an eye for
species identity and nonhuman animals, is that even as it makes its legitimate argument
for black humanity as a political category, it dramatizes a plethora of species
malleabilities that expose and dissolve the human as a biological category.
I register that rending the bio from the political may seem counterintuitive, and I
do not mean to imply that biological and political humanity are discrete—they are
mutually imbricated and constitutive. I follow Alexander G. Weheliye’s conception of
“racializing assemblages” (4), a framework that acknowledges the centrality of “layered
interconnectedness of political violence, racialization, and the human” (1). The popular
discourses of “bare life and biopolitics” (4), Weheliye stresses, do not acknowledge
“how deeply anchored racialization is in the somatic field of the human” (4). There is, in
other words, no concept of the human or the human-animal binary that is not always
already implicated in racialization. As I mobilize it, the political concept of “humanity”
corresponds to Weheliye’s notion of “Man” (135)—a concept that has value for analysis,
if only as the object of criticism. Like Weheliye, I believe that the political category of
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Man or “the human” is the patriarch at the core of many overlapping and intersecting
systems of oppression. Weheliye’s project in his riveting book Habeas Viscus is, at least
partly, to destabilize “the false universality of western humanity” (135). Weheliye offers
an eloquent diagnosis of the superstructure of exploitation, where
humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species for the benefit of other
humans, which at the same time yields a surplus version of the human: Man. Man
represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the
heteromasculine, white, propertied, and liberal subject that renders all those who
do not conform to these characteristics as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal nobodies. (135)
I can only gesture to Habeas Viscus for readers who seek a full account of Weheliye’s
sophisticated marriage of biopolitics and black feminist studies and the theoretical union
of flesh and corpse he finds in the phrase “habeas viscus—‘you shall have the flesh’”
(2). Of course it is natural and for post-emancipation black communities to seek to
reclaim themselves as human. But, complexly, even as emancipated slaves take back the
mantra of the “human” they destabilize and disintegrate the Western claim of
huManity—demonstrating the vulnerability and fragility inherent within that political
construct. Drawing on Weheliye’s attempt to unite “flesh and habeas corpus in the
compound habeas viscus” (11), I offer the milk that flows from mammalian species as a
liquid exemplar of interspecies connections—connections that are not pleasant to
address, but that remain important for thinking through species being and the past and
future of conceptualizations of the human. While Weheliye attempts a radical
reconceptualization of the human—“a version of the human unburdened by shackles of
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man” (92)—I turn to specific formations of animal-human interactions and cross-species
leakages to ask questions about the claim of species supremacy and the real formations
of bodies and discourse underlying the fiction of the human.
This chapter elaborates the parallel between Beloved’s profusion of threatening
animal eroticism and Sethe’s panic about becoming human dairy. Sethe demonstrates a
profound and righteous species panic about being made into an animal through the tyrant
overseer Schoolteacher’s anthropological writing. This phobia takes on a more evocative
physical dimension in Sethe’s sexual violation by Schoolteacher’s nephews, when the
milk she produces for her children becomes rendered and coded as dairy for white
consumption. Sethe’s alternately phobic and frantic obsession with body fluid
emphasizes the animality of the human body and its link to other mammal species while
also demonstrating the radical contingency of the species hierarchy through Sethe’s fear
that if her lactological connection with her children is lost she will become a milkproducing animal. I argue that the novel’s focus on human milk draws attention to the
bovine bodies that lurk in the shadows of the novel as purveyors of dairy and receptacles
of violent human desire. Through two coupled moments of humiliation and degradation
via the bovine body—Paul D’s bestiality and Sethe’s lactic sexual abuse—Morrison
dramatizes the troubling connection between bovine life and the conditions of human
slavery. Offering a series of vivid moments where the machinery of slavery deploys the
animal body as a mechanism for sexualized torture of the enslaved black body, Morrison
demonstrates the way slavery operates as a version of what Dominic Pettman calls the
“humanimalchine” (6). The nonhuman animal body, here, persistently appears as a force
of degradation and dehumanization via sexualized torture. In the dark erotics of its
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interspecies explorations, Beloved repeatedly demonstrates the way animal eros threatens
the tenuous and contingent political species status of slaves. While animality is a
troublesome and controversial lens through which to discuss slavery, it also offers some
illuminating insights into the conjoined structures of political, ideological, and biological
oppression that have left us, 150 years after emancipation, living in a dystopia of
massive-scale black carceral labour, casual racialized murders, and overtly racist heads
of state. Asking questions about the ways we oppress bodies, asking about the linkages
between the subjugation of human and nonhuman bodies, offers one way to confront the
many-armed machine of race/species oppression.

The Anxious Interface

When is species panic necessary, desirable, or ameliorative? When do situations of
human oppression require an assertion of species status, an affirmation of humanity in
the face of being rendered subhuman or animal? In historical circumstances such as the
Holocaust, chattel slavery in America, and the widespread extermination of indigenous
life and culture in the Americas, regimes of oppression consistently designated certain
racialized peoples “bestial” and “subhuman.”120 The residues of such racist-speciesist

Elie Wiesel’s Night (1958) offers a prime example of the drive to claim human status in Holocaust
survivor literature. Repeatedly brought into situations where humans become “[beasts] of prey” with
“animal hate in their eyes” (101), Wiesel bespeaks a compulsive desire to assert that despite the challenges
posed to human dignity, the victims “were men after all” (84). Holocaust testimony is rife with similar
examples, including Primo Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved (1986) and Jean Améry’s At The Mind’s
Limits (1980). Such works also demonstrate a recurring need to show the savagery and bestiality of the
oppressors, a thematic that is also prevalent in slave narratives such as Frederick Douglass’ Narrative
(1845). For a cogent analysis of species taxonomies and the “battle over the human being” in the
Holocaust (25), see Anat Pick’s Creaturely Poetics (Columbia University Press, 2011), 23-51. Here Pick
argues that “animals permeate the Holocaust” and that “anxiety over species identity”—species panic—
“determines the ways the Holocaust is and is not represented” (24). There is of course a long history of
120
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definitional thresholds are of course still rampant in contemporary Western culture.
Indeed, the claim to the species status “human” is always motivated by logics—most
often racially driven—of exclusion. In this chapter and the one to follow, I take up these
concerns through what I call the “anxious interface” where racial categories, species
taxonomies, and gender identifications meet. The human, as discourses of slavery reveal,
is nothing more than a panicked process of negotiating who has the power to declare
themselves as such. Colleen Glenny Boggs stresses the need to be “cautious of the
current embrace—my own included—of posthumanist theories that see species boundary
crossing as part of a liberating narrative” (33). Heeding Boggs’ warning, it is crucial to
note that in the case of the history of slavery species categorization emerges as an
essential part of the institutionalized practice of racism: the self-reproducing machine of
white power repeatedly contrived ways to take human populations and pseudoscientifically slur them into the semantic and legal category of the subhuman.121 To be
clear, I am not trying to level the difference between species and races or conflate
various overlapping modes of oppression. I merely wish to insist that species, like race,
is a malleable and historically determined category. It is not that race and species are the
same thing but that racist discourse is inextricably intertwined with species panic.122
Furthermore, as Anat Pick notes regarding the Holocaust, while “[d]ehumanization as a
strategy of oppression has a long and iniquitous history” (6), it is nonetheless crucial to

settler conflations of indigenous peoples with animals and “savagery.” In Taxidermic Signs, Pauline
Wakeham notes the troubling connection between “animality and aboriginality” in modern portrayals of
indigenous life in which the animal and the indigenous body come together, dubiously, as signs of a
fetishized atavism (3). I will treat this different formulation of the “anxious interface” as it applies to
indigenous peoples more thoroughly in the next chapter of this study.
121
In Scenes of Subjection (1997), Saidiya V. Hartman offers a profound analysis of the legal conditions
under which “blacks” came to be “considered less than human” in antebellum America and beyond (117).
122
In the words of Christopher Peterson, “speciesism and racism” are “logically and historically
enmeshed” (2).
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recover the “disavowed animality” of such institutional traumas “as central to the ethics
of memory” (6). What were the discursive dialogues between humanity, animality, and
flesh in the torture-regime of slavery, and how was the bio-zoological spectrum linking
human and animal, creature and beast, free agent and chattel, navigated through an
erotics of torture via animalization?
The very possibility that a group of people could be degraded below human
status and into the humiliating realm of the subhuman/animal—the fact that becoming
“less than” human would always be panic inducing—depended on a system of white,
European, enlightenment thinking that had already denigrated the animal as an inferior
being. The foundation underlying the entire nexus of species/race oppression is the
originary assumption of human exceptionalism. It is this initial claim of the superiority
of the human, as Marjorie Spiegel demonstrates in The Dreaded Comparison (1988), that
creates the very conditions under which dehumanization becomes a degrading and
humiliating threat. Spiegel asks, “[w]hy is it an insult for anyone to be compared to an
animal?” and concludes thus (15):
With the exception of those who still cling—either overtly or subtly—to racist
thought, most members of our society have reached the conclusion that it was
wrong to treat blacks ‘like animals.’ But with regard to the animals themselves,
most still feel that it is acceptable to treat them, to some degree or another, in
exactly the same manner; to treat them, as we say, ‘like animals.’ (19)
Spiegel exhumes a haunting litany of “similarities between [slaves’] treatment at the
hands of white people in the United States and the treatment of animals at the hands of a
large sector on the American population” (29), offering an extensive archive of textual
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evidence as well as eerily juxtaposed images of human and animal branding (28-9),
bondage (36-7), and—most crucially for the arguments to follow—milk production (467). Spiegel’s deliberately provocative approach takes the direct opposite tack to someone
like Saidiya Hartman, who focuses on the “routinized violence” of slavery rather than
indulging in the temptation to “exploit the shocking spectacle” (4).123 Legal scholar
Angela Harris outlines a number of problems with the “dreaded comparison.” Harris
notes that the “comparison implicitly constructs a gaze under which slaves and animals
appear alike” to the sentimentalizing gaze of the privileged, white, soi-disant liberator
(26). Furthermore, “dreaded comparison(s) erase the specificity—and the seriousness—
of each rights struggle” and “ignores the dynamic relationship between people of color
and animals given their historic linkage in the white western mind” (25, 27). Similarly,
Weheliye accuses animal studies critics of using this comparison irresponsibly,
examining “how the (not so) dreaded comparison between human and animal slavery is
brandished about in the field of animal studies and how black liberation struggles serve
as both the positive and negative foil for making a case for the sentience and therefore
emancipation of nonhuman beings” (10). Anticipating just such a (valid) criticism, I’d
like to clarify my own position; although I do offer some heavy critiques of the
contemporary industrial meat and dairy complexes, I won’t be attempting to make the
case for animal liberation in this chapter. I am not an advocating abolitionism or
veganism so much as attempting to illuminate the entanglements of overlapping systems
of oppression, domination, and subjugation. I do not equate human slavery and animal
captivity; my argument does not depend on a conflation of these two categorically

Certainly, Morrison herself does not follow Hartman’s approach—piling violence and traumas on top of
one another in a novel that flirts with the gratuitous.
123
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different, though often aesthetically similar, forms of bondage and subjection. Rather, I
try to probe the dynamics of human-animal interactions during slavery and its aftermath
as Morrison dramatizes it in Beloved. Heeding Harris and Weheliye’s warnings about the
dangers of sensationalism, insensitivity, and the irresponsible erasure of nuance at risk in
comparing human slavery and nonhuman captivity leads me to modify Spiegel’s
terminology.
With such dangers in mind, I move from the “dreaded comparison” to what I call
the “anxious interface” in order to convert the deliberately provocative equation of
enslaved human and nonhuman subjugation towards an emphasis on an overlapping
nexus of racist/speciesist oppression. Animal and enslaved human suffering are not
equivocal or reducible to each other, but they are essentially related and interconnected. I
am not interested in levelling histories but in exposing their complex and nuanced
connective tissues. What I do intend is to follow the path set out by recent and important
work at the intersection of critical race studies and animal studies that has stressed the
need to critically examine the long and complex co-implication of race and species
categories as part of a yoked nexus of oppression against those—both human and
nonhuman—wrongly deemed subhuman.124 The first problem, as Spiegel insinuates, is
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The discursive interconnection of race and species is by this point well established. The first major
work to connect race and species as part of a conjoined nexus of white-male-human exceptionalism was
Marjorie Spiegel’s groundbreaking book The Dreaded Comparison (1988). Before Spiegel, Michel
Foucault had already laid the groundwork for such thinking—the connection between race and species was
from the beginning inscribed in his concept of biopolitics: “power is situated and exercised at the level of
life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population” (137). A prominent recent
theorization of the race-species continuum is Zakiyyah Iman Jackson’s article “Animal: New Directions in
the Theorization of Race and Posthumanism” (Feminist Studies 39.2), a review of three crucial recent
books—Mel Chen’s Animacies (2012), Michael Lundblad’s The Birth of the Jungle (2013), Kalpana
Seshadri’s HumAnimal (2012), Christopher Peterson’s Bestial Traces (2013), and Alexander G.
Weheliye’s Habeas Viscus (2014)—that deal with this topic at length. For an overlapping and more robust
list of explorations of this topic, see Weheliye, 141n14. See also the excellent 2013 special issue of
American Quarterly on the theme of “Species/Race/Sex” (65.3), edited by Claire Jean Kim and Carla
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the very idea of human supremacy, an idea that must be posited before the designation
“subhuman” can be doled out. Furthermore, my particular intervention is to examine the
way eroticism both binds and unsettles notions of species exceptionalism—a dynamic
closely joined to racial supremacy. In reference to the 2005 PETA (People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals) ad campaign juxtaposing images of human slavery and animal
slaughter, Harris notes that such a strategy presumes “a comfort in associating oneself
with animals and animal issues that people of color can only assume with difficulty”
(27).125 While the sentimentalizing or sensationalizing gaze of the presumed-to-be-white
animal rights activist too-readily equates the sufferings of slaves and nonhuman animals,
for the person of colour such a juxtaposition causes “difficulty.” This difficulty—a form
of species panic—is symptomatic of the anxious interface. And it is precisely this
anxiety, with all its complexity, that provides a productive theoretical tool for the
exploration of the highly erotic human-animal relations saturating Morrison’s depiction
of slavery in Beloved.

Paul D: Bestiality, Bestialization, and the Erotics of Torture

Freccero. The 2015 special issue of Gay and Lesbian Quarterly on the theme of Queer Inhumanisms (21.23), edited by Mel Y. Chen and Dana Luciano, also contains several robust articles probing the intersections
of race, species, and sexuality. In a short article in GLQ 65.3, entitled “Outer Worlds: The Persistence of
Race in Movement Beyond the Human,” Jackson forcefully states her own position that “blackness
conditions and constitutes the very nonhuman disruption and/or displacement” that posthumanist thinkers
advocate (216). For Jackson, then, it is crucial that “slavery and colonialism” are inseparable from the
“Enlightenment humanism” that posthumanist thinking tries to displace (“Animal” 681). Posthumanist
thinking, in other words, must confront the history of slavery, colonialism, and racism (and, I would add,
heteronormativity) in order to productively trouble human exceptionalism.
125
Referring to the similarly thorny theoretical area of the Holocaust, Anat Pick notes that “[c]omparing
the fate of animals to that of Jews is considered ethically repugnant” (24).
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Beloved’s copious portrayals of nonhuman eros persistently unsettle the presumed
rigidity of species taxonomies. Here scenes of degradation-by-bestialization—and the
politics of species being in the novel as a whole—play out through a series of torturously
erotic exchanges between animals and humans, versions of what Christina Sharpe calls
“monstrous intimacies” between human and nonhuman beings (3).126 Morrison depicts
sexuality as something of a species grey zone, a realm where humans and animals can
ascend and descend the species echelon—thus proving that this hierarchy is not fixed but
negotiable. Sexual desire is, like hunger, one of the clearest indicators that humans and
animals exist in a world of shared biological needs. While Cora Diamond has
emphasized the importance of “vulnerability to death” as a locus of the “sheer animal
vulnerability” humans share with nonhuman animals (74), sex is perhaps a more obvious
space of affinity; not only do humans and nonhuman animals both experience sex,
humans can and often do literally cross the species divide and enter the animal’s bodily
experience through sex and other forms of physical integration. In Beloved, human
sexuality often unfolds through a rhetoric of animality. The first sex act Morrison
describes is Sethe “rutting” with an engraver in order to purchase Beloved’s epitaph
through sex (5); when Sethe is pregnant and fleeing Sweet Home, her deus ex machina,
Amy, asks whether she plans to “just lay there and foal” (33); in the same scene Sethe
repeatedly thinks of her gestating child as an “antelope” (30, 31); when she encounters
her spectrally re-embodied daughter Beloved for the first time, Sethe finds herself
discharging an endless flow of water “like a horse” (51); Beloved herself learns about

Although Sharpe’s powerful analysis in Monstrous Intimacies: Making Post-Slavery Subjects (2010)
stops short at the threshold of the animal, much of what she has to say can be productively augmented by
considering her notion of monstrous intimacy through human-animal relations and the race-species nexus.
126
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sex by watching turtles mate (105), engaging in the familiar human experience of
encountering animals as sexual pedagogues. This persistent animalization of sex and
reproduction first of all suggests Morrison’s investment in an emergent 1970s and 1980s
feminist tradition that criticized the cultural construction of women’s physiologies as
embodying an “animality” seen to be “more manifest” than that of men (268).127 The
accumulation of animal imagery to refer to copulation and the reproductive human body
also highlights Morrison’s engagement with the way in which, as Margaret Grebowicz
notes, “we imagine that sex is where humans are at their most animal” (11).128 Though
modern Western culture ubiquitously associates sex with animality, that same culture
most often considers the successfully adjusted sexual being to be one who can
appropriately “rein in” the animal impulses while still discharging them in a healthy
manner. While there is something intrinsically animalistic about sex, those who have sex
best in our civilized post-Freudian world are those who do it least “like animals.”
The sexuality of animals and the animalization of human sexuality is most
palpable in the character of Paul D. Throughout the novel, Morrison constructs Paul D
through striking and highly eroticized encounters with animals and technologies of
livestock. Beyond the quickly dispatched information that Paul D frequently copulates
with calves at Sweet Home, the reader later learns that after an escape attempt
Schoolteacher tortures Paul D by placing a bit in his mouth (69), one of several critical
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Near the beginning of The Second Sex, de Beauvoir offers a litany of destructive animal metaphors—
praying mantis, spider, “splendid wildcats, the tigress, lioness, and panther” (21)—used to subdue the
perceived animality of women. Sherry B. Ortner’s 1972 article “Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture”
takes a similar tack, arguing that ‘[w]oman’s physiology” is “more involved more of the time with ‘species
life’” and “animal-like infants” (22). Similar sentiments can also be found across much feminist thought,
specifically in works such as Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément’s The Newly Born Woman (1975) and
Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which is not One (1977).
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This line of thinking is deeply ingrained in the human psyche, indicated artfully in Shakespeare’s
Othello when Iago describes interracial sex as “making the beast with two backs” (1.1.115-16).
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scenes in which Morrison “likens black people to barnyard animals” (McWeeny 272).
Sethe, who witnesses this foul torment, commiserates: “how offended the tongue is, held
down by iron, how the need to spit is so deep you cry for it . . . . The wildness that shot
up into the eye the moment the lips were yanked back” (71). Significant about such
technologies of bondage is both the fact that they are highly routine forms of animal
confinement—horses spend the better part of their outdoor lives sporting such
postanimal prosthetics—and that they are manifestly erotic appendages. The subjugation
of the tongue and the yanking of the lips suggests an erotics of domination and torture
fixated on the oral orifice. Significantly, bits and “bit gags,” like floggers, riding crops,
harnesses, and chains have become part of the arsenal of BDSM sex play. In Mel Y.
Chen’s words, “BDSM practices” often “deploy accoutrements of animalness” (105).
BDSM, in fact, in its stylized eroticization of torture, borrows heavily from the bondage
materials used for both animals and slaves, demonstrating the ongoing eroticization of
these mechanisms of subjection.129 If, as Frantz Fanon states, “[w]e know how

A quick perusal of the website extremerestraints.com reveals items such as “Pony Bit Gags,” “Crops,”
“Floggers,” “Collars,” “Wrist and Ankle Restraints,” and a subcategory called “Pony and Puppy Play”—
the main two referents of the BDSM fantasy are clearly slavery and animal subjugation. Slavery, of course,
contributes much to the aesthetics of domination and subjection on which sadomasochists thrive. As
Margot Weiss notes in Techniques of Pleasure: BDSM and the Circuits of Sexuality (2011), “the shackle,
slave auction, [and] flogging” are among the most common tools of BDSM (151). BDSM culture routinely
stages eroticized scenes of domination, regularly re-enacting “rape, torture, slavery, or Nazi concentration
camps” (Weiss 148). Weiss argues that such dramatization “simultaneously incites and denies the realness
of these historical or socially meaningful scenes of power” (151), but the relation of BDSM to historical
slavery remains fraught. This is, as Weiss notes, a highly touchy subject in BDSM communities: “SM play
with social power, especially cultural—and national—trauma like slavery and the Holocaust, is contested
and politically complex” (188). In fact, entire monographs—most notably the 1982 book Against
Sadomasochism—have been written arguing that “SM is the product of internalized oppression” (149).
Most SM practitioners—and the community is, significantly, “overwhelmingly white” (Weiss 192)—
contest this claim, arguing that BDSM is “about abstract or neutral, not racialized, power” (Weiss 194).
Beyond these debates, what is clear, and what matters for my argument, is that the technologies of
fetishism—indeed the very word “kink”—trade on the legacy and aesthetics of chattel slavery. The way in
which BDSM incorporates both posthuman prostheses and animal appendages such as riding crops,
floggers, and dog collars suggests a palpable species-transgressive erotic force underlying this realm of
fetish and desire. The contemporary eroticization of technologies of bondage such as whips and chains
129
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sexualized torture, abuse, and ill-treatment can be” (123), then the casual and constant
subjection of nonhuman animals offers a dark fantasia of unacknowledged interspecies
erotics. For Sethe, though, the fact that horses routinely take the bit in their mouth, their
eyes filling with that same fierce and frenzied wildness, is of little concern. What matters
in the emotional world of the novel is that a human being should not be subjected to a
horrific torture designed for animals.
Of Paul D’s experiences of torture at Sweet Home, the one he finds most
degrading is his encounter with the rooster, Mister. As Paul D roams the yard with the bit
in his mouth, Mister watches from a washtub. Heather Duerre Humann notes that
through this encounter the overseer Schoolteacher “not only causes him extreme pain
and humiliation, he destroys Paul D.’s sense of humanity” (66). Indeed, Paul D confirms
such an interpretation in his anguished reflection that in this moment he had become
“less than a chicken sitting in the sun on a tub” (72). Paul D not only feels dehumanized,
here, he also feels sub-animal, demonstrating a more complex hierarchy of species being
than simply human > animal. Furthermore, Mister’s humiliation of Paul D is palpably
erotic. From the rooster sitting on the washtub “like a throne” to Paul D’s description of
himself “licking iron” (72), every detail in the encounter feeds into Paul D’s general
feeling of sexual powerlessness. When Paul D describes the moment, he gives the
rooster a hefty sadistic agency: “he was hateful all right. Bloody, too, and evil . . . . He
sat right there on the tub looking at me. I swear he smiled” (72). The tragedy of the
scene, for Paul D, is not only that the rooster witnesses his degradation but that Mister

demonstrate the way the history of human domination over both slaves and animals has become part of a
widespread eroticization of power and domination.
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takes pleasure in his subjection. The rooster, is, of course, an intact male with his choice
of the hens.130 The spectacle of chickens mating, furthermore, appears to the human eye
as a vicious spectacle of primal violence and vicious masculine domination. Mister, then,
leering over Paul D’s debasement, does so as a prolifically sexual being while Paul D has
spent his young years “sick with the absence of women” (10). Justine Tally notes that
Morrison’s story-world is one where “[p]rocreation . . . is highly valued” (72), and Paul
D’s agonized reproductive ineptitude serves, here, as a stark contrast to the rooster’s
plentitude of copulation and generation.
The clearest indicator of the way animal eros serves to dehumanize Paul D is the
novel’s central scene of human-bovine intercourse—Paul D and the other Sweet Home
men engaging in habitual sex with Sweet Home’s calves. The most obvious reading of
this scene understands it as an instance of the species degradation brought about by
slavery, part of the mechanism that makes the Sweet Home men feel like “trespassers
among the human race” (126). The phobia of bestiality, traditionally, is that on some
level the human who has sex with an animal becomes beast, at least in the moment of
copulation—that, via sex with a calf, Paul D would become bestialized. What is most
surprising, in a text that generally presents dehumanization through vivid spectacles of
species panic, is that Morrison treats this most explicit example of interspecies sexual
exchange in a largely casual manner. The sheer volume and cavalier delivery of
Morrison’s repeated invocations of bestiality—“taken to calves,” “fucking cows,”

The reproductive masculinity of the rooster leads Trudier Harris to argue that “Mister . . . is an
objectification of freedom and a metaphor for manhood” and that the rooster eventually becomes “more of
a ‘man’ than Paul D, more human” (181). I find a domestic chicken—bred through thousands of years of
coevolution to be all-but-incapable of surviving without human aid—to be a strange symbol of freedom. I
tend to interpret this scene as being more about domination, and Mister is certainly the “alpha” male to
Paul D’s submissive position.
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“abused cows,” “fucked cows” (10, 11, 11, 20)—suggest that this is not a particularly
delicate subject. It is something repulsive, perhaps, but not something that needs to be
handled with sensitive literary artistry. Morrison does not depict human-bovine
intercourse indirectly or obliquely, the way she delivers Sethe’s infanticide or Cholly
Breedlove’s rape of his daughter Pecola in The Bluest Eye (1970). As a writer who
generally handles trauma and violence with great care, Morrison renders the interspecies
sex acts of the Sweet Home men in a surprisingly cavalier manner.
Paul D himself, the only Sweet Home man whose perspective the reader
glimpses, does not see species-transgressive intercourse as a particularly shocking form
of sex. In one startling moment, after he has had sex with Sethe and realizes that the
experience could not possibly live up to twenty-five years of fantasy, Paul D reflects that
“[t]he jump . . . from a calf to a girl wasn’t all that mighty” (26). “A vagina is a vagina,”
Paul D seems to think here, demonstrating a remarkable indifference to the bestiality
taboo. There may, in fact, be a sense in which bestiality is empowering for the Sweet
Home men; bestiality is an assertion of human dominance via sexuality. These men, in
peril of being reduced to human livestock, prove their place in the hierarchy of species
via sexual domination of nonhuman animals.
Morrison portrays sex between men and calves as expected and natural given the
absence of human females. Interspecies sex, here, works primarily as a substitute for
human eroticism.131 Morrison’s syntax when describing the sexual predicament of the
Sweet Home men—“minus women, fucking cows, dreaming of rape” (11)—suggests a
clear hierarchy of appropriate outlets for sexual needs; these men would prefer women,

Robinson Devors’ film Zoo makes clear that many zoophiles resent the general assumption that they are
attracted to animals as substitutes for the human partners they secretly want but are unable to attain.
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but they will sleep with calves. Furthermore, these men, “paralyzed by yearning for
Sethe” (25), fantasize about “the new girl they fucked cows for at dawn while waiting for
her to choose” (20). Morrison’s narration transforms the nonhuman animal body into a
prosthetic sex toy for human masturbation. The emotions the descriptions conjure,
though, is not so much a sense of the degradation wrought via bestiality as the abjection
of lacking women, the agonizing emptiness of these men’s sexual and romantic lives.
Recalling his sense of dehumanization at the hands of the tyrannical overseer
Schoolteacher, Paul D describes the Sweet Home men as “[w]atchdogs without teeth;
steer bulls without horns; gelded workhorses” (125). In this remarkable menagerie, Paul
D conflates emasculation and impotence with animality. Morrison does not present the
Sweet Home men primarily as violators of cows but as men afflicted by the lack of
available female bodies. One slave, Sixo, walks for thirty miles and forgoes sleep in
order to see his lover who thereby earns the nickname “Thirty-Mile Woman” (25, 24).
Women, here, are clearly the “correct” object of male sexuality.
If Paul D’s bovine romance is queer insofar as it is species-transgressive, it is
also crucially hetero. Significantly, then, Morrison’s narrative seems to suggest that
interspecies sex between humans and juvenile calves would be preferable, for sexdeprived men, to sex with one another. Charles Nero takes Morrison to task for the
heteronormative presumption underlying her text.132 Noting the “homophobia” at work
in Morrison’s creation of the “five heroic black men of the Sweet Home plantation”
(232), Nero suggests that the fact that, in the absence of women, these men “either
masturbated or engaged in sex with farm animals . . . does a great disservice to the

Nero also notes that Morrison’s novels The Bluest Eye (1970) and Tar Baby (1981) similarly
pathologized homosexuality (232).
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complexity of men’s lives” (232). Certainly, the fact that the sex-deprived Sweet Home
men apparently never consider male-male intimacy a legitimate option suggests a deepseated aversion to homosexuality shaping the erotic world of Sweet Home. While
Sethe’s relationship with her ghost-daughter, Beloved, resonates with a music of
incestuous eros—“she felt Beloved touch her. A touch no heavier than a feather but
loaded, nevertheless, with desire” (58)133—male-male intrahuman erotics become coded,
here, as perversion.
Homosexuality looms as a strange specter of perversion overshadowing the
novel, a more degrading and emasculating force than bestiality. When Sethe has finally
chosen her partner, Halle, the rest of the Sweet Home Men watch as the newlyweds
make love for the first time in a cornfield. The narrator notes that the four men sit
together, “erect as dogs, watching corn stalks dance at noon” (27). The presence of other
animal spectators at the event—“[e]ven the crows knew and came to look” (26)—
emphasizes the way these men with erections become animalized observers of human
sexuality. It is a tragic and painful scene, emphasizing the sexual and emotional
abjection of life as a male slave with no available partners. It is also, though, a moment
of screaming sexual tension as these four men huddle together, “erect as dogs” but not,
as dogs surely would, humping one another. Morrison, here, places these erect males in
dangerous proximity to one another and leaves them there, agonizingly, tantalizingly,
amplifying the novel’s general thrust of homo- and other sexual panics. This act of

Another example: “Sethe was licked, tasted, eaten by Beloved’s eyes” (57). Juda Bennett argues that
Beloved is, as a ghost, an essentially queer character, “a compelling symbol of lesbian and black
invisibility” (33). Furthermore, Bennett rightly notes that there is a “queer aspect” suffusing Sethe’s
“relationship with Beloved” (30). Bennet, however, does not address Morrison’s pathologization of malemale sexuality.
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withholding suggests a fierce and determined restraint of a bubbling homosexual
impulse; while homosexual desire seems to—and presumably often did—course between
these fit, young, erect, and lonely men, they choose to sublimate their desires, instead,
into calves. If some animals function, here, as eroticized menace, cows function as a
sexual safety net—an acceptable receptacle of male desire. The male human body, on the
other hand, is a site of disgust and perversion for the Sweet Home men—confined to the
firmly sealed closets of the enslaved agrarian psyche.
In the novel’s most explicit scene of homosexuality, a routinized sex act between
male slaves and their overseers emerges starkly as a repulsive form of torture. Working
on a chain gang in Alfred, Georgia, Paul D finds himself at the mercy of “overseers who
force [the slaves] to perform fellatio” (Raynaud 54). The enslaved men react with horror
to this institutionalized sexual cruelty: “Occasionally a kneeling man chose gunshot in
his head as the price, maybe, of taking a bit of foreskin with him to Jesus. . . . Convinced
he was next, Paul D retched, vomiting up nothing at all” (108). Oral sex among men, in
Beloved, figures as a form of heinous torture, an act meriting vomit and even potential
suicide and instilling in the enforced receptive partner the desire to bite off the penis of
his assaulter. This sexual degradation is also a racialized emasculation, as the black men
perform the highly symbolic role of servicing the white phallus—a sordid extension of
the more general debasement of their bodies, minds, and labour. Certainly, in Beloved
giving a blowjob is a far more degrading act than having intercourse with a calf. Insofar
as the novel figures sexuality through access to power and species status, Paul D here
experiences the ultimate degradation. If bestiality allows Paul D to attain a certain
prominence in the sexual echelon of Sweet Home, all of that eroticized species power
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has been lost to him in Alfred, Georgia, where he ends up “[g]rateful for the daylight
spent doing mule work in a quarry” (41). Of the degradations available to him, the status
of laboring animal finally comes to appear to Paul D as a relief.
One rarely considered spinoff of the species panic running throughout both sides
of the fabricated human-slave-animal continuum is the proximity of slaves to working
animals in the agrarian culture of the antebellum American south. Slavery brought
animals and slaves into contact on a regular basis, leading Frederick Douglass to argue
that the institution of slavery caused farmers to treat their animals more brutally than
they ever had before (qtd in Spiegel, 107). In a discussion of agrarian slave narratives,
Kimberly Smith points out that despite persistent “complaints that slaves were treated
like animals, the slave narrators seldom stopped to consider whether it was appropriate to
treat animals so badly” (286). Among many thefts, one thing enslaved peoples may have
been robbed of was the ability to coexist harmoniously alongside animals. Beloved
likewise portrays animals primarily through a phobic lens, offering almost no empathetic
connections between humans and animals, despite frequent contact across species lines.
As most pet owners know, domestic animals can be a great source of comfort in difficult
times. Rather than seeing animals as purveyors of fondness and love, though, Douglass
and others suggest that slaves often saw animals as competitors for privileges such as
food and freedom.
What, exactly, were the emotional and erotic connections between slaves and
animals? The lived historical conditions of enslaved life on farms also populated by
animals can be contextualized through the larger history of interspecies erotics in rural
areas and agrarian cultures. Historically, bestiality was thought to be common among
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peasants and other occupants of rural areas. For example, sexologist Havelock Ellis notes
“the great frequency of bestiality among shepherds, goatherds, and others whose
occupation is exclusively the care of animals.” (82).134 It is tempting to speculate, then,
that the central scene of bestiality in Beloved has grounds in historical precedent. Slaves
often dwelt alongside animals and domestic livestock, and the practice of bestiality may
have been fairly common. Presumably, given the panicked definition of the self as antianimal in the discourse of slavery, such sexual encounters would have only increased the
slaves’ sense of humiliation regarding their tenuous species status. (I do not say this to
out anyone in particular, but to try to illuminate the larger overlapping system and the
panicked negotiation of species status that the anxious interface of species/race
illuminates.) Morrison uses zoophilia and interspecies erotics to variously degrade and
empower her enslaved characters, she also invites consideration of the enormous
complexities of zoophilia in relation to consent and species-wide bondage. The question
of consent—a live and thorny issue in discussions of bestiality and zoophilia—becomes
further complicated by the novel’s immersion in the history of slavery. Debates about
consent surrounding the modern animal rights movement may have no place in
discussions of slavery, where the paradigm of consent is radically alien. Slaves do not
consent to being enslaved, or to being animalized. Therefore their actions, whether those
actions are an attempt to reclaim power and species status by penetrating/dominating the
animal or simply a more physical quest for pleasure and satisfaction, are not

Likewise, Midas Dekkers states that according to Alfred Kinsey’s survey results, recorded in Sexual
Behavior in the Human Male (1948), 50% of “young men in the countryside” of 1940s America had “had
sex with animals” (Dekkers 133). Even if such numbers look rather “far-fetched” (Pettman, Human Error
79), they still suggest that bestiality may have been far more normal and less panic-inducing than
homosexual sex or interracial sex (Dekkers 39). Perhaps, then, Morrison is right and Nero is wrong—the
Sweet Home Men may really have been more willing to turn to calves than each other for erotic solace.
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commensurable with consent as a criterion of ethics. This is murkier territory, with
slippages of sex and species at every turn. In the two sections to follow—and in a logic
Morrison’s novel invites—milk complicates the already fraught question of consent in
interspecies erotics. The production of cow’s milk—the perpetual theft of the milk a cow
produces to feed her babies—offers an example of a continual and non-consensual erotic
exploitation of the bovine body that nonetheless complicates and blurs the meat-focused
framework of animal studies.

Meat and Mammaries

Dairy is a strange and nebulous substance; it is not meat and does not require death to
produce but it is a consumable product of the mammalian body. Taking dairy from an
animal is, furthermore, manifestly erotic—it requires the animal to continually reproduce
(often through artificial insemination or other human technological enforcements) so that
human beings can then drain maternal fluid from the animal’s breasts. Dairy production
is a lifelong non-consensual interspecies erotic relationship, one self-styled technological
parasite feeding off the biomass of another species. Institutionalized dairy production
offers the very paradigm of Michel Foucault’s definition of biopolitics as a “power
organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death” (147). The
agricultural production of dairy requires the careful manipulation of animal sexuality,
reproduction, and the mammalian maternal body.
When animal studies veers towards advocacy, it often focuses on meat and
animal slaughter. In her books The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990) and The Pornography
of Meat (2003), Carol J. Adams offers ready examples of this paradigm, drawing an
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instructive and striking litany of connections between gender exploitation and the
iconography and politics of meat-eating.135 Meat is a rich signifier of the exploitability of
the nonhuman body, offering a clear line of demarcation between the traditional
categories of “human” and “animal.” As Jacques Derrida notes in a 1991 interview with
Jean-Luc Nancy, nonhuman animals are largely subject to a “noncriminal putting to
death” for the purposes of human consumption (112). Humans, on the other hand, should
not be killed or eaten according to the laws of most cultures. In Eroticism, Georges
Bataille writes that although humans are at times sacrificed or ritualistically
cannibalized, “[m]an is never looked upon as butcher’s meat” ( 71). In modern Western
civilization this is perhaps the best legal/political definition of the human—the animal
who should not be killed or eaten.
When Derrida turns consider animal life and bodies in “Eating Well,” he shifts
his previous delineation of modern “phallogocentric” society to make room for meat,
diagnosing what he calls the “carnivorous virility” of a modern culture he deems “carnophallogocentric” (“Eating Well” 113). Here, in an interview contemporary with Adams’
The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990), at an identifiable moment of conception for animal
studies, Derrida takes issue with the fact that “our cultures are carnivorous” (“Eating
Well” 112). Through the highly influential work of Adams and Derrida, meat achieves a
central valuation in this emergent discourse of animal studies. While Derrida and Adams
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Significantly, both books also locate race as part of the oppressive politics of meat-eating. In The Sexual
Politics of Meat, Adams argues that “meat eating” is “an index of racism” (52). In The Pornography of
Meat, Adams also draws race into the nexus of animalized portrayals of human sexuality. Noting
“[p]ornographic book and magazine titles such as A Cocksucking Slave, Soul Slave, or Slave Stud” (45),
Adams suggests that [a] prevalent theme in pornography is portraying African American women in the
South during slavery, thus eroticizing the master-slave relationship and recalling a time when the
Constitution excluded them. Titles such as Black Bitch and Bound, Gagged, and Loving It make the racism
more, not less, dangerous. They posit that black women have an animalistic sexuality that must be
controlled, otherwise they are dangerous. (45)
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are both specifically theorizing eating practices, a broader view of human-animal
relations can benefit from looking beyond meat, the most obvious gastronomic rendering
of the nonhuman animal body. The underlying presumption of Adams’ work is that
modern “carnophallogocentric” culture turns women into 1) meat, and 2) animals, and
that such a presentation of human women is degrading, even monstrous. While such
thinking offers a crucial bulwark against the exploitation of women in contemporary
heterocentric society, following too quickly behind the animalism=degradation
presumption risks missing Marjorie Spiegel’s point, which serves as the theoretical heart
of this chapter: that the very idea that being dehumanized/animalized should be insulting
stems from the underlying problem of humanity’s hugely problematic and violent
relation to animals. The initial valuation of animals as (symbolically) profane, debased,
and hyper-erotic—and as commodities to be bred, killed, and consumed—is precisely
what leads to the eroticized power relations that allow humans to be degraded by
rendering them bestial.
While recent thinking with and around animals has done much work towards
theorizing meat, far less theoretical labour has attended to milk. The fixation on meat
risks occluding other forms of animal exploitation beyond slaughter for meat, missing in
particular the flood of violent eroticism at work in dairy production processes.136 More
recent thinking, such as Mel Chen’s Animacies, troubles the presumed binary makeup of
the life-death distinction, probing the “richly affective territory of mediation between life
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Despite her emphasis on meat, Adams herself clearly acknowledges the pandemic violence of dairy.
Adams, a militant vegan who advocates for the cause at regular public lectures, has elsewhere spoken of
her larger project as a “feminist-vegan theory” (“Foreword” x). She has also recently co-authored, with
Patti Breitman and Virginia Messina, Never Too Late To Go Vegan: The Over-50 Guide to Adopting and
Thriving on a Plant-Based Diet (New York: The Experiment, 2014).
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and death” to examine theoretical possibilities such as “the ‘affect’ of a vegetable” (4).
When Derrida states that “[t]he difference between ‘animal’ and ‘vegetal’ also remains
problematic” (“Eating Well” 106), he prefigures such thinking and gestures towards
nebulas that blur the distinction between life and death, meat and flesh.
Flesh is central in Weheliye’s recent theorization of the “enfleshed modalities of
humanity” (132), a project derived from Hortense Spillers’ distinction between “body”
and “flesh” (67).137 Weheliye hopes that it might be possible “to claim the monstrosity of
the flesh as a site for freedom beyond the world of Man” (125); his vision of “the
hieroglyphics of the flesh” (127), though, also entails a crucially liminal and malleable
understanding of “humanity as a relational ontological totality” (32). Such thinking
opens a slippage between body, flesh, and the inanimate—a fissure into which dairy can
squelch and leak. Milk, though it is part of the living body, is decidedly not flesh; it is
the liquefied rendering of human embodiment. Milk is a fluid that is itself full of
potential life and yet stripped of the traditional category of life, a substance that affronts
death insofar as it demands its animal producers to be kept alive for the sake of perpetual
and protracted corporeal extraction, rather than killed and eaten. Milk sustains life,
allowing human and nonhuman babies to live only if they can properly latch onto their
mothers’ bodies. But milk itself is not an organism, not properly “alive.” Yet it is more
lively than meat, occupying a space between food/flesh and living animal on the animacy
hierarchy. Milk, then, dances through various positions on Mel Y. Chen’s animacy
hierarchy, demonstrating the radical malleability of the body, walking archive of fluid

Although Weheliye offers robust accounts of many of Spillers’ essays, Spillers herself made this
distinction most clearly and famously in her 1987 essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American
Grammar Book.” For Weheliye’s most extended engagement with Spillers, see “Bare Life: The Flesh,” the
second chapter of Habeas Viscus.
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and flesh. Milk also represents a transitional substance between food and fluid, hunger
and thirst. Human babies often live for up to six months on milk alone—it is high in
caloric value, a kind of superfood that generates in women a kind of superhuman feeling
of body-transcendence, and yet it is not masticated, it is not solid. In these ways and
more, milk is a nebula, a ready conduit for thinking the transitory nature of bodily and
species being.
Dairy is also profoundly and multiply erotic. In our contemporary world, dairy
offers a more clearly eroticized vision of human-animal exploitation than the more
familiar and sensational scene of the abattoir. The dairy industry produces repeated and
long-lasting degradations of the animal body that may be more suggestive of how the
modern biopolitical apparatus works than the institutionalization of animal death. The
crucial fact is not that beef cows and veal calves die to give humans meat but that dairy
cows are walking, zombified sacks of fluid waiting to be joined to the ever-expanding
human species. In an appendix to the chapter collection Sister Species: Women, Animals,
and Social Justice, Lisa Kemmerer offers a stark description of the twisted erotics of
dairy production:
milking machines are attached to the cow’s teats morning and evening. Dairy
cows endure mechanized milking for ten out of twelve months per year
(including seven months of their nine-month pregnancies) . . . . Genetic
manipulation and dietary controls cause extraordinary and unnatural milk output.
Cows naturally produce just over two tons of milk per year, but Bovine Growth
Hormone (BGH/BST) has increased milk flow so that cows now provide as much
as thirty tons of milk annually, enough for ten calves. (174)
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After being artificially impregnated and then having their calves taken away to be
slaughtered as veal at four months old, hormonally-enhanced milking cows spend the
majority of their lives with their nipples attached to tirelessly thirsty machines, nothing
less than endlessly greedy prosthetic extensions of the collective human body. This
shockingly banal spectacle of the technofuturist postanimal serves as a haunting
incarnation of Dominic Pettman’s “humanimalchine.” The notion of the cow as
posthuman prosthesis also extends to consideration of the selective breeding practices
that have on some level created cattle as itself a kind of milk-machine designed by a dark
strand of symbiosis for perpetual human exploitation. Insofar as the life of a dairy cow
consists of being “sent to slaughter after just four or five years of repeated impregnation,
giving birth, and constant milking” (Kemmerer 174),138 the modern dairy system in
countries such as the United States begins to register as nothing less than dystopia.139
There is also an interspecies erotics and intimacy at work in the very act of
drinking milk and eating dairy products. This intimacy used to be more obvious when
milking was done by hand, requiring a physical connection between human and bovine
bodies. Despite the alienation of modern CAFO dairy practices, though, consuming dairy
still at root consists of putting a cow’s breastmilk into the human mouth or body—a
system of mechanically augmented human-bovine suckling.
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The natural lifespan of cattle is over twenty years (Kemmerer 174).
In the dystopian strand of his book Cloud Atlas, David Mitchell heavily draws on the imagery of the
slaughterhouse and dairy industries to add a gothic twist to the end of the lives of his waitress-clone
“fabricants” (326), who believe they are going to reach “Xultation” after death but end up perishing en
masse in a kind of floating death factory (340). Mitchell’s fabricants are raised in “wombtanks” and live on
“Soap” (343), which turns out to be a kind of milk made out of the “reclaimed proteins” of their own
species (343). The 1973 film Soylent Green explores similar themes, depicting massive industrial
cannibalism as the eerily foreseeable solution to feeding a starving human population. Kurt Vonnegut’s
novel Slaughterhouse Five suggests that the panic induced by pairing the technology of the slaughterhouse
with human life—as in the industrial death-machine of the Nazi concentration camps—is the ground zero
of dystopian literature.
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Consideration of the erotics of dairy consumption takes on a strange twist, too,
when we think about the way that milk is marketed, by the Dairy Farmers of America
(DFA) and similar organizations, specifically for human children, with cartoonish
images of benevolent, cows or human-cow hybrids. For example, the crimson avatar of
The Laughing Cow brand, wearing hoop earings and abundant eyeliner, looks clearly
and unsettlingly simultaneously racialized and sexualized (“The Laughing Cow”). The
push to get kids to drink cow’s milk looks, from a distance, a little like a nation of bovine
wet nurses feeding America’s children. Pair this with the erotics of ad campaigns such as
the California Milk Processor Board’s “Got Milk?” endeavour or Coca Cola’s pin-upgirl branding (itself a bovine metaphor) of their new milk product in partnership with
Fairlife,140 and what emerges is a strange mixture of bovine and female human sexuality
coalescing through the murk of lactose.
Another quasi-dystopian and eerily familiar element of the contemporary dairy
industry is the way it treats the bovine family unit. A necessary facet of extracting milk
intended for calves from dairy cows is the separation of families. Behaviourist Temple
Grandin sums up the deep emotional bond between cows and calves: “Cows are herd
animals that need to be with their buddies and family members. They have close
relationships, especially between sisters and between mothers and daughters” (137). In
modern dairy practice, though, “the calf is usually removed from the cow within a few
hours of birth” (Keyserlingk and Weary 106). This means that both calf and cow are
highly distressed, shown by the fact that calves “bawl and scream and pace for three to
five days trying to get back to their moms” (Grandin 158). The complete obliteration of

See Ylva Johannesson’s article “The Fairlife ‘Coke-Milk’ adverts: Do we really need pin-up girls to sell
us drinks?”
140
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the family structure in the dairy industry, with little care taken for the emotional lives of
this living property, bears an ominous resemblance to the treatment of slave families in
antebellum America.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently stated that as of 2013
there were almost 1.5 billion cattle in the world (“Statistical Pocketbook” 30), taking up
an enormous amount of land mass and draining environmental resources at a level that
makes livestock the single greatest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions. These
creatures are generally so hidden from the human eye that most people don’t even know
that cows have to reproduce in order to provide milk (Velten 8), or that such
reproduction is habitually forced upon them. For the most part the dairy industry looms
darkly in the subterranean closets of human society, providing a product marketed as
healthy and rustic that in fact depends on a bio/zoopolitics of massive-scale human
manipulation of bovine sexual and reproductive anatomy. Humans habitually using
machines to impregnate cattle. Human-made milk machines suckling greedily at the
bovine teat. Hormones given so cattle will produce highly unnatural amounts of milk.
Offspring—the very reason for this milk—taken at birth and killed soon thereafter. What
is this if not a twisted interspecies erotics of torture?

Lactic Panic
Breastmilk lies at the deepest core of Sethe’s traumatic memory; she is a character
defined by lactic panic. Sethe’s central, anxiously emphatic ethic in Beloved is that she
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should be able to nurse her own children, a concern wrought through her manically
repeated mantra that she would have “milk enough for all” (198). Fleeing Sweet Home,
her imperative is not her own freedom but the drive to deliver her milk to her baby girl
on the far side of the Ohio river: “I had milk . . . . I was pregnant with Denver but I had
milk for my baby girl. I hadn’t stopped nursing her when I sent her on ahead . . . . All I
knew was I had to get my milk to my baby girl. Nobody was going to nurse her like me”
(16). Here Sethe emphasizes the primacy of the mother-daughter connection, a bond
encapsulated in her maternal body fluid. Through repeated vocalizations of Sethe’s
searing desperation regarding the transference of milk to her child, Morrison conjures the
voices of legion slave women who felt this urge to deliver breastmilk to their children
and were unable to do so. This baby girl later becomes Beloved, named after the first
words given at her own funeral, “Dearly Beloved” (5), after she was murdered by her
mother in order to save the family from being forcibly returned to slavery under the
Fugitive Bill. Sethe’s obsession with breastmilk says many things about her fierce and
tortured maternal instinct, but one suggestion here is that something was lost during the
period where mother and nursing child were separated—something irrecoverable,
something that made Beloved so thirsty for love she would return from the grave and
cause Sethe’s body to abject an “endless” stream of urine (51).141
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Though child-bearing does involve abjections such as the passage of the placenta and the amniotic
fluid, breastmilk would not be considered an abject in Julia Kristeva’s sense. Kristeva’s examples of the
abject are “waste and dung” (2), as well as “the corpse” (3). The abject, then, is a wasteful or decaying
substance, while breastmilk is crucially nourishing. Slavery and colonialism have, however, often been
seen as analogous to abjection (Koopman 304). Emy Koopman, however, insists that “using the discourse
of abjection to illustrate processes of colonization” is “questionable” (304).
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Sethe’s preoccupation with the lactic connection between mother and child
derives from two central scenes of lactic trauma. The first main scene of lactic trauma is
Sethe’s lactic sexual abuse at the hands of schoolteacher’s nephews.142 This is the
memory by which Sethe is most aggressively haunted: “As for the rest, she worked hard
to remember as close to nothing as was safe. Unfortunately, her brain was devious. She
might be hurrying across a field, running practically . . . . Nothing else would be in her
mind. The picture of the men coming to nurse her was as lifeless as the nerves in her
back” (6). In spite of her efforts to suppress this particular memory, it haunts her more
viscerally and stubbornly than even the memory of putting her own child to death.
Justine Tally notes that Freud’s idea of the repetition compulsion is clearly at play in
Morrison’s depiction of Sethe, and this obsessive revenant is nowhere more clear than in
the protagonist’s anxiously habitual recollection of the nephews’ theft. Sethe is clearly
obsessed with, and haunted by, this scene of her own reduction to human dairy—the
exploitation of her milk for sustenance under the lips and hideous teeth of these boys. If,
as critics such as Claudine Raynaud suggest, the “tragic core” of Beloved is Sethe’s
“infanticide” (43),143 Sethe’s own primal scene is the moment of having her milk stolen
by Schoolteacher’s nephews.144 This scene is torturous for Sethe on two levels: first, it
deprives her of the milk intended for her own child, and second, it places her in the
terrain of livestock—a human dairy animal being drained of the liquid essence of her
reproductive labour.
McWeeny calls this scene “the moment of violation” that Sethe “returns to again and again throughout
the text” (272).
143
Karla Armbruster argues, similarly, that Beloved “revolves around” this “central act” (365). In fact, the
critical consensus on the novel places much more emphasis on this moment than the lactic theft, which
receives much more textual attention.
144
Humann notes that Sethe “seems to have minded being milked . . . more than she minded being
whipped” (67).
142
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The second deep-seated lactic trauma is Sethe’s experience as an infant, having
to share a wet nurse, Nan, with the white children who always got the first feed: “Nan
had to nurse whitebabies and me too because Ma’am was in the rice. The little
whitebabies got it first and I got what was left. Or none. There was no nursing milk to
call my own” (200). Sethe’s mother suckles her for only a “week or two” because her
labour is more useful in the fields (203). The forces of white power deprive the infant
Sethe of essential nourishment and maternal intimacy, laying the psychological
foundations which will cause her fierce focus on delivering her own milk to her children.
Furthermore, this recollection situates the politics of breastmilk in the novel in light of
the widespread white exploitation of enslaved black wet nurses in antebellum America.
In Wet Nursing: A History from Antiquity to the Present (1988), Valerie Fildes notes that
“in all regions in the Americas where slavery was instituted Negroes were used to suckle
the privileged infants of their white overlords” (141). The black female breast in
antebellum America, then, serves a strange double-function, at once the object of
pandemic sexual exploitation of the black body by white overlords, and as the object of
nutrition for white children—an entrance into enforced interracial eroticism at a
formative age of infantile sexuality for these white children who learn, early on, to
exploit the black female body. When Sethe has her breast milk stolen by Schoolteacher’s
nephews, these two roles collapse into one another; Sethe’s bosom becomes at once an
object of male sexual pleasure and a source of sustenance and nourishment—a hybrid
vessel of dairy and desire.
The primacy of milk in Beloved influences the novel’s ethical thrust in three
major ways. First, and most obviously, it makes the novel into a story about motherhood
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and, more specifically, mother-daughter relationships during slavery and its aftermath.
Second, it suggests that Morrison wishes to at least invite consideration that this
breastmilk-related violence could be more degrading and horrific than Sethe’s murder of
her own child. This notion finds support in the fact that though Sethe laments the
necessity of what she did, she steadfastly stands by her actions, insisting that she was
justified insofar as “she stopped him” (164)—preventing Schoolteacher from stealing
herself and her children back into slavery.145 Third, it mobilizes the thematic of stolen
human breastmilk as a lens through which to view the larger history of slavery and
particularly the enslaved female reproductive body. Because slaves were legal property,
infants belonged not to their mothers but to their owners. Families were therefore
routinely torn apart, causing what Morrison calls the “emotional disfigurement” at the
heart of this novel of tormented motherhood (“Foreword” xvi). Morrison’s major focus
is, of course, the unique tortures of motherhood during slavery.146 In Playing in the
Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, Morrison voices the dominant conception
during antebellum slavery: “that slave women are not mothers; they are ‘natally dead,’
with no obligations to their offspring or their own parents” (21). The rhetoric of “natal
death”—one formation of Orlando Patterson’s broader notion of “social death” (6)—is
particularly striking if read in the context of Beloved; one of the tasks of the novel is to
exhume, through the undead Beloved, this deceased natality.
The exploration of the particular traumas of motherhood during slavery is a
crucial imperative and one which Morrison’s novel undertakes brilliantly. However, the

Significantly, Sethe ultimately finds a notably lactic solace that justifies her decision: “Nobody will
ever get my milk no more except my own children” (200).
146
Beloved voices what Andrea O’Reilly calls “the hitherto silenced maternal narrative of slave women”
(127).
145
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prominence of milk in Morrison’s novel takes on a different and underexplored
resonance if read in the context of dairy; the nephews’ theft renders Sethe a milkproducing animal. Morrison offers a haunting abundance of dairy cows in the backdrop
of the novel alongside the calves whom the Sweet Home men repeatedly violate in order
to create an atmosphere saturated with dairy milk and render Sethe’s fear of becoming
dairy a highly proximate concern. Dairy, in fact, seems to provide an analogue for the
“slow violence” of the slavery institution (Nixon 8). The torture of slavery in fact works
much like the extraction of dairy from cattle; this is not the sudden slaughter that kills to
make meat, it is the gradual agony of extracting labour and physical sustenance in an
ongoing attrition. This is not the “right to kill” but a “life-administering power”
(Foucault 136), a life where the body of one species (Bos taurus) is converted into a pure
and ongoing state of sustenance for another species (Homo sapiens). As a substance
painfully and protractedly stolen from cattle and women alike, milk clearly serves as a
vessel of macabre fascination in Morrison’s writing. The comparison between women,
particularly racialized women, and cows is troubling and unsettling; but to compare is
not to equate. Beneath the panic, anxiety, and outrage such comparisons justifiably
provokes, and after the important affirmation of black humanity and dignity, questions
remain at the interstice between species—questions about intimacies, linkages, and
overlaps. Questions that, in Morrison’s work, often ooze forth through an aesthetics of
dairy.
Morrison’s oeuvre demonstrates a sustained and at times anxious artistic interest
in milk. In her first novel, The Bluest Eye (1970), Morrison uses milk to form a palate of
saccharine 1950s whiteness which she epitomizes through the face of Shirley Temple,
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the ambassador of “little white girls whose socks never slid down under their heels” (19).
In Tar Baby (1981), Thérèse, a onetime wet nurse for white infants, has “magic breasts”
that produce milk long after there is “nobody to nurse them” (289). In Paradise (1997),
the final book of the loose trilogy that begins with Beloved, Lone reprimands the
younger women who don’t care for her maternal advice, including “how to comb their
breasts to set the milk flowing” (271).147 Song of Solomon (1977) presents milk as the
purveyor of a quasi-incestuous bond between a mother and her son, earning the novel’s
protagonist the appellation “Milkman” after the town drunk witnesses a scene of belated
nursing (15). Morrison’s depiction of Ruth Dead feeding her son froths with the
intrafamilial erotics of lactic transference:
he was old enough to be bored by the flat taste of mother’s milk, so he came
reluctantly, as to a chore, and lay as he had at least once each day of his life in his
mother’s arms, and tried to pull the thin, faintly sweet milk from her flesh
without hurting her with his teeth. She felt him. His restraint, his courtesy, his
indifference, all of which pushed her into fantasy. She had the distinct impression
that his lips were pulling from her a thread of light. It was as though she were a
cauldron issuing spinning gold. (13)
Mother’s milk, here, serves to edify the female maternal body and launch a woman into a
triumphant reverie organized around her own bodily beatification and plenitude. This
scene, though, also augurs a lactic panic response. Macon Dead—Milkman’s father, the
economic leader of the town, and the ambassador of a decaying erotic order—finds
Milkman’s name “dirty, intimate, and hot” (15). Although he doesn’t know how his son

Significantly, Morrison’s description of the midwife Lone also explicitly pairs human and bovine dairy,
raising the maternal concern “about the quality of cow’s milk as well as her own” (271).
147
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came about this moniker, Macon has the sense that there is some “filthy connection”
between the name and the “unsettling” force of Ruth’s “steady beam of love” for her son
(17, 23). For the reader, though, it is hard to blame Ruth; she and Macon no longer have
a sex life and this act of primal nourishment sustains her erotic needs in the face of daily
domestic abuse at the hands of her husband. Despite concerns about the child’s erotic
development, it is difficult to deny Ruth this passageway into bodily phantasmagoria.
Breastmilk serves here as a site of erotic female subversion of enforced male sexual
norms. Not only is human breastmilk clearly something that interests Morrison from
early in her writing career, it is a thematic humming with an erotic current that figures
clearly as potentially transgressive of the established sexual order.148
Morrison’s interest in milk also serves as a membrane where Morrison’s
narratives quite explicitly align themselves with the project of 1970s and 1980s
psychoanalytic feminism, where milk was a central concern. It is well known that
Morrison was deeply influenced, when researching and writing Beloved, by the work of
Sigmund Freud and French Feminists, such as Hélène Cixous, who responded to and
revised Freud’s thinking.149 Considering that Morrison was clearly steeped in Freud,150 it
seems appropriate to read both Sethe and Beloved as victims of an unresolved fixation
on what Freud calls “the so-called ‘cannibalistic’ or ‘oral’ phase, during which the
original attachment of sexual excitation to the nutritional instinct still dominates the
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In Song of Solomon, Morrison crystalizes the dominance of the hetero-phallic order through the figure
of Macon Dead, and that order figures as expressly barren and shrivelled; during the main action of the
novel, Macon has not had sex with his wife in “almost twenty years” (16).
149
Tally’s book Toni Morrison’s Beloved: Origins (2009) offers the most substantive analysis of
Morrison’s many influences, with Freud and Cixous figuring centrally. Tally notes that “in re-examining
Cixous, Freud, and Hoffman, Morrison’s novel penetrates the myths that dominate the twentieth century’s
obsession with sex, thus signifying on the ‘primitive’ concerns with procreation and regeneration” (84).
150
Tally notes that “Freud’s work . . . ‘haunts’ Beloved” (69).

183
scene” (265). Freud, here, sets the stage for a thinking of the inherent erotics at work in
breastfeeding, something thinkers such as Adrienne Rich, Charlotte Perkins Gilman,
Hélène Cixous, and Morrison take up and explore at length.151 Insofar as they were both
insufficiently weaned by their mothers, Sethe and Beloved both have ready causes for
the traumas that afflict them and lead to what can easily be read as a pathological and
quasi-incestuous lesbianish relationship.152
Part of Morrison’s project, though, hinges on the attempt to depathologize, or at
least to bring the focus onto the tragedy of, Sethe’s fixation on the lactic maternal body.
Beloved, therefore, can be read as channeling Cixous’ attempt to mythologize milk as a
vestigial universal of female human experience. In The Newly Born Woman (1975),
Cixous articulates her project of feminist lactophilia: “The Voice sings from a time
before law . . . . Voice: milk that could go on forever. Found again. The lost
mother/bitter-lost. Eternity: is voice mixed with milk . . . woman is never far from the
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In her groundbreaking feminist study Women and Economics (1898), Charlotte Perkins Gilman chose to
foreground the strange eroticism at work in human manipulation of cattle as part of her more general
indictment against the “excessive sex attraction” she diagnosed in modern humans (16). Here is Gilman’s
striking description of bovine sexuality: “The cow is oversexed. Turn her loose in natural conditions and, if
she survive the change, she would revert in a very few generations to the plain cow, with her energies used
in the general activities of her race, and not at all running to milk. Physically, woman belongs to a tall,
vigorous, beautiful animal species” (23). Gilman’s willingness to compare the human female to the cow is
brave and surprising, as is her invocation of bovine sexuality. Adrienne Rich, like most modern feminists,
was more focused on human breastfeeding. In her landmark essay “Compulsory Heterosexuality and
Lesbian Existence” (1980), Rich writes: “If we consider the possibility that all women—from the infant
suckling her mother’s breast, to the grown woman experiencing orgasmic sensations while suckling her
own child, perhaps recalling her mother’s milk-smell on her own . . .—exist on a lesbian continuum, we
can see ourselves as moving in and out of this continuum, whether we identify ourselves as lesbian or not”
(650-51). Rich, here, delves into the eroticism of the primal scene of mammalian nourishment, iterating it
as a frame of female erotic transference that joyfully threatens to exceed the incest taboo. Rich’s lesbian
continuum offers a ready model through which to read the quasi-incestuous relationships between Sethe
and her daughter Denver with their ghastly and spectrally eroticized kin, Beloved. This, certainly, is how
Juda Bennett reads the household dynamic at 124 Bluestone Road in Toni Morrison and the Queer
Pleasure of Ghosts. Rich’s focus on breastmilk transference between women as a central configuration of
the lesbian continuum as well as the date of the essay’s publication (1980) make it plausible that Morrison
had read this essay and was thinking of it in the crafting of Beloved.
152
Paul D uses notably milky rhetoric to diagnose Sethe’s pathologically cloying love for her daughters
when he says, after learning of Sethe’s infanticide, “your love is too thick” (164).
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‘mother’ . . . . There is always at least a little good mother milk left in her. She writes
with white ink” (93-4). Here Cixous positions the primordial mother-daughter
relationship as ubiquitously foundational of the female psyche. Furthermore, she names
female existence itself as a practice of writing, of voicing via milk. Morrison’s Beloved
is one of the best exemplars of this project of lactic écriture; it would not be an
exaggeration to say that the form of the novel itself—fluid, circular, pulsing with
mnemonic heave and swell and recoil—is itself an attempt to write the affective structure
of lactation. But, while Cixous’ analysis focuses on the primacy of the relation between
human females, Morrison takes a step backwards in order to place the politics of human
breastmilk against its backdrop of mammality through bovine dairy. Morrison
demonstrates that there is something creaturely in écriture.
In Beloved, Morrison’s thematic of milk and human dairy is at its most
suggestive, visceral, and vigorous. Here the textual prevalence of human breastmilk joins
with a protracted exploration of the erotic presence of nonhuman animals. Sethe’s
torturous recollections of human lactic trauma gesture to the milk-producing bovine
bodies that lurk in the backdrop of the agrarian world of Sweet Home. The Sweet Home
plantation is a farm with a working dairy—hence the plenitude of sexually available
calves with which the Sweet Home men copulate. The very fact that the Sweet Home
men have sex with juvenile cows speaks to the enforcement of bovine reproductive
labour in Sweet Home’s dairy, an undercurrent of mammalian maternal exploitation that
spasms darkly beneath this novel’s preoccupation with human milk. Aside from the
Sweet Home men regularly sexually abusing calves as they fantasize about her body—
linking her with bovine eros through the male erotic imaginary—Sethe also works

185
closely with dairy-producing cattle. A working dairy in the 1850s would of course look
very different from the massive industrial machines sketched above, and the relation
between bovine udder and human hand would likely be manifestly intimate in this
context. On her deathbed, the benevolent mistress Mrs. Garner instructs Sethe to “[k]eep
Billy away from Red Cora. Mr. Garner never let her calve every other year” (195). This
moment not only suggests that Mr. Garner was a generous handler of his livestock, it
also emphasizes the larger human control over the sexual lives of cattle—the
unquestioned interspecies erotics that drives the dairy industry. Further, Mrs. Garner’s
instructions situate Sethe as a kind of steward of the cattle and suggest that Sethe has
dealings with the cows as part of her day-to-day duties at Sweet Home. The cow—
threatening emissary of her own ultimate degradation—is also a creature Sethe tends to
daily, a being that Sethe smells and touches, that she certainly cares for and perhaps
loves. Whatever intimacy exists between Sethe and the Garners’ cattle, though, takes
place in the novel’s background—the animals that Morrison does bring into the novel’s
direct action tends to figure as menace. The fact that it is Sethe who tends to the cows
also complicates the sex taking place between men and calves. If Sethe is linked to the
female bovine body at the intimate level of milk production and cultivation, perhaps
these men fornicating with calves—baby cows—are on some level violating her, even as
they are more explicitly “damaging the goods” of the Garner household. To think Sethe
and the cattle side by side in this way is by no means to animalize or bestialize her or to
indict the Sweet Home men for their actions; rather, such a juxtaposition seeks to draw
attention to the complex web of sexuality and intimacy—the complex of degradation that
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plays out on the Sweet Home plantation through the regulation and management of
sexuality and species identity.
The bovine body figures directly in Sethe’s experience of torture. When Paul D
asks Sethe for the details about her violation by Schoolteacher’s nephews and the
subsequent lashing she received, he focuses on a telling detail to which she seems
oblivious:
‘Them boys found out I told on em. Schoolteacher made one open up my
back, and when it closed it made a tree. It grows there still.’
‘They used cowhide on you?’
‘And they took my milk.’
‘They beat you and you was pregnant?’
‘And they took my milk!’ (17)
While Sethe retains, here, her characteristic focus on her lactic violation, Paul D draws
attention to the “cowhide,” the euphemistic name for the slaver’s whip which was
traditionally constructed out of leather. Significant, here, is that the animalizing politics
of torture during slavery regularly brought the slave’s body into violent contact with the
flesh of a dead and rendered animal through the act of whipping. Sethe’s body, subjected
to punishment, comes into agonizing contact with the bovine animal that serves
throughout as a threat to her species status.
Nowhere are Morrison’s traumatic lactic dynamics more resonant than in the
recurring scene where Schoolteacher’s nephews steal her milk: “I am full God damn it of
two boys with mossy teeth, one sucking on my breast the other holding me down, their
book-reading teacher watching and writing it up” (70). The nephews pin Sethe down as
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they steal her precious maternal bodily fluid for their own erotic and gestational
pleasures. Sethe’s description of this scene, coupled with her insistent focus on the
imperative to get her milk to her children throughout the novel, not only implies that the
theft of Sethe’s milk by these boys is a kind of sexual assault,153 it suggests that the
coupling of sexual trauma and maternal violation renders this act even more horrific.
This is a theft of the very connective tissue of the black family, a metaphorical
appropriation of the family tie itself. It is, in Karla Armbruster’s words, “a violation
which symbolizes slavery’s larger violation and deformation of the mother-child
relationship” (365). Of course, this “deformation” or perversion of the maternal bond is
something humans do regularly with cattle—a fact Sethe knows first-hand. Clearly,
Sethe’s horror during this scene also contains a panic about being reduced to a human
dairy animal.
The parallel between the female slave body and the female bovine body has a
dark and agonized history. Frederick Douglass relates a familiarly dreadful account when
he describes a woman named Caroline whom the overseer Covey had purchased for a
“breeder” (70)—a stark reality of the treatment of women during slavery. McWeeny
argues that Sethe’s agony regarding the central scene of lactic violation is driven by a
fear of being “‘farmable’” (274), that is, of having “your reproductive system exploited
again and again in the service of others” (274). In other words, Sethe’s torment has its
roots in a thundering lactic panic—fear in the face of a future of perpetual lactic
exploitation (which would, as with dairy cows, also require perpetual reproduction and

The word “boys” may be misleading, though the precise age of Schoolteacher’s nephews remains
unclear. They are young enough to be in school, but old enough to restrain Sethe against her will with
relative ease.
153
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childbirth). Recalling her own lactically traumatized infancy (how she knows about it
remains an open question), Sethe links her sense of primal maternal malnourishment to
her own abjection at being violated by the nephews: “I know what it is to be without the
milk that belongs to you . . . . I’ll tell Beloved about that . . . . She my daughter. The one
I managed to have milk for and get it to even after they stole it; after they handled me
like I was the cow, no the goat, back behind the stable because it was too nasty to stay in
with the horses” (200). Here Sethe offers the most explicit example of her feeling of
being reduced to livestock by the nephews’ violation. Her panic is not only that they
should steal her breastmilk but also that in the process she had been handled like a cow
or a goat in the banal torture of mammalian barnyard erotics—that in having her
breastmilk stolen she should become a purveyor of dairy. Sethe’s horror at becoming
dairy, then, is not so much the panic of becoming animal as it is the panic of becoming a
very particular type of creature: the domestic milk-producing mammal, forced into a
perpetual cycle of maternal labour. A milk-producing animalchine.
When Paul D later reveals that Sethe’s husband, Halle, watched this scene of
lactic theft from the loft of the barn and did not intervene, Sethe’s panic reaches a new
pitch. Paul D explains that witnessing this moment “broke” Halle (69), and that he
responded with insane behavior: “Last time I saw him he was sitting by the churn. He
had butter all over his face” (69). Witnessing the complete subjection and humiliation of
his wife and the theft of the breastmilk of his own child and being unable to help drives
Halle into an animalistic state of madness. This is the last time any of the characters in
the novel see him, and so it is the reader’s parting and lingering vision of Halle—a
bizarrely bestial entry into a maddening swirl of dairy, a strange and deranged
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lactophilia. The smearing of butter onto his face may be an attempt to whiten the skin or
a willing entry into the creaturely world of dairy, visceral leakage of the nonhuman
animal body. Sethe—who has held out hope for eighteen years that her husband might
return to her—indulges in a curious fantasy after she learns of Halle’s plunge into this
maddened underworld of dairy:
There is also my husband squatting by the churn smearing the butter as well as its
clabber all over his face because the milk they took is on his mind . . . . And how
sweet that would have been: the two of them back by the milk shed, squatting by
the churn, smashing cold, lumpy butter into their faces with not a care in the
world. Feeling it slippery, sticky—rubbing it in their hair, watching it squeeze
through their fingers. (70)
How else to read this tortured reverie but as a description of lactic erotics, a stylized
sexual performance of what the narrator calls “butter play” (71). Both clabber and
untreated butter, being white and viscous, also bear a visual resemblance to human
sexual/reproductive fluids, further emphasizing the sexuality of this scene. Sethe,
tormented throughout the novel by her own lactic panic, has learned that her husband
was similarly afflicted. She interprets his crazed nosedive into the butter churn as
directly connected to the theft of her breastmilk, as if it were an attempt to steal back her
lost body fluid, to imbibe it into himself. Here the latent animality of the human body
emerges in full force; Sethe ceases to worry about her own species status and imagines
succumbing to the animality of full immersion in dairy. Such a descent figures here and
throughout Beloved as a threatening degradation, but it also suggests the inherent
slipperiness of species categories as something madness and torture can alter.
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Sethe’s panic regarding her tenuous species status also emerges in the context of
racist science and species taxonomies—an engagement through which Morrison
ultimately foregrounds the contingency of species being. Shortly before the incident of
lactic violation, Sethe discovers that Schoolteacher has been using her as the object of an
ethnological study. After having her body measured regularly without understanding
why (191), she overhears Schoolteacher talking to his nephews: “I told you to put her
human characteristics on the left; her animal ones on the right” (193). Here
Schoolteacher becomes an avatar of the nineteenth-century racist pseudo-biology that
sought to prove the animality of black people, raising larger questions about an
American education system that has long been designed to prolong racial subjugation.
Schoolteacher’s remark turns out to be precisely the reason Sethe flees Sweet Home,154
as Sethe ensures that “no one, nobody on this earth, would list her daughter’s
characteristics on the animal side of the paper” (251). Sethe rightly reacts against
Schoolteacher’s attempts to pseudoscientifically dehumanize her and her family. While
she manages to escape Schoolteacher, though, she remains subjected to his flawed
epistemology. It is Schoolteacher’s thinking, inevitably, that controls the ontology of
Sweet Home, where slaves believe that to be “animalistic” means being subject to
perpetual domination and exploitation. Here the political definition of the human
masquerades as a biological truth. This is a view of species being that is always already
hegemonic and a view of power, politics, and social relations that feeds naturally into the
will to dominate and the construction of racist systems such as the institution of
antebellum slavery. The root problem, here, is not the association of black people with

Armbruster notes that “it is not the nephew’s beating but rather schoolteacher’s classification of her as
animal that ultimately makes slavery unbearable” (365).
154
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animals—black people are, like all humans, animals. The fundamental problem is the
idea that a lesser being—and the definition of “lesser” will always of course be
arbitrary—deserves to be subjugated and exploited. Inadvertently, Schoolteacher teaches
all of this to Sethe insofar as she internalizes his praxis, coming to believe, based on how
he organizes power, that “definitions belonged to the definers—not the defined.” Along
with the belief that “humans” are better than other species and subspecies, Sethe
internalizes the knowledge that human status is something that can be granted and taken
away, that “humanity” is not an essence but a shifting point on a spectrum of species
being. While definitions may belong to the definer, however, the defined must suffer
their consequences. In slavery, and in modern politics, it happens that there are two
definitions that matter more than any other; on the one hand there are humans, the sole
beings not considered property, the sole beings with access to “rights.” On the other hand
there is the nonhuman world—raw material subject to endless exploitation. In such a
schema, who would not panic at the threat of losing human status?
Ultimately, Sethe’s struggle against the threat of animality reveals Beloved’s
radical warning against the danger of constructing hierarchical species and racial
taxonomies. When Schoolteacher comes to collect Sethe and her family and Sethe
responds by murdering her child, Morrison offers the reader a rare glimpse into the slave
driver’s psyche: “now she’d gone wild, due to the mishandling of a nephew who’d
overbeat her . . . just think—what would his own horse do if you beat it beyond the point
of education . . . the animal would revert . . . you just can’t mishandle creatures and
expect success” (150). Addicted to his game of pseudoscience, Schoolteacher witnesses
a tormented slave mother driven to infanticide and proceeds to compulsively measure her
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against nonhuman animals. He watches a child being murdered and thinks about how to
refine his own techniques of mastery and domination over those he deems, collectively
and equally, less-than-human “creatures.” His investment in racist pseudoscience and
species taxonomies seems to have nullified all capacity for compassion, empathy, and
affective connection. All that is left to Schoolteacher is a logic of mastery and
subordination, and it is precisely such thinking against which Beloved offers its most
forceful reprimand. In Schoolteacher’s morbid calculus, Morrison highlights the larger
dangers of species/racial taxonomies and the risks of delineating forms of life into
hierarchical echelons. It is not animality itself but Schoolteacher’s designation of animals
and black people as beings destined to be dominated that suffuses the novel’s racialized
subjects with horror regarding their species status; because schoolteacher (who stands in,
here, for the powers of white supremacy), has named animality something loathsome,
detestable, and exploitable, animality is indeed something to be feared, and species status
is something that should be defended with all the resources available.
Ruetenik concludes his reading of Beloved by suggesting that “not until racially
motivated inequalities among humans are remedied can speciesist-motivated inequalities
between human and nonhuman animals be remedied” (325). This is problematic, first
and foremost, because Ruetenik’s argument assumes a stable definition of race and
species that Morrison’s novel undercuts. This misunderstanding leads Ruetenik to argue
that racial conflict must be solved before species conflict can be addressed, a
presumption which will lead nowhere barring the highly unlikely scenario that racial
strife will one day reach a cathartic and identifiable terminus. The idea that we can’t act
on animal abuse until the “resolution” of racial inequality is detrimental to racially
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subjugated peoples as well as animals. Such a logic ignores the essentially yoked
oppressions of speciesism and racism and occludes the fact that the dehumanization of
non-white peoples is made possible by a logic of human supremacy that grants certain
(white, male, heteronormative) people the power to pronounce themselves “human” and
thereby deem all the other links on the chain of being “subhuman” and thereby subject to
domination. Speciesism and racism are part of the same nexus of oppression, and the
matrix itself must be tackled from multiple angles and viewed as a complex site of
intertwining oppressions. The imperative, the starting place, is to realize that racial
violence has long been coimplicated with violence against human animals and that
violence against nonhuman animals has long been racialized.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), greenhouse gas emissions from livestock account for 14.5 % of all humaninduced emissions (Gerber et al, 15). Beef and dairy cattle emissions are the leading
contributors to livestock emissions (Gerber et al, 15), and the two industries are so
deeply intertwined that consuming dairy makes one complicit in beef and veal
production, as does mere participation in the current economic machine of late
capitalism. In a world threatened by climate disaster and environmental degradation, the
question of human and nonhuman milk production has never been so urgent. Adding to
this the sexual, erotic, and reproductive complexities of the dairy industry illuminates the
fact that the human species is basically involved in a massive-scale perpetual sexual
manipulation of cattle in order to drain their biological resources for our own
nourishment and gustatory pleasure. Cows spend their lives being fertilized by artificial
insemination, wrenched away from their beloved offspring on the first day, and hooked
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up to machines that harvest their breastmilk for human consumption. Apart from the
dystopian non-consensual erotics at work in this pandemic “humanimalchine,” there is
also the emotional lives of cattle to think about. While Temple Grandin notes that many
people “still don’t believe animals have emotions” (5), neuroscience tells us that
“animals and people have the same core emotion systems in the brain” (Grandin 5). This
means that a cow stripped of her children and robbed of her breastmilk will react
psychologically in much the same manner as Sethe does in Beloved—with a screaming,
visceral torment. Take this dark calculus of torture and apply it to the hundreds of
millions of cattle producing dairy worldwide and observe the dark erotic underworld of
dairy feeding the human species as it expands ceaselessly, far beyond any utopia of
sustainability.

Beloved’s Appetite

But what of Beloved? How has this chapter been haunted by the unconjured ghost at the
centre of the story? When Beloved returns to Sethe—walking fully clothed out of the
river to arrive at 124 Bluestone Road—she is thirsty, drinking “cup after cup of water” as
if “she had crossed a desert” (51). After she drinks, she takes to eating “as though sweet
things were what she was born for” (55). Having satisfied these cravings, she seeks
erotic sustenance, first from Sethe—“Sethe was licked, tasted, eaten by Beloved’s eyes”
(58)—and then Paul D, compelling him to have “involuntary” sex in the “cold room”
while he stares “at the silver of the lard can” (116, 117). Paul D himself remembers the
atrocity of slavery as being largely about hunger, recalls having “hidden in caves and
fought owls for food” as well as stealing “from pigs” who “like him, had buried
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themselves in slop” (66). Paul D, clearly animalized by his hunger, eats among the pigs
and feels all the symbolic baseness of the act, knowing that nearby white families dine at
tables. In situations of extreme suffering, little room remains for the ethics of eating, and
the fear of bestialization looms in the roil of the ravenous stomach. Towards the end of
the novel, Beloved begins to gnaw away at Sethe’s very being; Beloved “laps devotion
like cream” while Sethe sits immobile, “limp and starving” (243), “licking her lips like a
chastised child while Beloved ate up her life” (250). Beloved’s appetite—fierce,
insatiable—figures as the response to the depravations of slavery, a time when eating
was precarious and often animalistic. The revenant of the hunger of slavery returns to
devour post-emancipation life.
The question of the ethics of animal consumption is certainly tweaked by the
specter of slavery. One of the general and lasting responses to the deprivation of slavery
was to eat—to eat well and richly. After the Civil War, barbecue, a tradition deriving
from slave communities during plantation life (Moss 95), became a central feature of the
celebration of black culture, crucially associated with emancipation: “Emancipation Day
barbecues were held by African Americans throughout the country in the nineteenth
century” (Moss 100). These barbecues were often large public events including speeches
by prominent community members and clearly symbolizing freedom and community
solidarity—all of this centered around the custom of meat-eating. Given the atrocities of
slavery and the need to assert black humanity and build black community in its
aftermath, such celebrations seem excusable—life affirming and politically powerful, if
also speciesist.
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Beloved takes place between the 1850s and 1870s. Sethe lives in the agrarian
world of mid-nineteenth century ante- and post-bellum America, not in the contemporary
world of CAFOs, milking machines, and artificial insemination. In Sethe’s time, milking
would have been done exclusively by hand—a sensual and sensory practice that would
have involved a regular intimacy with and connection to the bovine body. Sethe would
have spent her time at Sweet Home milking cattle, and she would have been privy to
their reproductive behaviour, to their sadness, their torments, their joys. But, crucially,
there is not even a suggestion of human-bovine love in the novel. This absence, I would
like to suggest at this chapter’s denouement, is a sadness at the heart of the novel:
slavery creates a situation where enslaved humans have a damaged relation to nonhuman
animals, and are largely incapable of nonhuman love. When Beloved, the spectral
incarnation of slavery’s memory, returns to 124, Sethe’s dog, Here Boy, runs away, not
to return as long as Beloved stays (51). This suggests the dark shadow cast by slavery on
amicable human-nonhuman relations. While Union General William T. Sherman’s
promise of “forty acres and a mule” offers a fanciful vision of emancipated black
agrarian life and human-animal harmony,155 Morrison’s novel suggests a much more
troubled view. In Morrison’s vision, the hunger of slavery continues to haunt humannonhuman relations after emancipation, and the domesticated animal flees from the
troubling revenant of the subjugated and animalized antebellum black body.
While it may be tempting to conclude this chapter by arguing (rightly) that
speciesism and racism are part of one larger nexus of oppression and therefore

For more on Sherman’s Field Order No. 15, see the New Georgia Encyclopedia
(http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/shermans-field-order-no-15) and Henry
Louis Gates Junior’s essay “The Truth Behind ’40 Acres and a Mule’” (The Root Jan 7 2013:
http://www.theroot.com/the-truth-behind-40-acres-and-a-mule-1790894780).
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consuming milk and dairy are wrong, such an ethical standpoint seems too rigid. What
I’m after, here, is something murkier, milkier. So, as we approach the haunted afterlife of
the chapter, a final question: given what we’ve worked through, how might milk and
dairy help us to theorize race, species, and the human? In his chapter, “Deprivation:
Hunger,” Weheliye tells a story about the detainment of Trinidadian socialist and writer
C.L.R. James (113), who was kept under police supervision for two months in a Staten
Island hospital as part of a failed deportation effort resulting from James’ categorization
as a “subversive” (Weheliye 114). Unable to stomach the local cuisine, James
“subsisted” for four weeks “on milk and the inside of rolls with a bit of butter”
(Weheliye 115). For James, Milk was a gift, the gift of pained survival.
What if we conceived milk not as threat or commodity, not the gleaming-white
carton on the supermarket shelf but a gift, a donation, a passage between human bodies
and across species bounds? A fluid that yokes the human drinker—not negatively or
pejoratively but with all the responsibility entailed—to the producer, whether human or
nonhuman. Sethe hurts profoundly because her milk is stolen by Schoolteacher’s white
nephews and that as a child she was denied lactic nourishment from her own mother.
Sometimes we eat to survive. Sometimes we need to claim a little bit of the power that
travels under the name of humanity. Sometimes some speciesism is necessary, just as
other forms of selfishness are necessary. Veganism, surely, is the most efficient and
painless way to feed humanity. But veganism is also about power and privilege, and
enslaved peoples can’t be blamed for wanting to eat, or for being disgusted by the
animals that were used as tools of humiliation and torture by animalization. One of the
hopes that Beloved leaves unmentioned is the possibility of less troubled, less panicked
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human-animal relations. If milk can serve as a force of degradation-by-animalization,
can it also serve as a productive nexus for thinking the dissolution of the human, both as
individual body and ideological construct (Man)? Part of the craving of Beloved, part of
what Beloved’s appetite calls out for, is a world beyond panic, beyond the agony of
degradation-by-animalization, towards a world where genuine interspecies intimacies
might be possible beyond the pall of (de)humanization. Maybe that place would be
creamier, messier, more lactic—a place where hierarchies of bodies could dissolve into
“hieroglyphics of the flesh,” where atrocity could melt into viscosity.
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Chapter Five:
The Equine Erotopoetics of Linda Hogan and Joy Harjo

This chapter aims to unearth the potentialities of equine eros in the poetry of Chickasaw
writer Linda Hogan and Muscogee Creek author Joy Harjo, arguing that these two poets
engage with the eroticism of horses as part of their larger decolonial projects of
attendance to the nonhuman world. Attuned to Cherokee scholar-poet Qwo-Li Driskill’s
call for an “alliance between queer studies and Native studies” in the drive to expose
“ongoing settler-colonialism’s relationship to heteropatriarchy” (29, 22),156 I advocate a
queer approach, where “queer” means the sense of that which bends or otherwise
contorts the straightness mandated by familiar, Western regimes of sexuality—
institutions that simultaneously enforce heterosexual and intraspecies comportments of
desire.157 What I add to analyses by Driskill, Mark Rifkin, Andrea Smith,158 and other
critics working at the intersections of queer studies and Indigenous studies—and what I
examine throughout my broader research project—is a focus on the queerness of

Being Canadian, I use the term “Indigenous Studies” rather than the American Native Studies. Though
it is not the subject of this chapter, I would like to point out that I am also attuned to Driskill’s point that
“Native people have largely been ignored” in queer studies and that challenges to “settler-colonialism’s
relationship to heteropatriarchy” problematically “remain contained within work that focuses on
Indigenous peoples” rather than acknowledging that all writing and scholarship and discourse and life in
settler-colonial states takes place on “occupied Indigenous lands” (32, 22). Rather than addressing this
concern, all I can do here is recommend Driskill’s book Asegi Stories: Cherokee Queer and Two-Spirit
Memory as required reading for the settler-colonial world.
157
My sense of the concept “queer,” as I use it here, owes much to the work of Indigenous studies scholar
Mark Rifkin, who, in his 2011 book When Did Indians Become Straight?, analyzes the co-implication of
settler colonialism and heteronormativity. As Rifkin notes, the Western institution of marriage is “alwaysalready bound up in racializing and imperial projects” (6); marriage is an important part of a larger
machinery of socio-sexual (hetero)normativity contributing to the “U.S. assault on indigenous social
formations” (7).
158
While remaining wary of Andrea Smith’s dubious claimed Cherokee ancestry, called out by several
prominent female scholars in a 2015 open letter published in Indian Country Today, I nonetheless agree
with Smith’s argument that “Native studies” and “queer studies” should work together in the important
task of “unsettling settler colonialism” (42).
156
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nonhuman eros and sexuality. Part of my agenda, then, is to show how reading Hogan
and Harjo’s equine erotopoetics can open a productive membrane of intersection
between queer theory, Indigenous studies, and animal studies.
Harjo’s 1983 poetry collection She Had Some Horses and Hogan’s 2008 volume
Rounding the Human Corners both explore equine eroticism,159 an unmistakably queer
eros, from the vantage of traditional Creek (Harjo) and Chickasaw (Hogan) thinking.160
The speaker of Harjo’s poem “She Had Some Horses” imagines eroticized mares replete
with “full, brown thighs” and “long, pointed breasts” (Horses [1983] 63). In Hogan’s
“Affinity: Mustang,” a woman attends to a horse whose foal has died: “Tonight I sit on
straw / and watch milk stream from her nipples” (Rounding 66). Such moments of transspecies intimacy are common in the work of two poets who differently explore the
decolonial potential of equine eroticism. Hogan and Harjo’s equine erotopoetics enact
Sisseton Wahpete Oyate scholar Kim TallBear’s statement that “Indigenous peoples
have never forgotten that nonhumans are agential beings engaged in social relations that
profoundly shape human lives” (234),161 resulting in powerfully feminist and queer
poetics of decolonial animal love.

Harjo’s 2008 volume of selected poems, How We Became Human, may have been titled as a response
to N. Katherine Hayles’ groundbreaking work How We Became Posthuman (1999). Whether or not
Harjo’s title is an intentional retort, the juxtaposition raises interesting questions about how much of the
teachings of posthumanism have long been known by the traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples.
160
Significantly, neither author comes from what Thomas King calls a “horse culture” (70); both Muscogee
(Creek) and Chickasaw are Southeastern woodland peoples.
161
TallBear is, of course, speaking here on behalf of a widespread belief and ethic held throughout many
discrete Indigenous cultures and commonly voiced in Indigenous literature and criticism. For example, in
his 2006 book Our Fire Survives the Storm, Indigenous studies scholar Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee)
describes Cherokee poet Marilou Awiakta’s advocation of an “ecosystemic understanding that rejects
human supremacism” (165). Likewise, Cree scholar Alex Wilson writes that the Idle No More Movement
reinvigorates the “very old” traditional knowledge “that we, the land, the water, and all living creatures,
are related and, as relatives, we are meant to love and care for each other” (256). Wilson’s final turn to an
ethic of care and love for the nonhuman world certainly frames and foregrounds my own discussion of the
poetics of Hogan and Harjo.
159
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This chapter follows the broad sense of eros I deploy throughout Species Panic
and finds a broad range of extra-genital interspecies intimacies directed at, refracted
through, or riding alongside, the equine body in Hogan and Harjo’s poetics. Both Hogan
and Harjo rejuvenate Audre Lorde’s understanding of the erotic as “a resource within
each of us that lies in a deeply female and spiritual plane” (53),162 extending this
conceptualization beyond the threshold of species being to create a space for humannonhuman affinity and intimacy. Their work, furthermore, adds to Lorde’s thinking by
queering settler colonial erotic regimes wherein “the familiar status of Native bodies
(often those of women) as submissive victims of the colonial erotic” (Justice, Schneider,
and Rifkin 1). If, as Creek-Cherokee scholar and novelist Craig Womack argues, “[a]ny
tribal poet . . . is a queer, anomalous creature” (245), and if—as Dana Luciano and Mel
Y. Chen suggest with the provocative title of their 2015 chapter “Has the Queer Ever
Been Human?” (183)—the definitional threshold of the human has never been a place of
welcome for queer bodies and minds, what kind of theoretical conduits might emerge
from an openness to the queer force of nonhuman eroticism conceived beyond traditional
humanist and settler colonial anxieties about bestiality and miscegenation, as discussed
in this project’s Introduction.
The Creek and Chickasaw backgrounds of the poets discussed here grounds their
discrete visions of human-nonhuman relations. Such a worldview also enacts a queer
subversion of the settler colonial machinery that has depended on the construction and
enforcement of conjoined taxonomies of species and race in order to exceptionalize and
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Harjo herself lists Lorde as one of her crucial feminist influences (Spiral 31).
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grant power to a particular vision of the (white, straight, male) human.163 While the
equine body serves here as my favoured explorative nexus of nonhuman eros, this is just
one node of a larger network of eros formations that are simultaneously heterosubversive and decolonial. Ultimately, I argue that while Hogan proffers a more
straightforward vision of horse-love as an edifying force leading to an ethic of care for
the nonhuman world grounded in interspecies eros, Harjo’s sometimes darker horse
poetry uses the equine body as poetic image to enact her vision of what I call the equineerotic-ecstatic. I conclude that both poets use equine eroticism to advance decolonial
agendas, offering challenges to the institutionalized heteronormativity that is both a
crucial part of the machinery of the settler colonial state and a central element in the
ongoing attempt to define the human—racially, sexually, politically—as the one with the
right to dominate. Seeking to encounter the erotic valences of the poeticized equine body
with an open mind and heart, this chapter reads affinity between humans and horses
(Hogan) as well as the equine-erotic-ecstatic (Harjo) as simultaneous forces of
decolonial and anti-heteronormative subversion.
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Both Rifkin and Smith comment on the ways in which heteronormative institutions also connect to the
co-implicated membranes of race and species. Rifkin notes that heteronormative “marriage . . . remains
haunted by the vexed history of efforts to define which kinds of persons, practices, and principles get to
count as paradigmatically ‘human’” (4). Similarly, Smith writes that “the project of aspiring to ‘humanity’
is always already a racial project” (42). The race-species taxonomic continuum is most clearly visible in
claims of the “savagery,” “primitivism,” and “subhumanity” of non-white peoples, charges often leveraged
in the attempt to exceptionalize Euroamerican Caucasians as the ideal type of the human
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Straddling Species: A Human-Equine Romance

A brief sketch of the erotic role of the horse in human life will help to ground the
arguments to follow. Interspecies erotics is, of course, a queer realm insofar as the
mandates of human heteronormative-homospecies sexuality do not apply here. Hence
Alice Kuzniar’s claim that “dog love” is “queer beyond queer!” and Kathy Rudy’s
argument that “Z” (for “zoophile”) ought to be included along with “LGBTQ” in the
acronym rainbow of all things queer (“‘I Married My Dog’” 206; “LGBTQ...Z?” 612).
While animal sexuality and interspecies erotics are queer others to the forces of human
hetero/sexual normalization, equine sexuality has its own particularly queer history.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, when “riding astride became respectable for
women” (112), a special relationship between women and horses began to emerge. In her
book Dark Horses and Black Beauties: Animals, Women, A Passion (2000), Melissa
Holbrook Pierson draws on the work of Margaret Cabell Self to argue that March 1942,
when the U.S. cavalry was disbanded, inaugurated the era of “equine romance” (13). No
longer utilitarian creatures, useful for war or hunting or “horsepower,” the horse
becomes technologically obsolete and takes on a new primary function as provider of
love. Pierson’s account suggests that this is a fundamental experience for the human
female, that most women will at some point or another experience a transformative
moment of horse-love that troubles the enforced norms of homospecies desire. The act of
riding itself is, according to Marilyn B. Skinner, “a standard ancient metaphor for sexual
intercourse” (51). The equine body, furthermore, offers an often orgasmic platform for
what Donna Landry names an “ecstatic transference between woman and horse” (468).
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Horse and female rider meet in the queer join of collective kinesis, an at-times orgasmic
process Elspeth Probyn calls “becoming-horse-becoming-lesbian” (61-2)—horse and
human connecting in the transitive membranes of eros and affect.164 This Western canon
of girl-horse love suggests that there is a vigorous, persistent, and often unspoken queer
eroticism at work in the woman-horse bond, a kind of underground of interspecies
erotics, a circuit of eros that unsettles the reductively pat rubrics of species, sex, and
desire.
This history, though is complicated by the fact that, traditionally, the horse was a
male symbol—an icon of war, power, and masculinity. Susan McHugh, in a chapter on
girl-horse intimacy, rhetorically quips: “[g]irls and horses have a natural affinity, right?”
(65).165 Although our contemporary world sees equestrianism as primarily a woman’s
domain, this was not the case in relatively recent history when the horse was still a
technology and icon of power. As Elaine Walker notes, horse riding was historically a
“male preserve” in “equestrian cultures” of the “Western world” (112). In European
military history, the bond between horse and (male) soldier was a union of enormous
affection and interdependence, and, as Dekkers notes, one that may have lent itself
readily to interspecies sex.166 Despite the eurocentrism and heteronormativity of
Dekkers’ historic gloss—where zoophilia, rather than homosexuality, would be the
presumed non-hetero erotic formation of choice—there is no doubt some truth to his

In her racy and instructive article “Horsy and persistently queer: imperialism, feminism, and bestiality”
(2001), Donna Landry provides a rich genealogy of women writers and feminists from Freya Stark to
Elspeth Probyn to Germaine Greer, all of whom have figured the bond between woman rider and ridden
horse in strikingly erotic terms.
165
In the third chapter of her book Animal Stories (Minnesota 2011), McHugh outlines this history of
queer girl-horse love and intimacy.
166
“With such an intimate bond between horse and rider it is understandable that men should sometimes
wish to mount their steed. In the army especially, with many horses and few women available, it must have
happened often” (18).
164
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narrative. Historically, horses were often male-coded animals in the masculine arena of
war, and in male-only militaries it was no doubt common for queer sex to occur both
within and beyond the level of the species.
In addition to the important role of the horse in the above history of queer girlhorse erotics, another important context for this chapter is the complex colonial history
of the horse’s reintroduction to the ecosystems and Indigenous peoples of North
America. Horses, extinct on this continent for 8,000 years, were reintroduced by Spanish
conquistadors in the sixteenth century (Walker, Horse 26). Horses were key players in
the project of colonization as Spanish, French, British, and finally American settlers
roamed and claimed Indigenous lands. Horses were important to the machinery of
colonization insofar as they allowed settlers to travel quickly and transport goods in
addition to giving the settler a military advantage over non-equestrian cultures; the horse,
as a technology, yielded power. Later, horses also became symbols of Indigenous
resistance; according to historian Herman J. Viola, for the warriors of many plains tribes,
“[c]apturing an enemy’s horse was a coup, a great achievement” (9). During the
American colonial wars, slaughtering horses was a common military tactic, and in one
story Elaine Walker narrates about nineteenth-century Montana, 400 Appaloosas—a
“symbol of resistance” after the martial successes of the fleeing Nez Perce people (81)—
were “driven into a canyon and shot” by the U.S. Army (81).167 In the equine-human
history of U.S. colonialism, horses were both engines and casualties of war.
Soon after their reintroduction to the continent, horses became crucial to the
culture and livelihood of many Western nations including the Northwestern Nez Perce
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For a more detailed account of the tragedy of Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce people, see Kent
Nerburn’s Chief Joseph & The Flight of the Nez Perce (Harper 2005).
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and Blackfeet and plains peoples such as the Kiowa, Comanche, Crow, Cheyenne,
Arapho, and Sioux (Viola 9). 168 After their arrival in North America, horses gained a
place in the epistemologies of many North American Indigenous peoples, entering a
complex fabric of story-worlds that had long been rich with animals, metamorphosis, and
a deep-seated love for the land and its creatures that, in the words of Cree scholar Alex
Wilson, Indigenous peoples “have stewarded for millennia (257). In a striking Skidi
Pawnee story, a woman grows fond of a horse who “assumes human shape and becomes
her lover” (Dorsey 294). The woman eventually gives birth to a “spotted pony” and
transforms into a human-equine hybrid (Dorsey 294): “When the pony was born the
woman found she had a tail like that of a horse; she also had long hair. When the colt
sucked, the woman stood up” (294). This story depicts a world where a woman and a
horse can copulate and reproduce, can give birth to something other than a monster,
where that woman can sprout a tail and nurse a pony in an interspecies exchange of
maternal fluid. Such stories are drenched in a queer eros unhampered by normative
intraspecies eroticism, challenging the fragile fabric of alleged human autonomy. Such
stories also demonstrate ways of thinking interspecies erotics beyond violence, panic,
and pathology, a conceptual practice Hogan and Harjo take up and elaborate to great
effect in their equine erotopoetics.
Gradually, the relationship between horses and Indigenous peoples began to be
fetishized in various Western art forms, culminating in the genre of the Hollywood
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As historian Peter Mitchell demonstrates in his book Horse Nations: The Worldwide Impact of the
Horse on Indigenous Societies Post-1492 (Oxford University Press, 2015), horses were crucial to the
success and resilience of many Indigenous nations in the centuries following European contact. For
example, horses helped the Comanche people to gain a “hegemony over the Southern Plains [. . .] from the
1770s into the 1840s” (Mitchell 121).
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western. Significantly, Cherokee novelist and critic Thomas King frames Hollywood’s
interest in Indigenous motifs in baldly erotic terms: “Hollywood has a longstanding love
affair with Indians” (33). For King, this romance simultaneously fetishizes equine and
indigenous bodies, blending the two in the spectacle of exotic wildness: “Indians were
exotic and erotic. All those feathers, all that face paint, the breast plates, the bone
chokers, the skimpy loincloths . . . the galloping horses” (34). Horses, here, form part of
the animal-erotic equipage of the Indigenous body, a stereotype Spokane/Coeur d’Alene
poet and novelist Sherman Alexie lampoons in his poem “How to Write the Great
American Indian Novel.” Alexie writes that “[w]hite women dream about half breed
Indian men from horse cultures. / Indian men are horses, smelling wild and gamey” (95).
Clearly, there are gender issues here; what Alexie and King are both talking about is a
colonial fetish of Indigenous masculinity and the way that the equine body features as a
part of that circuit of commodified desire. Hogan and Harjo, by contrast, speak from
Indigenous female perspectives, examining how the horse figures in genuine spaces of
female love and desire. Both poets also place their poetic explorations of equine bodies,
blending traditional knowledge and storytelling techniques with the broader concerns of
feminism and ecological thought.169

As Norma C. Wilson notes, Hogan writes “from a traditionally minded Chickasaw perspective” that
extends to “universal consideration of human relationships” (76). Similarly, Laura Coltelli notes that
Harjo’s work is both crucially rooted in her Creek “cultural background” and a broader “Anglo-American”
literary tradition as well as jazz and country music (“Introduction” 11, 10).
169
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A Poetics of Affinity: Linda Hogan

If male American writers such as Ernest Hemingway, Jack London, and Philip K. Dick
dramatize a palpable species panic in their fictions, a poet such as Linda Hogan assuages
such anxiety through a remarkably calm resistance to human autonomy and supremacy.
Linda Hogan’s poetry, like her essays, presents a heartfelt ethic of care for the biotic
world. At the heart of Hogan’s worldview is “an ecological spirituality in a world both
sentient and aware” (“The Call” xiii). This view of the land as animate inflects her poetry
in Rounding the Human Corners through a profoundly rendered love for animals. With
section titles such as “Unlayering the Human” and “Rounding the Human Corners” and
poem titles such as “Gentling the Human,” Hogan’s project is—more obviously than
Harjo’s—a posthumanist, unhumanist, or perhaps pre-humanist endeavour.170 The poems
in Rounding the Human Corners are primarily about biophilia, human love for the
nonhuman world, and they are tender in their contemplation of animal life: “Oh / he has
loved our horses” (88),”when I see it I have to love and hate it / because its body is my
cat, / my neighbour’s cat” (79), “oh world I love you” (62). These poems also cast a
dubious eye on the human.171 In Janet McAdams’ words, the collection “argues for the
shedding of the many layers that stand between us and the rest of the world, between the
human and all from which we have estranged ourselves” (226). While Eurocentric
thinking from the Holy Bible on situates the human as the centre of existence, holding
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By arguing that Hogan is a pre-humanist thinker, I mean that the traditional Chickasaw knowledge she
espouses and reinvigorates has long held that humanity is just one unexceptional species among many, a
conclusion the tradition of Judaeo-Christian European knowledge structures is still grappling to find and
that posthumanism and animal studies often claim as new.
171
After describing a series of divine transformations, Hogan explains that none of the changed “wanted to
go back / to being human” (70).
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dominion over land and animals, Hogan challenges this taxonomy of life with a poesis of
nonhuman-oriented eros, humbling the human by situating the species as just one strand
in the complex web of being.
Hogan’s practice as a writer is deeply grounded in a traditional Chickasaw
perspective. Recently, Hogan has laboured on behalf of the Chickasaw nation as an
editor for the Journal of Chickasaw History and a contributor for the educational volume
Chickasaw: Unconquered and Unconquerable (Chickasaw Press, 2006). As Norma C.
Wilson notes, the Chickasaw element is most clearly present in Hogan’s 1978 collection,
Calling Myself Home, which explicitly ruminates on questions of homeland and
displacement and prominently features the turtle shells that rattled on women’s legs
during traditional Chickasaw ceremony (76). The Chickasaw are a southeastern nation
who were forcibly removed from their homelands during the Andrew Jackson
administration. As historian Richard Green explains, they were “among the last of the
Southeastern tribes to travel the Trail of Tears to Indian territory, emigrating in both
large and small groups by steamship and overland between 1837 and 1850” (4). The
traces of this dislocation are present throughout Hogan’s oeuvre, which explores themes
of travel, migration, transformation, and the search for a spiritual homeland amidst what
Patrick Wolfe calls the ongoing “land-centered project” of settler colonialism that
dispossesses Indigenous people of their rightful territory (393). Hogan’s search for home
and spiritual sustenance plays out in her poetry through love—of land, of a world “made
by songs, by dreams” (Human 67), and of nonhuman animal bodies.
While, as Norma C. Wilson notes, the turtle has been “the animal that appears
most frequently in her early poems” (76), Hogan’s more recent work in Rounding the
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Human Corners—which features a horse’s eye peering out from the front cover—
explores a wide range of animals and ecosystems. This book shows Hogan’s career-long
biophilia channelled through the bodies and feelings of animals such as deer, foxes,
whales, earthworms, slugs, spiders, and, most prominently, the horse. One of the most
powerful considerations of equine being comes in the poem “Affinity: Mustang.” The
mustang is a breed inextricably intertwined with Indigenous versatility and revitalization,
a breed that has been slaughtered and demonized by stockowners, sportsmen, and
profiteers, and a breed which has been morphed into the namesake of a flagship musclecar for the American automotive company Ford Motors:172
When we walk together
in the tall grasses I feel her
as if I am walking with mystery,
with beauty and fierce powers,
as if for a while we are the same animal
and remember each other from before. (Human 65)
Hogan uses an understated, serene poetic voice to seek to engage the horse, to inhabit the
equine body as “the same animal.” The poet deploys simple adjectives like “tall” and
lines that end on natural pauses and begin with prepositions (“in,” “as,” “as,” “and”) to
invite the reader into a new phrase. The phrasing and diction is deft but simple—
Hogan’s poetics do not use thesaurus words or poetic techniques that would unsettle the
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The proliferation of vehicles named after animals—Dodge Ram, Volkswagen Rabbit, Chevrolet
Impala—provide a striking instance of Pettman’s “humanimalchine” and the broader commodification of
animal attributes (Human Error 6). Names such as “Jeep Grand Cherokee” show the American cultural
impulse to fetishize Indigenous life in the same semantic realm as commodified animals. Significantly, the
Ford Motor Company’s “Mustang Division” has helped to fund the plight of mustangs in America (Ryden
11).
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reader or demand the interruption of a Google search. The overall effect is one of
simplicity and calm, a plainspoken poetics that invites the reader to experience the poem
in open, loafing cadences—to walk calmly alongside the poet as she walks astride the
horse. This plainspoken approach—where an unobtrusive poetic form serves to
emphasize content—characterizes the formal approach to Hogan’s project of transspecies affinity.
“Affinity” is a key word for Hogan—the title of the final section in the collection
and an appropriate term for the kind of interspecies empathetic connection Hogan
cultivates in her poetics. “Affinity” is also a word often used to express a special bond
felt towards animals; in Robinson Devors’ 2007 film Zoo, for example, the selfidentified zoophile Coyote suggests that zoophiles have a “lot more affinity with
nonhuman animals than their own kind.” According to the OED, the word “affinity”
derives from the Latin word for marriage (“affinity,” def. 1a), a relationship that—much
like the management of human livestock (or “husbandry”)—simultaneously
encompasses love and property/economics. But marriage and the idea of animals as
property are both Eurocentric concepts that do not adequately embody Hogan’s notion of
affinity. Hogan’s concept of affinity can be thought of rather as a kind of species
sisterhood, a notion Hogan encourages when she writes of a horse-like poem that “calls
out for its sister” and “is wild with its herd” (Corners 59). Hogan’s poetic treatment of
the horse offers a clear departure from thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, who famously
records his own humiliation—a “shame ashamed of itself” (4)—as he stands naked
before his cat. There is no shame in Hogan’s contemplation of the horse as the “beloved
partner of a woman” (Human 59). In contrast to Derrida’s emotionally fraught
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engagement with the feline body, Hogan offers an engagement more akin to the way
Donna Haraway describes species companionship: “We are, constitutively, companion
species. We make each other up, in the flesh. Significantly other to each other, in
specific difference, we signify in the flesh a nasty developmental inflection called love”
(16). Like Haraway, Hogan explores the queer love of a nonhuman animal in an attempt
to challenge the norms of a society committed to the pretense of human exceptionalism.
Hogan’s poetics of multispecies affinity also seeks to fuse equine experience and
human consciousness in the space of the poem. The author signals her interest in
collapsing the boundary between horse and verse in the metapoetic reflection that opens
“Wild,” a poem that once again contemplates mustangs: “This is not the horse. It is the
poem” (Corners 59). By explicitly stating that the poem is not the horse, Hogan
encourages the reader to intuit the opposite. The horse and the poem nestle closely, here,
paired by the caesura that joins as much as separates them. “Wild” goes on to describe
the poem as horse-like, fully undermining its opening assertion:
it walks across the land
loving tall grasses and alfalfa
and is wild with its herd
speaking in ways the human mind
can’t hear. (59)
Here, Hogan claims her own horse poem as a voice beyond human understanding.
Language and form remain simple; Hogan again uses the adjective “tall” to describe the
noun “grasses” and keeps the lines rolling in the uninterrupted syntax of a single
sentence. Hogan does not attempt to mimic the language the human mind can’t hear, but
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the reader may take pause to wonder whether not being able to “hear” with the “mind”
fully excludes the possibility of communing with the horse-poem. Are there other ways
to encounter the horse? Part of what Hogan’s poetics teaches is that the process of
encountering the nonhuman animal might be better achieved through feeling, through
love. Significantly, the erotic here provides the central node through which the reader
can encounter the equine perspective—Hogan invites the reader to inhabit the horse’s
experience of vegetal love, to roam as horse and poem through a differently energized,
horsy appreciation of the animate landscape.
Of the poems in Rounding The Human Corners, “Affinity: Mustang,” offers the
most resonant and visceral exploration of human-equine intimacy. The poem presents a
series of dream-like walks where the speaker and the mustang amble side by side—
moving as lateral companions rather than traveling in the hierarchical horse-rider
relation. Towards the end, the poem takes a turn into an especially evocative femalefemale interspecies intimacy:
Last night it was her infant that died
after the kinship and movement
of so many months.
Tonight I sit on straw
and watch milk stream from her nipples
to the ground. I clean her face.
I’ve come such a long way through time
to find her and
it is the first time
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I have ever seen a horse cry. (Corners 66)
Hogan here extends her figuration of human-equine sisterhood through the languages of
the reproductive body and body fluids such as milk and tears. This visual emphasis on
the equine tear, alongside the focalizing presence of the human witness, creates a sense
of resonant interspecies intimacy. This movement culminates when the speaker cleans
the horse’s face, an act of grooming and bodily proximity rich with a sense of
interspecies empathy and care. Hogan’s mustang is crucially female and maternal—a
mother who has lost her child, whose milk streams mournfully from her teats. Norma C.
Wilson notes that the “mother-child, particularly the mother-daughter relationship is
central to Hogan’s poetry” (79).173 Motherhood for Hogan is a metaphorical concept that
can travel beyond the human, linking females of different species through the embodied
bond of the maternal journey. The horse of “Affinity: Mustang” reads as an “ancient
mother” (Corners 41), an emissary of “the earth / the way it used to be” (Corners 64).
The speaker tends to the grieving horse, cleansing her face of emotional fluids in a
shared space of female-female intimacy and solidarity. The horse and the human thus
come together to participate in what Rich calls “survival relationships” (652), common
between women in oppressive patriarchal societies. Such an intimate interspecies
connection offers an instructive ethic for species/gender relations in a world where to be
“human” means to claim human status and where such status is habitually claimed by
white, hetero males.
“Affinity: Mustang” crystalizes the female interspecies maternal eros that runs
throughout Hogan’s collection and her thinking more generally, but the horses of “Wild”

Wilson also points out that in an earlier poem, “Celebration: Birth of a Colt,” Hogan extends this
exploration of motherhood to the equine realm (79).
173
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and “Affinity: Mustang” are not simply horses; they are mustangs, and the complex
history of the mustang clearly poises in the background of these poems. Elsewhere in the
collection, Hogan references the “mustang’s changed history” (59), suggesting that the
historical context of this particular breed—brought to the Americas by Spanish
conquistadors, they broke free and thrived for centuries as wild horses on the Great
Plains before being demonized and slaughtered en masse—self-consciously textures
Hogan’s horse poems. As Hope Ryden notes in her authoritative and politically
influential study America’s Last Wild Horses (first published in 1970), the mustang is
technically feral (descended from domestic ancestors) and not wild (16), a fact that
rendered this animal ineligible for national protection and thereby available for mass
slaughter. In the mid nineteenth century, wild horses in America had reached an
estimated population of between five and seven million (Ryden 18). By 1971 their
numbers had shrunk to an estimated 16,000, largely because of widespread human
slaughter. The horses were competing with cattle and other grazing animals for public
land, resulting in prejudice against them. This animosity, of course, was largely rooted in
the mustangs’ affiliation with Indigenous peoples; “It was the Plains horse, more than
any other single asset, that enabled the Indians to perpetuate their nomadic hunting style
of life at the expense of a farming culture being imported to the West by the whites”
(Ryden 17). The reason people didn’t like the mustang, this history suggests, had much
to do with “the American conscience” (Ryden 17); horses were lumped in with
Indigenous peoples as a clear and unsettling example of the race-species continuum,
where Indigenous peoples became racialized through their association with horses and
vice versa. After the surge of activism that followed the publication of Ryden’s book in
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1971, mustangs achieved a national victory: “On December 15, 1971, President Nixon
signed PL 92-195, designating the wild horse a national heritage species” and thereby
liberating this animal from the threat of perpetual slaughter (Ryden 284). Along with the
eagle and the buffalo, America’s national mammal as of May 9th 2016, the wild horse
thus became a symbol of national power by being tenuously and perhaps tokenistically
saved by national legislation.
It is crucial that in Rounding the Human Corners the poet’s main equine
companion is the mustang, a breed that arrived on these lands as an emissary of Spanish
colonial conquest but then escaped to roam the plains and love “tall grasses.” The
breed’s very existence queers the mandates of settler colonial domesticity, and Harjo’s
exploration of female-female interspecies love offers a window of the erotic that persists
within and against the rubrics of settler heteropatriarchy. Ultimately, Rounding the
Human Corners uses the erotic connective tissue where human poet meets horse to
emphasize the primacy of female experience and affective connection over species
identity, replacing prescribed Western circuits of love and desire (heterosexual,
intraspecies) with the more queer-conducive concept of affinity.

The Poem, Galloping: Joy Harjo
Joy Harjo’s 1983 poetry collection She Had Some Horses helped to establish Harjo as a
central figure in American poetry. 174 Harjo is, in Womack’s words, “[o]ne of the

In critic Laura Coltelli’s words, Harjo is “one of the more powerful voices among the second generation
of the so-called Native American Renaissance” (“Introduction” 1). In 2015, Harjo received the $100,000
Wallace Stevens Award for Poetry from the Academy of American Poets, a lifetime achievement award
that confirms her place among the most prominent contemporary American poets.
174
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strongest voices in contemporary poetry” (223). Harjo is also a crucial figure in the
critical and literary re-discovery of the Indigenous power of the erotic.175 In his essay
“Your Skin is the Map: The Theoretical Challenge of Joy Harjo’s Erotic Poetics” (2008),
Robert Warrior (Osage) argues that Harjo’s work sheds light on the debilitating lack of
attention to eroticism in most Indigenous scholarly discourse.176 Love is clearly the
driving force behind Harjo’s poetic project; as Womack notes, the word “love” “appears
in almost all the poems” of Harjo’s 1994 collection The Woman Who Fell From the Sky
(258). Womack, further, describes the political power of Harjo’s notion of love: “When
Harjo talks about love, then, it is not trivially universalizing but fully contextualized with
an awareness of the colonization process. Love, in Harjo’s work, is also an act of
resistance” (259). While there has been significant critical attention paid to the role of
the erotic in Harjo’s poetry, relatively little of it deals at length with the prominent theme
of horses. Here I argue that Harjo’s horses are crucially connected to her erotic vision
and that the horse, particularly in the collection She Had Some Horses, often mobilizes
her vision of love as “part of the spirit of resistance that has kept Indian people alive
these last five hundred years” (Womack 259).177 The horse is also, to borrow Andrew
Wiget’s phrase, a crucial conduit through which Harjo’s speakers aim to “recover an
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For an instructive overview of the move towards eros in Indigenous scholarship, see the introduction to
Lisa Tatonetti’s The Queerness of Native American Literature (University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
176
A critical consensus supports Warrior’s claim that eros was long occluded from scholarship on
Indigenous literature. As Tatonetti notes, “analyses of Indigenous texts precluded considerations of
sexuality until the late 1990s” (xxi). Deborah A. Miranda’s 2002 essay “Dildos, Hummingbirds, and
Driving Her Crazy: Searching for American Indian Women’s Love Poetry and Erotics” was an initial
important early step in revealing the “systematic exclusion” of Indigenous women’s poetry from the
academy (136).
177
The most prominent exploration of this theme is Andrew Wiget’s essay “Nightriding with Noni
Daylight: The Many Horse Songs of Joy Harjo.” Harjo also fields some questions about the role of horses
in her work in the interviews collected in The Spiral of Memory (Ed. Laura Coltelli, University of
Michigan Press, 1996).
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ecstatic union” (192). In She Had Some Horses, Harjo’s larger vision of the erotic works
through the poeticized bodies of horses in order to enact what I call the equine-eroticecstatic. It is crucial, here, that the ecstatic contains a darkness; it is a condition of
“frenzy” deriving from “astonishment, fear, or passion” (“ecstasy,” def. 1a)—the rapture
of torment as well as the gallop of joy. As Womack notes, everything in Harjo’s poetics
strives after balance, a key condition of Creek cosmology in its negotiations of the
“Upper World,” the “Lower World,” and “This World” (239). Hence Harjo’s vision of
the equine-erotic-ecstatic is at times dark and at times jubilant; but it is also
transformative and rapturous as it gallops through the restless swirl and dash of eros.
Horses are everywhere in Harjo’s work—a governing metaphor cantering over
the terrain of her oeuvre. Further, they are often paired with erotic explorations of love
and sexual desire: “what the horses mean, a kind of love, brought together despite an
opposition of culture, of place and time” (“Introduction” xxiii). Engaging with the
“removal of the Muscogee people from Alabama to Oklahoma” (Spiral 75), Harjo writes
from a historically-inflected position where “[d]isplacement is a spiritual condition”
(Spiral 75). The thematic of movement and travel figures in Harjo’s poetics as at once a
recollection of the trauma of displacement, a response to the anguish of confinement, and
the cultivation of an ecstatic eros that often mobilizes through a recurring vision of
horses. Harjo, I will argue here, uses the poeticized horse to enact an experience of the
equine-erotic-ecstatic, an invitation for the reader to explode the boundaries of sexual
and species embodiment in the encounter of the poem, galloping.
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The main focus of my analysis is the widely taught and anthologized title poem
of She Had Some Horses. Here Harjo crafts a Muscogee-centered vision of the complex
intertwined histories of horses and humans:
She had some horses.

She had horses who were bodies of sand.
She had horses who were maps drawn of blood.
She had horses who were skins of ocean water.
She had horses who were the blue air of sky.
She had horses who were fur and teeth.
She had horses who were clay and would break.
She had horses who were splintered red cliff. (Horses [1983] 63)
Harjo’s vision is at times macabre, with “horses who licked razor blades” and “threw
rocks at glass houses” (61). But Harjo’s horses are also radically new and different in
each line—they are a shattering explosion of referents, yoked through the harness of the
poetic refrain. Repetition, one of Harjo’s characteristic techniques, works here as
elsewhere in her poetry to engage with Creek traditional storytelling through her use of
what critic Laura Coltelli calls “the tonal effects of ritual chanting” (“Joy Harjo’s
Poetry” 289).178 The refrain—“She had some horses”—creates what Harjo, in an
interview with Sharyn Stever, calls “a sense of ceremony” (Spiral 84).179 The repetition

This technique is used also to great effect in poems such as “I Give You Back,” with its repetitions of
the line “I release you” and the refrain “I am not afraid” (Horses [1983] 73). These repetitions, as
Indigenous studies scholar Jennifer Andrews points out, are resonant of “Navajo night chants” (108).
179
Transformation—a theme with a clear connection to eros—is key to Harjo’s writing generally. Harjo’s
thematic of transformation is evident in many poems, including “Transformations,” “Promise of Blue
178
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of the poetic refrain also serves to aurally enact the equine-erotic-ecstatic at the level of
the line. The refrain—“she had horses who were”—centers around the governing
trochee, “horses,” making the stressed syllable “horse” the primary sonic element in each
line. The lines then spill outwards, into a gallop of trochaic phrases ending in iambic
inversions: “bodies of sound,” “maps drawn of blood,” “splintered red cliffs.” Each line
ends with a spondee followed by an iamb, creating the sound pattern thump thump-athump. While the lineation varies, the establishment of this sonic pattern frames the
rhythmic expectation of the poem, where trochee spills into iamb and grounds the aural
experience of poem, galloping.
In spite of the poem’s technique of paratactic image-barrage, some lines carry
more semantic weight than others. One of the most telling images is Harjo’s reference to
sanguine cartography: “She had some horses who were maps drawn in blood.” This line
situates the equine body in the history of colonial exploration, where the horse was a
primary vehicle for surveying and military imposition. Harjo’s critique of American
colonialism both emerges from a Creek perspective—these are horses “who liked Creek
Stomp Dance songs” (Horses 62)—and gestures outwards, towards what Womack calls
“pan-tribal experience” (226). Harjo’s “use of pan-tribalism” allows her “to recast Creek
history in the larger context of the violence that created America” (Womack 228), a
violence in which the horse was clearly implicated but nonetheless blameless. While it
might have patrolled the “maps drawn of blood” and terrified people who travelled on
Horses,” and “The Woman Who Fell From the Sky,” among many others. Womack points to the
“specifically Creek concerns” of Harjo’s interest in transformation stories (230), citing traditional stories
where people enter animal worlds, leaving their “human existence” a “vague blur” (230). Patricia
Haseltine has written an article—“Becoming Bear: Transposing The Animal Other in N. Scott Momaday
and Joy Harjo” (Concentric 32.1 [2006])—on the “traditional motif of human-to-bear transformation” in
Harjo’s poetry and Momaday’s 1999 novel In The Bear’s House (81). Harjo herself also states that
transformation is key to her work (Spiral 43).
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foot, the horse could not actually be complicit in an anthrocolonial project of domination
and subjugation. The horse, furthermore, would soon become an object of interspecies
love, an asset to many Indigenous nations, and a symbol of decolonial resistance.
The role of the horse in American settler colonialism clearly backdrops Harjo’s
horse poems; but these are not history poems—they are visceral, immediate, intensely
female, and species-transgressive. The equine eroticism of “She Had Some Horses”
emerges clearly in the poem’s fourth stanza through a libidinal exploration of species
transgression: “She had horses with long, pointed breasts. / She had horses with full
brown thighs” (Horses [1983], 63). The prominent bosoms and thighs of the horses can
be read as a humanization of the equine body, an equinization of the human body, or (my
preferred reading) an unsettling synthesis of human and equine bodies—a speciestransgressive vision of human and horse collapsing in the poem’s ecstatic event. But they
also suggest a particularly female node of connection, gesturing to the kind of transspecies female solidarity Hogan explores.180 Given that traditional Creek culture was
matrilineal and that “gender violence is a primary tool of colonialism and white
supremacy” (Womack 42; Smith 61), the importance of feminine power and connection
in Harjo’s work cannot be overstated. But femaleness, for Harjo, is never stable: “I
firmly believe we are all varying degrees of male-female” (Spiral 81). Harjo, here,
recognizes the complexity of erotic life and refuses to reduce that into the Western
heteronormative bathroom-stall visions of Male and Female. Here, Harjo reaffirms Mark
Rifkin’s salient arguments connecting heteronormativity to settler colonialism and using

Harjo’s horses, notably, are also voices of female anger: “She had horses who spit at male queens who
made / them afraid of themselves” (Horses 62).
180
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“kinship” as “a lens” with which to map and ultimately unsettle these connections
(Rifkin 34).181 But much as she queers gender norms, Harjo also unsettles normative
ideas of species classification. Harjo’s poetics, which seeks to connect the spiritual world
to the lived world of daily life,182 resists stable boundaries such as species and gender
classifications. As Womack notes, the “Muskogean world” of Harjo’s poetry “lets
queerness in rather than driving it out” (245). Part of this queerness, certainly, is a
transgression of species being, with the human and equine body flickering back and forth
in an erotics at times traumatic and at times joyful but always ecstatic, transgressing
familiar Western boundaries of embodiment.
Harjo’s poetry is replete with horses, but also invites the reader to ask—what is a
horse? These horses lick razor blades and weep into beer (Horses [1983] 63), actions that
clearly render them human-like. Harjo’s poetry destabilizes pat, Western human/animal
distinctions. Harjo’s poetry embraces a different vision of species being, where “human”
and “animal” are not stable categories but different body parts in the corpus of poesis—
parts that seamlessly bleed into one another. Kim TallBear writes that “traditional stories
portray nonhuman persons in ways that do not adhere to another meaningful modern
category, the ‘animal.’ [. . .] Our stories avoid the hierarchical nature-culture and animalhuman split” (235). Harjo’s horses follow TallBear’s model in resisting firm and final
species classifications. Harjo’s horses are not “animals” in the Western sense of
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Rifkin also criticizes what he sees as the too-easy association of queerness and kinship insofar as these
approaches do not go deep enough, challenging neither the settler-based ideology of kinship nor “queer
scholarships own imbrications in ongoing projects of settlement” (26). In other words, when looked at
from the perspective of settler colonial critique, queerness starts to seem a lot less subversive than it might
otherwise appear.
182
“what I’m trying to do is make the spiritual realm more manifest, obvious” (Spiral 79).
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“inferior,” nor is their animality a permanent position. They are, instead, complex
agential beings, shifting between human and animal in the anima of Harjo’s poem.
In addition to offering a species-blurring vision of female embodiment, the horse
also serves in Harjo’s poetics as a more seemingly familiar conduit for human eroticism.
Take, for example, the poem “Two Horses”:
My heart is taken by you
and these mornings since I am a horse running towards
a cracked sky where there are countless dawns
breaking simultaneously. (Horses 64)
Here the horse is, at the most basic level, a symbol of human desire, a metaphor for the
wildness of sexual passion. This is, of course, a common way to deploy animals in
literature—as avatars for unbridled “animal” sexuality. But the horse, here, is also,
crucially, a force of fracture; the horse-as-eros charges towards a shattered sky, itself
multiplying into myriad shattering dawns. The erotic, here, becomes a force of
uncontainable movement and constant transformation, the ceaseless charge towards a
multiply fracturing horizon. What the speaker of the poem becomes is, in fact, neither
human nor horse but the gallop of the equine-ecstatic-erotic, a force that can never be
complete or whole or stably embodied, a force that, like desire, is never sated, that must
keep running, keep exploding, fracturing Western claims to autonomy such as species
and self.
Equine erotics, in Harjo’s work, is not always joyful. There is also, at times, a
dark violence at work in Harjo’s consideration of equine eros. Towards the conclusion of
the original 1983 edition of “She Had Some Horses,” the speaker relates an experience
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of equine-human sexual assault: “She had horses who tried to save her, who climbed in
her / bed at night and prayed as they raped her” (Horses [1983] 64). The combination of
rape and prayer in this scene of sexual violence perpetrated in the name of salvation
yields a pained recollection of residential school trauma, casting a dark pall over the
poem as a whole. Intriguingly, Harjo chooses to omit this moment of graphic equine
sexual assault from the subsequent editions of the poem. In both the 2002 volume How
We Became Human: New and Selected Poems 1975-2001 and the 2008 Norton reissue of
She Had Some Horses, Harjo excavates the line “[s]he had horses with long, pointed
breasts” and replaces it with the much less erotic phrase, “She had some horses with eyes
of trains” (Horses [1983] 63; Horses [2008] 61). This change shifts gears, turning away
from interspecies sexual trauma and towards an analytic of railroad Manifest Destiny.
Here, Harjo’s poem opens into another history: after the U.S. Civil War the government
punished Indigenous nations, like the Creek and Chickasaw people, who, for complex
reasons, had fought with the Confederates, by running railroads through their lands
(Green 5).183 The revised poem, then, also indicates the historical shift from early
equine-assisted colonialism to mechanized developments that would replace horses with
steam engines and technologized units of “horsepower.” In the modern era, horses are
for the most part antiquated as technology, rendering their connection to the human
species primarily aesthetic, athletic, and affective—conveyances of pleasure and love,
not war and domination.
In the later versions, Harjo also truncates the macabre interspecies sexuality of
the lines “She had horses who [. . .] climbed in her / bed at night and prayed as they

The railroad thematic is already present in the poem, in the earlier line “She had horses with eyes of
trains” (Horses 61).
183

225
raped her” to “She had horses [. . .] who climbed in her / bed at night and prayed”
(Horses [1983] 64; Horses [2008] 62). Why would Harjo choose to remove the most
explicit moments of equine eroticism from her poem? The extant scholarship on Harjo
has not addressed this question, nor has Harjo spoken about the omissions in interviews
or written comments. The removal of the unsettling equine breasts and the explicit
language of sexual assault suggests that Harjo may have found her early version too
heavy-handed; the author may have been searching for the subtler evocation of equine
eroticism found in the later version of the poem. If the changes make the poems less
species-transgressive, they also make the horses friendlier, more palatable, and the
message of the poem more nuanced, more suggestive.
What I would like to emphasize, though, is the way Harjo’s pursuit of the equineerotic-ecstatic culminates in the horse poems following the title poem in She Had Some
Horses. In the section “She Had Some Horses,” the titular poem is followed by “Two
Horses,” “Drowning Horses,” “Ice Horses,” and “Explosion,” marking a general
movement towards the equine-erotic-ecstatic that culminates in the final poem of the
series. (Each poem in this section is also given a Roman numeral, suggesting that the
section should be read as a unit.) The speaker of “Ice Horses” sings of “horses who
moaned like oceans” (Horses 66), one of whom is “a young woman” (Horses 66). Here
we see, once again, the hybridization of human and equine bodies. This interspecies
transference is again emphasized when it turns out that the horses “are the ones who
pranced on your belly” and “chased the deer out of your womb” (Horses 66). Harjo’s ice
horses conjure an image of species transgressive reproduction, recalling traditional Creek
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deer transformation stories in a species-blurring vision of equine-human hybridity. This
trajectory culminates in the poem’s conclusion:
These are the ones who loved you.
They are the horses who have held you
so close that you have become
a part of them,
an ice horse
galloping
into fire. (Horses 66)
In Creek terms, what Harjo describes here is the human-as-horse’s entrance into the
Upper World, the stellar realm of sky and “planetary orbits” that will become the central
concern of Harjo’s 1994 collection The Woman Who Fell from the Sky (Womack 240).
Harjo’s equine-erotic-ecstatic image of the “ice horse / galloping / into fire” also recalls
the imagistic power of the conclusion of American feminist poet Sylvia Plath’s “Ariel,”
where a woman and a horse soar “Into the red // Eye, the cauldron of morning” (29).
Harjo’s poem builds on Plath’s by further collapsing the boundaries of species being; the
“you” of Harjo’s poem, connected to horses through bonds of love and reproductive
embodiment, ultimately joins with horses, becomes “a part of them.” This final arresting
moment of equine-erotic-ecstatic rapture connotes a jubilant bursting together of woman
and horse, a stellar diffusion of the Western view of species taxonomization.
The last poem in this section, “Explosion,” offers the apotheosis of the equineerotic-ecstatic. This poem imagines the explosion of a highway “near Okemah,
Oklahoma” (67), a small community, home to the federally recognized Muscogee Creek
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Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, about 70 miles from Harjo’s hometown of Tulsa. In the
poem, Harjo imagines a “new people” emerging “from the center of the earth” (Horses
67), where the Creek origin story begins. The new people are “another color” yet bear an
affiliation to the Creek people: they “live in Muskogee on the side of the tracks / that
Indians live on. (And they will be the / ones to save us” (67). The poem also depicts a
scene of striking equine messianism: “But maybe the explosion was horses, / bursting
out of the crazy earth / near Okemah. They were a violent birth” (Horses 67). Horses,
here, are explosive and redemptive, suggesting the possibility of transformation and
renewal. The explosion of the highway, of course, opens a seam through an already
transitional space, a borderland. This blast also suggests the destruction of the settler
state, a move characteristic for Harjo, whose poetic vision often dramatizes “life without
colonialism” (Womack 230). Harjo’s exploration of the equine-erotic-ecstatic ends with
a vision of kinetic plenitude: “some will see the horses with their hearts of sleeping
volcanoes / and will be rocked awake / past their bodies” (Horses 68). Among the other
fictions these horses collapse (the sanctity of the settler colonial state) is the fiction of
permanent, stable embodiment. Those who can see the horses—and only some can—will
see “past” their own corporeal existence. This transcendence of embodiment serves to
subvert rigid identities such as species and gender, the entrapments of European
thinking. The idea of being “rocked awake” suggests a coming-into-new-knowledge with
the gentleness of a lullaby. Simultaneously, though, the image of the “sleeping volcano”
implies a massive violence, a potential punishment, an enormous geological change that
may provide the possibility of regrowth and renewal.
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Harjo’s horses are various—at times dark and threatening, at times viscerally
erotic, at times cosmic. Crucially, though, they are never stable, never rigidly embodied;
they are corporeally queer, subverting the bounds of normative species being, crossing
over into human bodies and flickering back to charge “into fire,” to soar the “countless
dawns” of the “cracked sky.” It is only taken as a whole that a genuine vision of Harjo’s
equine-erotic-ecstatic begins to emerge, and I can only hope that this short glimpse into
Harjo’s work has provided a passable shorthand for her vision of horses transforming,
horses in motion, horses exploding and giving birth and licking razor blades but most
importantly galloping.

Over the last few years Anishinaabe novelist, scholar, and political activist Winona
LaDuke has led a series of environmental horse rides following the proposed routes of
pipelines such as Enbridge’s Line 3 Replacement along wild rice lakes crucial to Ojibwe
communities in Minnesota.184 LaDuke’s work offers one important example of the way
the horse can serve as an ally to decolonial struggle—symbolizing older ways of caring
for the land and its inhabitants in the face of our modern, oil-drunken age. Linda Hogan
and Joy Harjo mobilize a different, though complementary, version of equine subversion
of settler colonialism: the cultivation of a loving, interspecies affinity (Hogan) and the
equine-erotic-ecstatic (Harjo). For both poets, equine eros serves as a powerful force of
decolonial subversion, announcing the possibility of a revolution of love. Robert Warrior

For more on LaDuke’s rides, see Douglas Thompson’s article “Treaty Rights Battle Links Hunting and
Oil Pipelines in Minnesota” in Indian Country Media Network and Sarah Littleredfeather Kalmanson’s
article “Winona LaDuke leads Environmental Horse Rise Against Enbridge’s New Pipeline Route and
Pipeline Abandonment Threats in Minnesota” at Honortheearth.org as well as the YouTube clip “Honor
The Earth: Triple Crown of Pipeline Rides” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1v6_1DLth9U).
184
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writes that “[t]he presence of the erotic in Harjo’s texts is a challenge, a confrontation”
(341), calling readers to recognize the primacy of embodiment and the power of the
erotic as a “force for human liberation” (340, 342). For both Hogan and Harjo, the erotic
also opens a node of connection to the nonhuman. In an era of mass extinction and
extraction, when the current U.S. president has habitually and belligerently denied the
rapid acceleration of anthropogenic climate change and the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists has moved the Doomsday Clock from three to two and a half minutes to
midnight, there has never been a more crucial time to cultivate love for the nonhuman
world. Exploring equine eroticism and exploring human love of horses provides one way
to begin to counter the settler colonial industrial-capitalist logics of human greed and
extraction, a machinery based in the faulty claim of human exceptionalism. Poetic
attention to the land, and poetic attendance to a particular creature, is a form of love, a
form of stewardship. The horse can be a symbol of resistance but it can also be a symbol
of shared pain, of tenderness, of grief. Unlike a car or an airplane, a horse feels back,
loves back. Reading the poetics of equine eros through the lens of settler colonialism
opens a seam into an erotic and affective world that persists beyond and in spite of settler
logics of white human supremacy, rigid species taxonomies, and Western regimes of
linear progress. Linda Hogan and Joy Harjo sing alongside the horse, a creature as gentle
as it is strong, crafting, in their equine erotopoetics, a space for ecstatic and
transformative interspecies love.
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Conclusion: Climate Climax, Planet Panic
On April 15th, 2018, as I was putting the finishing touches on this dissertation, 60-yearold former Lambda lawyer and gay rights champion David S. Buckel committed suicide
by self-immolation. Buckel emailed his suicide note to several major media outlets,
citing environmental devastation as the cause of his suicide and stating that his death by
burning fossil fuels—he used gasoline as an accelerant—should serve as a cautionary
tale for our fragile world ecology and the socio-political infrastructures that continue to
devour so-called natural resources, contribute to widespread extinction of nonhuman
lifeforms, and in turn cause current and future famine, water crises, increasingly
malevolent weather systems, and global temperature rise.185
Reading about the story, it struck me that Buckel’s tragic death offers an uncanny
parallel with my opening literary case study of the species panic complex, H.P.
Lovecraft’s Arthur Jermyn, who sets himself on fire after finding that he is directly
descended from a lost race of Congolese ape-human hybrids. While these cases are by no
means neatly symmetrical (one is real life and one is literary anti-fantasy), they might be
read as indicating a shift in American mood from 1921, when Lovecraft published
“Arthur Jermyn,” to 1918, when a person could pour gasoline on himself and start a
suicidal fire in the name of ecological activism. Buckel’s suicide demonstrates a
different iteration of species panic, one where the threat comes from inside: no longer
animal eros as indicator of the latent animality within the human and threat to human
exceptionalism but human existence as threat to the vulnerable natural world—a wake-

Buckel wrote: “my early death by fossil fuel reflects what we are doing to ourselves” (qtd. in Mays,
np).
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up call for a species devouring the very grounds of its existence. No longer a monstrous
and fearful animality lurking within the civilized human but civilization itself as
parasitical and chaotic, monstrous in its propensity to devour.
Another way of stating what I’m trying to articulate here is that what I see as a
future direction for this research is not so much a step forward but a lateral gesture,
beyond the charismatic megafauna that have traditionally been the literary loci of
interspecies erotics and on to broader ecoscapes. Botanic panic, for example, haunts the
gothic narratives of Nathaniel Hawthorne and Edgar Allen Poe. How might Species
Panic grow to contemplate the eros of plastic, usually derived from petroleum and in
turn from ancient zooplankton and plant life? Viral panic, cyborg panic, AI panic,
zombie panic, alien panic, and zoonotic disease panic pulse and purr through modern
film, television, and literature. These are signs and symptoms of a species panic that is, if
not dissolving, perhaps migrating crabwise. No longer the human under threat from the
animal but the human as threat to itself as well as to other species. Becoming uncanny,
species panic now looks back from the mirror as humans themselves become the
threatening creature, without and within.
The contemporary environmental mood seems to call for abject panic. Food looks
like it’s running out and water is becoming increasingly scarce, polluted, and privatized.
Species go extinct at a rate that has been called “alarming” so many times the phrase has
become banal. One of the ways we work through climate panic is through literature.
More and more modern fictions deal with nightmarish scenarios of ecopocalypse. The
proliferation of works like Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006), Ernest Cline’s Ready
Player One (2011), Omar El Akkad’s American War (2017), and Cherie Dimaline’s The
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Marrow Thieves (2017) demonstrate a cultural preoccupation with climate panic that has
begun to supplement if not replace the post-Darwinian species panic that preoccupied the
American literary imagination of the late-nineteenth century and carried through the
majority of the twentieth. If many writers interested in the natural world used to explore
the threatening eros of human-animal love, they are now more often turning to the
blasted sublime of full-scale ecological devastation. Although the ecological panic of the
current moment is itself a form of species panic, narratives of climate panic may
sidestep, somewhat, the dilemmas of Species Panic; the symbolic horror of the animal
within becomes less of a concern when famine, superstorms, and water shortage begin to
threaten human and nonhuman life. At the same time, as the human animal finds its
technoscientific bulwarks increasingly unable to defend against superstorms and forest
fires, the nature/culture distinction devolves before our eyes and the human becomes
desperately biological, enfleshed. In The Road, cannibalism emerges as a live possibility
again, as the no-longer sacrosanct human body becomes, once again, meat.
But the very fact that such narratives traffic in the horror of such an image, using
it to build narrative momentum, also suggests that species panic is alive and well in
America and beyond.186 Being treated “like an animal” remains a watchword for ultimate
subjection, “human” continues to denote unequivocal praise as a literary-critical
adjective (as in “a work of remarkable humanity”), and bestial, especially hybrid,
creatures continue to mobilize fear and shock in the aesthetics of the gothic. People—
many of whom sleep in beds with dogs or cats—still shudder and tremble when
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A slew of recent literary examples demonstrate the species panic complex. Books from recent years that
fit the bill: Dennis Johnson’s Train Dreams (2011), Jesmyn Ward’s Salvage The Bones (2011), and Colson
Whitehead’s The Underground Railroad (2016).

233
nonhuman eros is made explicit. But a major, if not dominant, discourse of species panic
has largely given way to the larger and more dramatic discourse of climate change and
ecological catastrophe.
In such circumstances, interspecies erotics can emerge as a form of healing and a
force of redemption, as it often does in recent work in the field of multispecies studies, as
discussed in the Introduction to this project. Such work suggests that if we love
ecosystems hard enough and cultivate new stories about them, maybe we can shift a
neoliberal mindset of extractivism and technoscientific frenzy towards a more balanced
viewpoint. But one of the things I’ve shown throughout this project, and one of the
revelations of literature, is that stories can and should be dangerous and slippery. As
much as we might turn to story for healing and guidance, we also seek it out for terror
and trembling, for warnings and mystery, to project the darkness in the seams of the
known. Furthermore, crucial as interspecies entanglements are (I’ve explored them at
length while trying to maintain critical distance), the preceding pages have certainly
shown the value of examining particular species in the literary terrain; we learn
something different when we examine horse literature alongside the ethology and history
of horses than what we learn when we try to understand massive-scale ecological
systems such as the one Timothy Morton calls “the mesh” (53). Each of the governing
animals of my five chapters—dogs, bulls, cows, androids, and horses—has its own
unique, if entangled, aesthetic, historical, and erotic narrative in human literary history.
But how can we panic better? How can criticism ride the fine line between the
desolate and the redemptive? In her 2016 book Risk Criticism: Precautionary Reading in
an Age of Environmental Uncertainty, Molly Wallace extends Ulrich Beck’s diagnosis of
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modern “risk society” to develop her own ecocritical practice of “[p]recautionary
reading” (20). Against the charisma of apocalypse, Wallace posits precaution. And in a
way what I’ve been doing all along is a form of precautionary reading, spurred by the
intuition that nonhuman eros is too often oversimplified in scholarship for the purpose of
mobilizing it in the service of the good. I want to show the dark side of love, the
messiness of companionship, the tensions of care, and the inherent exclusions of
interspecies entanglement. I want to show the extent to which our lives and literature are
already steeped in interspecies eros, and to emphasize that such eroticism isn’t always
edifying: that it can be thrilling and ecstatic, boring and banal, murky and milky,
brooding and curmudgeonly. I want to celebrate the complexity of story and poetics, the
ability of literature to explore the nebulas and ambiguities of interspecies coupling
without reducing such relations to salvations.
There is a perhaps surprising affinity between precaution and panic: panic, while
it sets the heart racing, also holds you still in the grip of arrest. Conceiving these affects
in tandem brings me back to the literary, reveals that my own method has been to collect
moments held in the tension of species-transgressive eros. Hemingway’s bulls,
Morrison’s cattle, Dick’s androids, London’s dogs, Hogan and Harjo’s horses. The main
thing that unites my readings of all of these species’ emergence in literature is perhaps
not so much the content of interspecies erotics in its various formations but the form or
feeling of the encounter. An animal appears, say Derrida’s cat. A human beholds,
considers. Something lurks, sweaty and panting. Something that threatens and connects,
something that draws closer. Something suggested, something palpitating, something
that is both the secret of nonhuman eros and the very enigma of story.
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In his thrilling paeon to Nietzschean interconnectivity, The Ecological Thought
(2010), Timothy Morton offers a lightspeed argument for the value of literature to
ecological thinking: “Art’s ambiguous, vague qualities will help us think things that
remain difficult to put into words. Reading poetry won’t save the planet. Sound science
and progressive social policies will do that. But art can allow us to glimpse beings that
exist beyond or between our normal categories” (61). Aside from its salvationalist timbre
(will or should anything really “save” the planet?), my issue with this passage is its
assumption that literature is and should be illuminating. Almost without exception, when
Morton quotes literature he uses it as tinsel with which to decorate his altar of ecophilia
(“the best environmental thinking” [20]). But, always suspicious regarding claims that
one way of thinking is better, I believe we turn to literature for complexity, ambiguity,
the tension of the unsaid, the spinach wilting between the teeth of language. Yes,
literature can help us see the creatures that inhabit and dissolve the margins of our
typical ways of thinking, but it can also show the panic, the overwhelming hurt, of trying
to let those categories go. It can show us that there are times when it’s okay to panic,
acceptable to flinch. It can show us that malleability and interconnectedness isn’t all fun
and games—there are connections across species bounds but there are also pressure
points, lines we might want to be wary about crossing. This approach, the approach I’ve
tried to demonstrate throughout this project, might perhaps be called a precautionary
attitude towards the typical animal studies and ecocritical tendency to want to revel
unproblematically in biophilia.
Above all, what I have found in Species Panic is a recognizable, if variegated,
literary trope: again and again, nonhuman eros threatens foundational Western premises
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about the human being. The literature I’ve examined in Species Panic has also
demonstrated that interspecies erotics can be a relation of enormous conscientiousness
and care, that it can help to soothe even as it provokes panic. I have explored five literary
avenues where species panic has twitched differently. I have watched species panic
move, gotten tangled in its thorns. I have tried to show how ubiquitous interspecies
erotics in American literature is and, by extension and for context, how entangled human
bodies and stories are with the erotic lives of animals more broadly.
The problem with a study about species malleability and the mangling mingle of
interspecies erotics is that all you can really take away from it is murk and mist, the joy
of the join. If there’s one thing my research has shown me definitively it is that
interspecies erotics is not necessarily liberating, redemptive, or beautiful. Rather, I
understand my intervention to be an unveiling or excavation of the importance of eros in
human-nonhuman relations historically and today. Nonhuman eroticism fills our
literature, engenders our fantasies, and yet it still makes us tremble to name the thought.
While writers like Hogan and Harjo help me see that a more intimate, less panicked
connection with the nonhuman world is possible, I am by no means sure that the
cultivation of interspecies erotics guarantees a better world. I am sure, though, that what
the literature of species panic provides is the cultivation of nuance, of doubleness, of
complication—tension suspended in the unexpected aesthetic loveliness of panic. What
such literature opens is reflection onto a world in which there are no right answers, just
the curves and swerves of eros and the perpetual vibrato, the shuddering tension of
panic. Here, at the denouement, Species Panic looks much the same as it did at the
beginning: a drift of Freudian hill-fog wafting over an entangled bank.
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